{"id":67587,"date":"2006-05-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-05-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/24\/jsf-au-tour-disrael\/"},"modified":"2006-05-24T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-05-24T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-au-tour-disrael","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/24\/jsf-au-tour-disrael\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF: au tour d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Apr\u00e8s la visite du nouveau premier ministre isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 Washington, c&rsquo;est au tour d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl d&rsquo;\u00eatre m\u00e9content des conditions de son implication dans le programme JSF (F-35). Les raisons sont assez similaires sur le fond \u00e0 celles qu&rsquo;avancent les Britanniques : l&rsquo;impossibilit\u00e9 pour les Isra\u00e9liens d&rsquo;intervenir sur les F-35 qu&rsquo;ils ach\u00e8teraient \u00e9ventuellement pour leur donner un standard sup\u00e9rieur \u00e0 celui de la version vendue par les Am\u00e9ricains. Cela revient au fondement de la querelle de la souverainet\u00e9 nationale (ou souverainet\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle, selon les Britanniques) au travers de la question du contr\u00f4le de l&rsquo;avion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette querelle (celle des Isra\u00e9liens, recoupant celle des Britanniques) est potentiellement la querelle la plus grave qui existe autour du programme. Pour les Isra\u00e9liens, c&rsquo;est une querelle strat\u00e9gique fondamentale, appuy\u00e9e sur la pr\u00e9misse difficilement acceptable par le Pentagone que les \u00e9quipements isra\u00e9liens assurent un rendement op\u00e9rationnel sup\u00e9rieur aux \u00e9quipements US. A la querelle formelle du contr\u00f4le du mat\u00e9riel s&rsquo;ajoutent de lourdes interf\u00e9rences de vanit\u00e9 nationale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;\u00e9dition du 24 mai de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.israelnn.com\/news.php3?id=104160\" class=\"gen\">Israel National News<\/a> nous informe sur la question, avec pour la premi\u00e8re fois la mention de la possibilit\u00e9 pour Isra\u00ebl de se retirer du programme (\u00ab <em> As a result, Israel is considering withdrawing from the project altogether<\/em> \u00bb). (La position d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl dans le programme JSF est actuellement assez marginale mais la pr\u00e9sence d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl est d&rsquo;un poids tr\u00e8s important pour le prestige du programme, \u00e0 cause des liens strat\u00e9giques USA-Isra\u00ebl et du prestige op\u00e9rationnel de la force a\u00e9rienne isra\u00e9lienne.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>&#8230;the U.S. is refusing to allow Israel to develop its own guidance, firing, and missile systems for the new aircraft. That policy will come as a heavy blow to Israel Aircraft Industries, which has traditionally has put its ultra-advanced high-tech equipment in fighter jets purchased from the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Many military strategists claim that Israel&rsquo;s technological superiority over its enemies is derived mainly from the advantage it attains by grafting its own top secret equipment onto the American planes. This is especially true in cases where the U.S. sells some of its most sensitive and sophisticated equipment to erstwhile allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are potential military adversaries of the Jewish State.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Israeli aeronautic military technology has gained worldwide renown for making U.S. fighter jets much more effective in combat. Souped up Israeli versions of American jets have a clear military advantage over their generic counterparts. U.S. refusal to allow Israel to use its unique technologies on the F-35 may put Israel&rsquo;s strategic military advantage at risk.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>An Israeli Air Force delegation that recently visited the U.S. and toured the Lockheed Martin plant, where the plane is being developed, failed to convince American officials of the importance of fitting Israeli weapons systems onto the F-35. As a result, Israel is considering withdrawing from the project altogether. Other countries involved in developing the plane, Britain, Turkey, and Norway, are also reconsidering their involvement due to production delays and widespread cost overruns that are running into tens of billions of dollars.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tPubli\u00e9 le 24 mai 2006 \u00e0 14H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Apr\u00e8s la visite du nouveau premier ministre isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 Washington, c&rsquo;est au tour d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl d&rsquo;\u00eatre m\u00e9content des conditions de son implication dans le programme JSF (F-35). Les raisons sont assez similaires sur le fond \u00e0 celles qu&rsquo;avancent les Britanniques : l&rsquo;impossibilit\u00e9 pour les Isra\u00e9liens d&rsquo;intervenir sur les F-35 qu&rsquo;ils ach\u00e8teraient \u00e9ventuellement pour leur donner un&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2774,250,2937,4849,2746],"class_list":["post-67587","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-israel","tag-jsf","tag-nationale","tag-retrait","tag-souverainete"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67587","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67587"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67587\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67587"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67587"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67587"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}