{"id":67610,"date":"2006-06-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-06-01T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/01\/strategic-fatigue-parce-que-cest-epuisant-de-changer-le-monde\/"},"modified":"2006-06-01T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-06-01T00:00:00","slug":"strategic-fatigue-parce-que-cest-epuisant-de-changer-le-monde","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/01\/strategic-fatigue-parce-que-cest-epuisant-de-changer-le-monde\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cStrategic fatigue\u201d, parce que c’est \u00e9puisant de changer le monde"},"content":{"rendered":"

Strategic fatigue<\/em>, parce que c’est \u00e9puisant de changer le monde<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t1er juin 2006 Discr\u00e8tement, subrepticement, l’ambition qui a \u00e9clat\u00e9 aussit\u00f4t apr\u00e8s le 11 septembre 2001 apr\u00e8s avoir matur\u00e9 depuis la fin de la Guerre froide est en train, non pas de reculer, mais de rencontrer une menace terrible de dissolution, dans l’esprit et dans les psychologies, ce qui est le plus grave possible. On distinguait d\u00e9j\u00e0 la tendance qui conduit \u00e0 ce constat avec les commentaires d\u00e9sabus\u00e9s qui ont pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 et accompagn\u00e9 la rencontre Bush-Blair (extrait d’un article du New York Times<\/em> d\u00e9j\u00e0 cit\u00e9<\/a> : \u00ab The overwhelming sense from the news conference was of two battered leaders who, once confident in their judgments on Iraq, now understood that misjudgments had not only affected their approval ratings, but perhaps their legacies. On a recent cover, The Economist pictured the two under the headline Axis of Feeble.’<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’autres \u00e9l\u00e9ments publi\u00e9s permettent de renforcer cette impression. Sur la question iranienne, la fi\u00e8vre est en train de tomber, et les projets d’attaque unilat\u00e9rale semblent de plus en plus incongrus et d\u00e9plac\u00e9s. Le Financial Times<\/em> (FT) rapporte ceci<\/a> le 29 mai : \u00ab Advisers to the White House say it would be premature, however, to write off the doctrine of pre-emption, which was restated in the National Security Strategy released in March. But on Iran, for example, they believe the Bush administration is moving towards a cold war-style strategy of containment and deterrence with as broad an international coalition as possible.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Graham Fuller, former diplomat and intelligence officer, suggests the US is suffering from strategic fatigue brought on by imperial over-reach. The administration’s bark is minimised, and much of the bite seems gone, he writes in the Nixon Center’s National Interest journal. Has superpower fatigue set in? Clearly so, to judge by the administration’s own dwindling energy and its sober acknowledgment that changing the face of the world is a lot tougher than it had hoped.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Short-term economic costs of the empire have been bearable, says Mr Fuller, but long-term indicators show it is not sustainable massive domestic debt, growing trade imbalances, an extraordinary gap in wealth between rich and poor Americans, the growing outsourcing of jobs. More immediately, the unprecedented unilateral character of the US exercise of global power has proved its undoing.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn sentiment de d\u00e9senchantement. Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs, ces gardiens intransigeants de la foi, se manifestent bien entendu avec le sarcasme sous la plume, pr\u00eats \u00e0 br\u00fbler ce qu’ils ont ador\u00e9 (sauf le Pr\u00e9sident lui-m\u00eame, qui peut toujours servir) : \u00ab Neo-conservative commentators at the American Enterprise Institute wrote last week what amounted to an obituary of the Bush freedom doctrine. Bush killed his own doctrine, they said, describing the final blow as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Libya. This betrayal of Libyan democracy activists, they said, came after the US watched Egypt abrogate elections, ignored the collapse of the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, abandoned imprisoned Chinese dissidents and started considering a peace treaty with Stalinist North Korea.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The neo-conservatives offered no explanation for desertion of the doctrine, other than a desire to make quick but transitory short-term gains. The president continues to believe his own preaching, but his administration has become incapable of making the hard choices those beliefs require, they wrote.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour William Pfaff, nous approchons du T\u00eat de l’Irak<\/a>. Pfaff se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e0 cette p\u00e9riode de janvier-f\u00e9vrier 1968 au Viet-n\u00e2m o\u00f9 l’offensive communiste du T\u00eat, quoique d\u00e9faite militairement, fit basculer la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste dans la certitude horrible de la d\u00e9faite. Mais le T\u00eat de l’Irak est d’une autre trempe. Il marque la d\u00e9faite d’une grandiose imposture, ou d’une imposture voulue grandiose, et qui court vers un destin r\u00e9ducteur, jusqu’\u00e0 un terme qui serait plut\u00f4t une dissolution, une implosion sans r\u00e9el fracas, sous le coup de cette strategic fatigue<\/em> entra\u00eenant le reste<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The real source of this American crisis, though, is the illusion with which Bush and his people began (and heard repeated by the former Soviet dissident and subsequent Israeli government official Natan Sharansky), that everybody everywhere is a natural democrat who wants to be liberated by the U.S.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb As late as January of this year Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was alluding to the administration’s ambition to replace the modern international system of separate national sovereignties with a great coalition of democracies under American leadership that can take over from the UN and make all international society democratic.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That was the fantasy the administration opposed to the reality that international relations are a matter of staying afloat in a stormy sea, protecting the values civilization has managed to create against destruction by the madmen, tyrants, and idealistic but clueless theorists who come to power in governments.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Disillusioned with George Bush’s Wilsonian idealism, the administration’s hard men, led by Dick Cheney, now are counting on sheer power to get the administration through, not to victory, but to 2008 when the shambles of their policy can be dumped on the doorstep of a new president.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb They still believe in power. The administration position was put best by the White House figure who told a realist critic of the administration a year and a half ago that America manufactures reality and the rest of the world will have to deal with the consequences.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It is turning out otherwise. Power isn’t working. The proof is what we are seeing right now. The United States can’t get what it wants in Iraq, Afghanistan (and Somalia, where the U.S. is again intervening, sponsoring tribal groups willing to attack Islamic fundamentalists). Now the administration talks as if it wants to take on Iran. Israel, at least, would like the U.S. to take on Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The greatest power on earth cannot do whatever it wants. Weakness may be more powerful than power, when as it’s doing in Iraq and Afghanistan it throws up enough passive obstacles, enough chunks of reality, to thwart American power.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n

Grosse fatigue ou nervous breakdown<\/em>…?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa tendance ainsi d\u00e9crite d\u00e9passe de beaucoup un revers, une d\u00e9faite, une issue donn\u00e9e d’une bataille. Elle concerne la question de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, et, comme exercice ultime de cette question de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, la question de la guerre contre la terreur. L’article du FT signale aussi ceci, qui montre aussi que la fatigue touche les psychologies contraintes par le montage virtualiste depuis le 11 septembre 2001 :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Even some traditional Republicans are challenging the concept that the global war on terror is the paramount issue for generations to come. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate’s powerful foreign relations committee, suggested that there are a good many who would feel that the possibilities for devastation of countries, including our own, may come much more from our myopia in terms of energy policy than our ability to track down the last of the al-Qaeda cells.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAinsi d\u00e9bouche-t-on sur le v\u00e9ritable enjeu: la strategic fatigue<\/em> est une chose, et elle peut effectivement rappeler le temps du Viet-n\u00e2m. Mais lorsqu’il s’agit de m\u00e9sentente sur la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame? Pfaff signale le probl\u00e8me lorsqu’il \u00e9crit : \u00ab The administration position was put best by the White House figure who told a realist critic of the administration a year and a half ago that America manufactures reality and the rest of the world will have to deal with the consequences.<\/em> \u00bb Il fait allusion, dans ce cas, \u00e0 la faith-based reality<\/a> (notre virtualisme).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl ne suffit pas d’envisager de quitter l’Irak, voire de quitter l’Irak effectivement, ce qui serait d\u00e9j\u00e0 un \u00e9norme \u00e9v\u00e9nement strat\u00e9gique parce que les conditions font que cela serait per\u00e7u comme une d\u00e9faite strat\u00e9gique, celle-ci se substituant \u00e0 la strategic fatigue<\/em> et la justifiant post\u00e9rieurement. Au-del\u00e0, il y a cet \u00e9norme d\u00e9bat qu’effleure Lugar : la priorit\u00e9 est-elle \u00e0 la guerre contre la terreur? Cet \u00e9norme d\u00e9bat se transformerait presque aussit\u00f4t en un d\u00e9bat diff\u00e9rent, surr\u00e9aliste et extraordinaire parce qu’il ne porterait plus sur des choix strat\u00e9giques mais sur la substance m\u00eame de la strat\u00e9gie : la guerre contre la terreur existe-t-elle?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’Irak n’est pas le Viet-n\u00e2m, mais le Viet-n\u00e2m + la Guerre froide. Pour avoir l’\u00e9quivalent de ce que pourrait \u00eatre un T\u00eat de l’Irak, il faudrait imaginer une situation historique qui conduirait \u00e0 la m\u00eame d\u00e9faite au Viet-n\u00e2m en 1975 mais suivie d’une r\u00e9vision extraordinaire sur le th\u00e8me : la priorit\u00e9 n’est pas la lutte comp\u00e9titive avec l’URSS car la menace sovi\u00e9tique n’existe pas vraiment ; et bient\u00f4t cette situation suivie de cette chose bouleversante : la menace sovi\u00e9tique n’a jamais vraiment exist\u00e9, et la Guerre froide ne fut qu’un montage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCertains esprits espi\u00e8gles pourraient objecter : mais c’est exactement cela ! (La Guerre froide n’est pas loin d’\u00eatre un montage.) Ce qui n’est pas vraiment faux Mais force est de constater que la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la p\u00e9riode ne permit \u00e9videmment pas une telle entreprise de r\u00e9vision parce que le syst\u00e8me y aurait laiss\u00e9 sa coh\u00e9sion, voire son existence. Au contraire : c’est au moment de la d\u00e9faite au Viet-n\u00e2m, et d’ailleurs dans une parfaite logique de cold warrior<\/em> qui juge qu’au moment d’une d\u00e9faite partielle une re-mobilisation s’impose, que fut lanc\u00e9e<\/a>, en 1975-76, ce qu’on nomma la seconde Guerre froide, culminant en 1981-83 avec la crise des euromissiles<\/em> et commen\u00e7ant \u00e0 agoniser avec la d\u00e9signation de Gorbatchev comme secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du PCUS le 9 mars 1985. Les cold warriors<\/em> qui lanc\u00e8rent la seconde Guerre froide comptaient dans leurs rangs nombre de jeunes futurs-n\u00e9o-conservateurs. Comme \u00e7a se trouve.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais l’on sait que la guerre contre la terreur n’est pas la Guerre froide, et que Al Qa\u00efda n’est pas l’URSS de Brejnev. La partie qui s’annonce contre les munichois type-Lugar (relancer la guerre contre la terreur en d\u00e9pit de la catastrophe irakienne) sera bien compliqu\u00e9e. Des tentatives ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 faites<\/a>, sans succ\u00e8s. Il faudra s’y remettre, cette fois press\u00e9 par l’enjeu. La partie sera nerveusement \u00e9puisante. De la strategic fatigue<\/em> \u00e0 la nervous breakdown<\/em>?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Strategic fatigue, parce que c’est \u00e9puisant de changer le monde 1er juin 2006 Discr\u00e8tement, subrepticement, l’ambition qui a \u00e9clat\u00e9 aussit\u00f4t apr\u00e8s le 11 septembre 2001 apr\u00e8s avoir matur\u00e9 depuis la fin de la Guerre froide est en train, non pas de reculer, mais de rencontrer une menace terrible de dissolution, dans l’esprit et dans les… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2631,1221,5452,5454,1131,3142,5453],"class_list":["post-67610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-de","tag-faith-based","tag-fatigue","tag-lirak","tag-pfaff","tag-strategic","tag-tet"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67610","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67610"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67610\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67610"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67610"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67610"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}