Andrew Bacevich est un auteur et un professeur d’universit\u00e9 (Boston University Department of International Relations) ; c’est aussi un ancien militaire (du Viet-n\u00e2m jusqu’en 1992), un ancien faucon de la Guerre froide devenu critique fondamental du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste. Bacevich rassemble sur sa personne des particularit\u00e9s remarquables qui en font un critique \u00e0 la fois inform\u00e9 et profond de l’artefact am\u00e9ricaniste, un critique comme seul le syst\u00e8me US est paradoxalement capable de fournir, on dirait presque par antidote naturel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLa longue interview de Bacevich dans TomDispatch.com<\/em> (le site de l’excellent Tom Engelhardt), publi\u00e9e en deux parties, le 24 mai<\/a> et le 25 mai<\/a>, est une belle occasion de r\u00e9flexions fondamentales sur le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAu contraire des p\u00e2les critiques europ\u00e9ens, Bacevich va au plus fondamental. Il ne se berce d’aucune illusion sur ce que peut produire le syst\u00e8me en cas d’alternance (\u00ab If we just toss Bush out and bring in… Who? Senator Clinton or John McCain? Will things be different? Somehow, I don’t think so. Of course, there is something to be said for competence even in implementing a bad policy. Right now, we have incompetents implementing a bad policy, but the essence of the problem is the policy not just the Iraq War but this paradigm of a Global War on Terror, this notion of unconstraining American power. That’s what we have to rethink.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuant aux causes fondamentales, Bacevich propose justement une r\u00e9flexion qui lie fortement les faits les plus techniques, les plus concrets, ceux qui sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dissimul\u00e9s derri\u00e8re la rationalit\u00e9 technicienne et strat\u00e9gique, aux \u00e9lans et aux penchants de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste, celle qui r\u00e9pond le plus \u00e0 une irrationalit\u00e9 myst\u00e9rieuse. C’est le cas dans ce passage o\u00f9 il s’interroge sur l’importance de la technologie, de l’avion per\u00e7u comme \u00ab the technological artifact that defines the last century<\/em> \u00bb, et qui implique \u00e9galement un type de guerre de destruction massive, dans la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb TD:<\/em><\/strong> You’ve used the word crusade and spoken of this administration as intoxicated with the mission of salvation. I was wondering what kind of ism’ you think we’ve been living with in these years?<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Bacevich:<\/em><\/strong> That’s a great question, and it’s not enough to say that it’s democratic capitalism. Certainly, our ism’ incorporates a religious dimension in the sense of believing that God created this nation for a purpose that has to do with universal values.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb We have not as a people come to terms with our relationship to military power and to the wars we’ve engaged in and the ways we’ve engaged in them. Now, James Carroll in his new book, House of War, is very much preoccupied with strategic bombing in World War II and since, and especially with our use of, and attitude toward, nuclear weapons. His preoccupation is understandable because those are the things we can’t digest and we can’t cough up. You know, at the end of the day, we, the missionary nation, the crusader state, certain of our righteousness, remain the only people to have used nuclear weapons in anger indeed, to have used them as a weapon of terror.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb TD:<\/em><\/strong> Air power, even though hardly covered in our media in Iraq, has been the American way of war since World War II, hasn’t it?<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Bacevich:<\/em><\/strong> Certainly that ism’ that defines us has a large technological component, doesn’t it? I mean, we are the people of technology. We see the future as a technological one and can’t imagine a problem that doesn’t have technological solutions…<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb TD:<\/em><\/strong> …except when it comes to oil.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Bacevich:<\/em><\/strong> Quite true. In many respects, the technological artifact that defines the last century is the airplane. With the airplane came a distinctive style of warfare. The Italians dropped the first bomb in North Africa; the Japanese killed their share of civilians from the air as did the Germans, but we and our British cousins outdid them all. I’ve been thinking more and more that our record of strategic bombing is not simply an issue of historical interest.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 29 mai \u00e0 13H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Andrew Bacevich est un auteur et un professeur d’universit\u00e9 (Boston University Department of International Relations) ; c’est aussi un ancien militaire (du Viet-n\u00e2m jusqu’en 1992), un ancien faucon de la Guerre froide devenu critique fondamental du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste. Bacevich rassemble sur sa personne des particularit\u00e9s remarquables qui en font un critique \u00e0 la fois inform\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5441,5438,1381,5440,3519,5439,2671],"class_list":["post-67602","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-avion","tag-bacevich","tag-engelhardt","tag-psyche","tag-technologie","tag-tom","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67602","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67602"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67602\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67602"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67602"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67602"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}