{"id":67599,"date":"2006-05-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-05-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/28\/des-icbm-a-tetes-conventionnelles-an-expensive-pleasure-ou-la-guerre-asymetrique-sens-dessus-dessous\/"},"modified":"2006-05-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-05-28T00:00:00","slug":"des-icbm-a-tetes-conventionnelles-an-expensive-pleasure-ou-la-guerre-asymetrique-sens-dessus-dessous","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/28\/des-icbm-a-tetes-conventionnelles-an-expensive-pleasure-ou-la-guerre-asymetrique-sens-dessus-dessous\/","title":{"rendered":"Des ICBM \u00e0 t\u00eates conventionnelles, \u2014 \u201can expensive pleasure\u201d ou la guerre asym\u00e9trique sens dessus dessous<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Des ICBM \u00e0 t\u00eates conventionnelles, an expensive pleasure ou la guerre asym\u00e9trique sens dessus dessous<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe 19 mai<\/a> encore, nous rapportions les inqui\u00e9tudes successives, \u00e0 quelques jours d’intervalle, de Poutine et du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Bouyevski, chef d’\u00e9tat-major g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des forces arm\u00e9es russes, concernant certains projets du Pentagone de transformer des ICBM de frappe strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire en arme absolue (c’est le surnom qu’on donnait aux ICBM dans les ann\u00e9es 1960-70) contre le terrorisme. Si le bon sens avait cours encore, on pourrait avancer que l’id\u00e9e est extraordinaire par sa loufoquerie. Le bon sens est quelque chose qui \u00e9chappe compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 la bureaucratie militaire. Quant \u00e0 l’id\u00e9e dont nous parlons, il s’agit de remplacer les t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires par des t\u00eates conventionnelles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’id\u00e9e a des nuances qui entretiennent le d\u00e9bat. Comme on le voit par ailleurs dans notre rubrique F&C<\/em> du 27 mai<\/a>, deux anciens secr\u00e9taires \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense soutiennent le programme, mais en substituant des missiles SLBM, strat\u00e9giques tir\u00e9s de sous-marins, Trident D5 \u00e0 l’ICBM. Variations de techniciens. La d\u00e9marche et le raisonnement sont similaires, et les commentaires valent pour les deux occurrences.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’ICBM (il s’agit ici du Minuteman<\/em> III) est un monstre de 78.000 livres au lancement (autour de 40 tonnes) dont l’essentiel du poids est consacr\u00e9 au carburant. La caract\u00e9ristique du missile est son extr\u00eame rapidit\u00e9 (autour de 35.000 km\/h dans sa trajectoire extra-atmosph\u00e9rique) pour transporter et larguer des t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires autonomes (MIRV, ou Multi-Independantly Reentry Vehicles), d’un poids \u00e9quivalent aux charges conventionnelles normales pour une puissance destructrice \u00e9norme. Si l’on installe une charge conventionnelle, bien s\u00fbr, on retombe sur des puissances destructrices tr\u00e8s limit\u00e9es puisque celles-ci sont alors directement d\u00e9pendantes du poids de la charge. (C’est d’ailleurs l’effet recherch\u00e9 puisque l’\u00e9norme missile devient, dans les missions qui lui sont assign\u00e9es si on le charge de t\u00eates conventionnelles, une arme de tr\u00e8s haute pr\u00e9cision \u00e0 tr\u00e8s longue distance, dont la capacit\u00e9 de destruction d\u00e9pend beaucoup plus de la pr\u00e9cision que de la masse, dont l’objectif serait g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement r\u00e9duit m\u00eame s’il est d’une tr\u00e8s grande importance.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est ce que Bouyevski d\u00e9signe, non sans ironie, comme un expansive pleasure<\/em> pour les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux du Pentagone qui ont imagin\u00e9 cette affaire. Le Minuteman<\/em> III devait co\u00fbter, dans les ann\u00e9es 1970, autour de $100 millions l’exemplaire. L’avantage de cette combinaison, selon les experts du Pentagone, c’est la rapidit\u00e9 de la r\u00e9ponse (le Minuteman<\/em> III met une petite demi-heure pour frapper au terme de son autonomie, \u00e0 plus de 10.000 kilom\u00e8tres de distance). L’inconv\u00e9nient de cette formule, on l’a vu dans le Bloc-Notes d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> signal\u00e9 ou dans notre F&C<\/a>, c’est qu’un pays arm\u00e9 de missiles strat\u00e9giques \u00e0 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires peut prendre un tir de cette sorte pour une attaque nucl\u00e9aire strat\u00e9gique et riposter \u00e0 mesure contre les Etats-Unis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous avons retrouv\u00e9 deux textes qui pr\u00e9sentent, parmi quelques autres projets, ce projet de transformation d’ICBM en arme anti-terroriste. C’est, pouss\u00e9e \u00e0 l’extr\u00eame, la tentative de rendre adaptables \u00e0 la guerre contre le terrorisme toutes les armes inadaptables \u00e0 cet usage issues de la technologie et de la strat\u00e9gie de la guerre au plus haut niveau.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe paradoxe de ces textes est qu’ils pr\u00e9sentent ces diverses id\u00e9es comme le triomphe de la guerre asym\u00e9trique. Il y a une remarquable et singuli\u00e8re d\u00e9formation de l’intelligence. La guerre asym\u00e9trique est un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne bien sp\u00e9cifique, li\u00e9 \u00e0 une situation g\u00e9opolitique : face \u00e0 des arm\u00e9es sur\u00e9quip\u00e9es de hautes technologies qui forment l’establishment<\/em> de la guerre si l’on veut, des adversaires en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral tr\u00e8s faibles selon ces crit\u00e8res adaptent des moyens frustres et diff\u00e9rents de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 infliger \u00e0 l’adversaire hyper-sophistiqu\u00e9 des pertes notables \u00e0 peu de frais et avec peu d’efforts. Un ensemble d’actions concomitantes (propagande, influence, etc.) permettent l’exploitation de ces actions parcellaires. Le but est moins de gagner une guerre qui n’existe pas que de daigner \u00e0 l’adversaire hyper-sophistiqu\u00e9 une victoire qui lui est politiquement n\u00e9cessaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes comptables du Pentagone ont compris la chose diff\u00e9remment. Ils ont pris l’expression au pied de la lettre, dans le sens le plus absolu : \u00e0 l’asym\u00e9trie impos\u00e9e par les terroristes, on r\u00e9pondrait par l’asym\u00e9trie impos\u00e9e par les \u00e9quipements de tr\u00e8s haute technologie. C’est un autre aspect du m\u00eame comportement d\u00e9crit \u00e0 propos de l’Irak dans notre rubrique Analyse<\/em> du 1er mai<\/a>. La d\u00e9marche est semblable : comment imposer, \u00e0 toutes forces, avec la force d’un missile de 78.000 livres filant \u00e0 35.000 km\/h pour tirer deux ou trois charges d’une tonne d’explosifs sur un groupe terroriste, un monde diff\u00e9rent, le monde virtualiste de la tr\u00e8s haute et tr\u00e8s ch\u00e8re technologie \u00e0 ces terroristes qui ne veulent pas jouer le jeu. D’une certaine fa\u00e7on, c’est croire \u00e0 l’id\u00e9e que le poids et la puissance imposeront asym\u00e9triquement ce qu’ils ne peuvent plus imposer sym\u00e9triquement (par absence d’adversaire sym\u00e9trique) ; c’est nier le principe m\u00eame de l’asym\u00e9trie et s’en tirer en collant tout de m\u00eame l’\u00e9tiquette asym\u00e9trie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes deux articles sont tir\u00e9s d’un num\u00e9ro de Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/a> datant du 7 juillet 2003. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le premier est un article de Erik Simonsen, qui examine, avec l’il froid et tout le s\u00e9rieux du technicien, les perspectives d’utilisation des ICBM comme lanceurs de charges explosives anti-terroristes dans le d\u00e9sert d’Irak ou \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re afghane du Pakistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le second est du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF Gen. Lance W. Lord, alors commandant de l’Air Force Space Command depuis avril 2002. Lord nous trace un tableau plus large de la guerre asym\u00e9trique faite dans l’espace, dans laquelle on place ces missiles dans l’utilisation d\u00e9crite par ailleurs (\u00ab We also are examining concepts for the next generation of missile systems to replace the Minuteman while, at the same time, evaluating a non-nuclear prompt global strike capability.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Rapid Response<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Erik Simonsen, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 juillet 2004<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGulf War II has made it abundantly clear that U.S. and coalition forces are highly dependent on military and commercial space assets. Without GPS navigation, high-resolution imagery, signals intelligence and near-real-time missile warning via communication satellites, allied troops would lose battlefield advantages they now take for granted. And absent those space-provided edges, airmen, soldiers, sailors and Marines would be reduced to fighting a 1960s-era war again, a war of attrition instead of precision. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA USAF study will assess the pros and cons of equipping a few Minuteman III ICBMs with conventional weapons. The missiles could hit targets halfway around the world in less than an hour. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhether battling a traditional army or radical terrorists, the U.S. can no longer afford the loss of its space-based capabilities or the luxury of waiting months to put a replacement satellite in orbit after a legacy system fails. Long recognizing how critical these assets are, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has made \u00a0\u00bbquick-response space\u00a0\u00bb one of its highest priorities. Ultimately, it hopes to have the means to launch satellites within hours or days of notification, quickly repair a critical system in space and strike an enemy on the other side of the globe in less than an hour, using conventional weapons. The command has embarked on several paths to reach that goal. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn Mar. 1, AFSPC kicked off a year-long Operationally Responsive Spacelift Analysis of Alternatives focused on putting payloads into space on short notice. Col. Pamela L. Stewart is directing the ORS\/AOA study, which will be conducted by USAF personnel, in-house contractors and the Aerospace Corp. NASA will be involved, primarily at the technology-assessment level. The broad review will address ORS application to key milspace mission areas force enhancement, space support, force application and counterspace. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe key element is responsiveness. The goal [of ORS] is hours-to-days versus weeks-to-months in order to have an asset on-orbit,\u00a0\u00bb Stewart said. \u00a0\u00bbThat requires responsive payloads, because just launching something, then taking three months to initialize it, does not make for responsive space.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tConceivably, a Minuteman III could carry three reentry vehicles fitted with conventional high-explosive warheads. The missiles might hit terrorists before they could use weapons of mass destruction. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe approximately $8-million ORS analysis is grounded in a Mission Needs Statement validated a year ago by the Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and a military spaceplane concept-of-operations approved by AFSPC. By shooting for a 2014 initial operational capability, the AOA is bounded by real-world, relatively near-term constraints. These are evident in payload examples that will be used by the AOA team: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCommon Aero Vehicle, a munition that can be delivered from or through space. A navigation payload that could augment or replenish the GPS constellation. A representative electro-optical payload, such as a low-cost visible-light imager. A counterspace device something in orbit that could protect friendly force satellites, or disable an adversary’s. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA payload that would augment a space-based radar equipped with a ground moving target indicator, perhaps in a latitude not covered by the primary system.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t[These] examples will affect the campaign model, so we can see the potential military utility of quickly getting these responsive payloads in orbit and available for the joint force commander to use, Stewart said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S. political and military leaders are reevaluating a full spectrum of space-based capabilities and strategic weapons, looking for new ways to counter both rogue nation states and the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For one, they are looking at the potential of existing weapon systems being used to quickly strike a target halfway around the world especially one that could threaten thousands of American or allied lives if not attacked within hours. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA Nuclear Posture Review released by the Bush administration last year redefined the concept of \u00a0\u00bbdeterrence,\u00a0\u00bb and put new demands on the Pentagon for dealing with WMD and terrorism threats. It also expanded the role of existing nuclear forces. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs a result of this new environment, the military space community is looking at near-term options to fulfill two objectives: putting systems in orbit quickly, and rapidly striking WMD or other time-sensitive threats anywhere on the globe. Long-term systems, such as rapid-response reusable launch vehicles and space-based laser weapons, for example, are still far from becoming operational realities. Milspace leaders need something now, if they are to answer a battlefield commander’s demand for revitalized space support, or a President’s call to head off a terrorist-caused catastrophe. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe need to reconstitute a satellite constellation or get a specialized imager or other sensor into orbit on short notice has led Pentagon space officials to look favorably on a variety of quick-response launchers. Some may become part of a rapid-response military fleet dedicated to placing off-the-shelf spacecraft into orbit within hours or days of notification.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Air Force Research Laboratory is taking a hybrid approach, resurrecting a decades-old concept of a supersonic fighter carrying a booster to high altitude, then firing it into space. But, unlike a 1985 test, where now-Maj. Gen. Doug Pearson the current Air Force Flight Test Center commander demonstrated an F-15-launched antisatellite system, the latest version will attempt to place a microsatellite in orbit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAir Force Space Command is looking at reusable launch vehicles, but these could be years away from being operationally useful as either launch systems or quick-response weapon-delivery platforms. On the other hand, the command has near-term options that might be effective in countering terrorists or a nation threatening to use WMDs against the U.S. or an ally. One option requires careful assessment and possible revisions to national policies: putting conventional munitions on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe concept will be one of many given serious consideration during another Analysis of Alternatives study now scheduled to begin in November ( AW&ST Jan. 13, p. 398). Among other topics, it will look at options for replacing the Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM with a follow-on nuclear missile, sometimes referred to as a Minuteman IV. The existing MM III fleet is scheduled to remain in service until 2020, and is now undergoing an extensive life-extension program. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe table is set for us to do new and innovative things with this current [Minuteman III] weapon system,\u00a0\u00bb said Maj. Gen. Timothy J. McMahon, commander of 20th Air Force, the AFSPC unit responsible for maintaining and operating the nation’s ICBM force. \u00a0\u00bbMy recommendation to [AFSPC commander] Gen. [Lance W.] Lord and his staff is to look at concepts . . . that could give us a broader capability, to include the employment of conventional munitions or the deployment of a strictly kinetic system with no munition on board at all [so-called] ‘rods from God.\u00a0\u00bb’ For example, a nonexplosive device, such as a titanium rod-based munition delivered at hypersonic speeds from space, would have enough kinetic energy to destroy a ground target. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe nation probably would not need many of these specialized conventional weapons, but even a small fleet could give leaders valuable options during international crises. Say, if U.S. or allied intelligence agencies ascertained that a terrorist group in central Asia had a WMD, and was planning to move it within the next few hours, launching an ICBM with a conventional warhead might be a viable way to destroy the threatening weapon and group. Conversely, if a U.S.-led coalition was bogged down in a fierce war halfway around the world, the President might want a quick-response weapon that could discourage the use of WMDs. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbIf the U.S. is involved in a struggle where WMDs are being deployed, and we’re taking 5,000-10,000 casualties per day or far more if WMDs are being used the question will be: How long do you want this to go on?\u00a0\u00bb McMahon asked. \u00a0\u00bbThis [ICBM] system has an inherent capability to go far, and go urgently. What [warhead] we put on top of it is a matter of policy and technology. And the technology is a piece of cake.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMissiles with upgraded navigation\/targeting systems and fitted with Mk. 21 reentry vehicles (RVs) housing high-explosive conventional warheads could be stored and launched from test pads or silos at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., for example. Today’s operational MM III silos in the north-central U.S. are not designed for reuse, and probably would be reserved for nuclear-armed ICBMs. Theoretically, some type of terminal guidance system could be installed, turning a strategic-type missile into a near-precision conventional weapon. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbOne thing that makes an ICBM unique is its ability to get to its [maximum] range in less than an hour about 45 min., depending on how you shape the flight [profile],\u00a0\u00bb McMahon said. \u00a0\u00bbThat’s the real appeal of this system. If you can afford to wait 12-24 hr., or whatever it takes to deploy a system with the same types of effects, then [an MM III] may not have utility. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbBut it’s important to understand the deterrent value of [a conventional ICBM], as well as its warfighting value. We tend to think in terms of battlefield effects. This current [nuclear] system’s primary purpose is not battlefield effect. It’s [intended] to have political effect,\u00a0\u00bb the general continued. \u00a0\u00bbI think a [conventional ICBM] broadens our deterrence capabilities. In simplified terms, it puts us at the conventional end of the deterrence spectrum, and [enables] being even more effective than we are today. And if we can do that at reasonable cost, then why wouldn’t we do it?\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUsing conventional ICBMs may be an attractive military option, but it also presents policy-makers with difficult political problems. What are the diplomatic issues associated with an ICBM overflying other nations to hit a WMD or terrorist target? How would Russia, for example, distinguish between a nuclear- and conventional-armed ICBM flying over its territory? Ballistic flight profiles would be the same, no matter what warhead was carried, and seeing an ICBM coming over the horizon from the U.S. would cause considerable anxiety. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbOverflight is an issue just as manned vehicles are but the political dimension is different,\u00a0\u00bb McMahon said. \u00a0\u00bbIt’s no harder than getting permission to overfly with [air refueling] tankers when you base them in another country, in my opinion. But I’m not a policy-maker.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEmploying ICBMs at the operational and tactical levels of warfare will force a rethinking of USAF and Pentagon doctrine, but such a shift from Cold War concepts has been underway since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. How doctrine will change remains uncertain, but most officials agree it will change. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbOur doctrine has basically always reserved the employment of these systems for the strategic level of violence,\u00a0\u00bb McMahon explained. \u00a0\u00bbToday, there are other countries that either [threaten] or have deployed weapons of mass destruction at the operational level of war or to cause terror.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough the idea of converting some nuclear-armed Minuteman IIIs to a conventional role may seem far-fetched, McMahon noted that similarly altering the B-52’s role caused the same angst. \u00a0\u00bbIt was just a different place, different time and different vehicle.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe AOA study that begins this autumn will examine technical, policy and doctrinal issues associated with conventional ICBMs. On the technical front, the AFSPC staff has been urged to look at work done years ago under USAF’s Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems Program. It considered maneuvering RVs, ablative shields and other elements, and many were tested. Archived data from the program could shorten any near-term effort to give the Minuteman III a new conventional role, McMahon suggested, adding the decades-old warhorse to what many hope is an emerging arsenal of quick-response milspace capabilities.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

U.S. Pushing To Maintain Asymmetric Advantage In Military Space<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAF, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 juillet 2004<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn Sept. 24, 1861, Thaddeus Lowe rose to more than 1,000 ft. in a balloon near Arlington, Va. The intelligence he gathered on Confederate troops 3 mi. away was used to aim and fire Union guns accurately without actually being able to see the troops directly a first in the history of warfare. Just 42 years later, the Wright brothers’ first heavier-than-air powered flight paved the way to a more complete exploitation of the new medium. The advantage gained from this new \u00a0\u00bbhigh ground\u00a0\u00bb changed the nature of war. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSimilarly, the evolution of space power has had a transformational impact on military operations. During the Persian Gulf war of 1991, called by some the \u00a0\u00bbfirst space war,\u00a0\u00bb our space capabilities provided a significant advantage but they were not completely integrated. Today, our space capabilities are joint-service and fully integrated with air, land and sea operations. They have been one of the keys to our success in recent operations. Because no other nation has similar capabilities, our ability to exploit the \u00a0\u00bbultimate high ground\u00a0\u00bb is a truly asymmetric advantage. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLowe and the Wright brothers took existing ideas and applied them in new ways. People are the key to any transformation, and from the missile fields in the Great Plains to remote locations around the globe, people are Air Force Space Command’s most important asset. As military dependence on space grows, USAF will meet the challenge of developing the right people space professionals to acquire, operate and sustain military space capabilities. A strong, proactive space professional development program is essential to safeguarding the U.S.’ leadership position in space. Our team is the best in the world, and we will continue to improve on that standard of excellence. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tToday, our space and missile systems are integral to every joint-service operation, combat or humanitarian, and essential for success in the fast-paced environment of the 21st century. GPS’ precise, all-weather navigation and timing capabilities are an integral part of today’s warfare. In fact, operations in Afghanistan saw satellite-guided munitions employed in transformational ways when B-52s flying at 40,000 ft. dropped Joint Direct Attack Munitions in a close air support role for Special Operations Forces. We also continue to provide coalition forces with theater missile early warning, using Defense Support Program satellites. Employing ground-based radars and optical systems, our operators provide around-the-clock space situation awareness as well as warning of an enemy missile attack. The importance of satellite communications has increased as we deploy our expeditionary forces. Secure, jam-resistant Milstar and Defense Satellite Communications System satellites, augmented with commercial capability, provide the bandwidth necessary for worldwide operations. Finally, our intercontinental ballistic missile forces have deterred conflict for more than 40 years with professional people and safe, secure missiles holding critical targets at risk and being ready to employ weapons upon direction by our national leadership. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs technology advances, the asymmetric advantage that space capabilities provide will become even more critical to our success. In Air Force Space Command, we are working to find those new ways of exploiting the ultimate high ground, to conduct operations more effectively. Improvements in satellite communications will increase bandwidth and user access. New systems will contribute to missile defense, battlespace characterization and technical intelligence missions. They also will provide the warfighter with on-demand, worldwide, all-weather surveillance, tracking and assessment capability for moving targets. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGetting these new capabilities into orbit will require us to focus on operationally responsive space-lift. We will continue moving forward with expendable launch vehicles as a first spiral toward future concepts such as reusable launch vehicles, systems that ultimately may achieve aircraft-like operations. We also are examining concepts for the next generation of missile systems to replace the Minuteman while, at the same time, evaluating a non-nuclear prompt global strike capability. Finally, the U.S. advantage in space has not gone unnoticed. Therefore, we must also protect our systems and their capabilities. We are charting a course to ensure our ability to gain and maintain space superiority. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSpace superiority is the foundation that will allow us to continue on our path to provide the horizontally integrated capabilities the asymmetric advantage that soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines need as we fight and win America’s wars. Clearly, we must continue to invest the resources, energy and intellectual capital necessary to meet these goals, and we have the men and women who can do just that fully exploit the ultimate high ground of space. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUSAF Gen. Lance W. Lord began his military career in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces. He became commander of the Air Force Space Command in April 2002.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Des ICBM \u00e0 t\u00eates conventionnelles, an expensive pleasure ou la guerre asym\u00e9trique sens dessus dessous Le 19 mai encore, nous rapportions les inqui\u00e9tudes successives, \u00e0 quelques jours d’intervalle, de Poutine et du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Bouyevski, chef d’\u00e9tat-major g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des forces arm\u00e9es russes, concernant certains projets du Pentagone de transformer des ICBM de frappe strat\u00e9gique nucl\u00e9aire en… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[5435,5406,5431,916,5434,4775],"class_list":["post-67599","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notre-bibliotheque","tag-conventionnelles","tag-icbm","tag-minuteman","tag-poutine","tag-tetes","tag-trident"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67599","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67599"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67599\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67599"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67599"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67599"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}