{"id":67617,"date":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/04\/mash-et-terreur-irakienne-les-marines-a-haditha\/"},"modified":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","slug":"mash-et-terreur-irakienne-les-marines-a-haditha","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/04\/mash-et-terreur-irakienne-les-marines-a-haditha\/","title":{"rendered":"<em>MASH<\/em> et terreur irakienne: les Marines \u00e0 Haditha"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Ce texte du <em>Daily Telegraph<\/em> (peu suspect d&rsquo;anti-am\u00e9ricanisme) du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/main.jhtml?xml=\/news\/2006\/06\/01\/wbush101.xml\" class=\"gen\">1er juin<\/a> est particuli\u00e8rement effrayant. Il d\u00e9crit une visite du camp des Marines (3\u00e8me bataillon, 1\u00e8re division des Marines) de Haditha, par le reporteur Olivier Poole, en janvier dernier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe spectacle est effrayant par l&rsquo;indiscipline, l&rsquo;atmosph\u00e8re de terreur et la situation incontr\u00f4lable qui y r\u00e8gnent. (Cela indique \u00e9galement une d\u00e9mission de la hi\u00e9rarchie devant des conditions de guerre qu&rsquo;elle ne comprend pas.) C&rsquo;est \u00e0 la fois <em>MASH<\/em> (le film de Robert Altman) et la terreur irakienne. L&rsquo;impression est que les troupes r\u00e9guli\u00e8res US sombrent dans la situation incontr\u00f4lable de forces irr\u00e9guli\u00e8res qui caract\u00e9rise de plus en plus, statutairement (pour les forces sp\u00e9ciales) ou accidentellement, les troupes am\u00e9ricaines engag\u00e9es dans ces conflits post-9\/11.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAu contraire des vieilles arm\u00e9es europ\u00e9ennes, les troupes am\u00e9ricaines ont besoin d&rsquo;un encadrement s\u00e9rieux pour ne pas devenir incontr\u00f4lables. L&rsquo;absence d&rsquo;initiative, l&rsquo;id\u00e9ologie contraignante, une psychologie compl\u00e8tement ferm\u00e9e aux diff\u00e9rences non-am\u00e9ricanistes, la d\u00e9pendance d&rsquo;un soutien logistique massif expliquent cette incapacit\u00e9 \u00e0 une certaine adaptation aux conditions locales. Quand, tout de m\u00eame, ces forces \u00e9voluent vers ces conditions locales avec la disparition du cadre habituel de contr\u00f4le, le r\u00e9sultat est le d\u00e9sarroi et l&rsquo;indiscipline. Dans de telles conditions, les massacres sont compl\u00e8tement explicables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques extraits du texte, qui montrent par le quotidien des choses comment l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e am\u00e9ricaine est en cours de d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration psychologique, en plus des revers op\u00e9rationnels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>In January, shortly before the first published reports emerged about US marines methodically gunning down men, women and children in the Iraqi town of Haditha, The Daily Telegraph spent time at the main camp of the battalion under investigation.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Rumours had spread that what happened on Nov 19 diverged from the official line that locals were killed by a roadside bomb. None of the troops wanted to talk, but even a short stay with the men of the 3rd Bn 1st Marine Division in their camp located in Haditha Dam on the town&rsquo;s outskirts, made clear it was a place where institutional discipline had frayed and was even approaching breakdown.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Normally, American camps in Iraq are almost suburban, with their coffee shops and polite soldiers who idle away their rest hours playing computer games and discussing girls back home. Haditha was shockingly different  a feral place where the marines hardly washed; a number had abandoned the official living quarters to set up separate encampments with signs ordering outsiders to keep out; and a daily routine punctured by the emergency alarm of the dam itself with its antiquated and crumbling machinery.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The dam is one of Iraq&rsquo;s largest hydroelectric stations. A US special operations unit had secured it during the invasion and American troops had been there ever since. Now they were spread across the dozen or so levels where Iraqi engineers once lived. The lifts were smashed, the lighting provided only a half gloom. Inside, the grinding of the dam machinery made talking difficult. The place routinely stank of rotten eggs, a by-product apparently of the grease to keep the turbines running.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The day before my arrival one soldier had shot himself in the head with his M16. No one would discuss why&#8230;.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 4 juin 2006 \u00e0 13H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ce texte du Daily Telegraph (peu suspect d&rsquo;anti-am\u00e9ricanisme) du 1er juin est particuli\u00e8rement effrayant. Il d\u00e9crit une visite du camp des Marines (3\u00e8me bataillon, 1\u00e8re division des Marines) de Haditha, par le reporteur Olivier Poole, en janvier dernier. Le spectacle est effrayant par l&rsquo;indiscipline, l&rsquo;atmosph\u00e8re de terreur et la situation incontr\u00f4lable qui y r\u00e8gnent. (Cela&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5436,5465,857,3895,5437],"class_list":["post-67617","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-haditha","tag-indiscipline","tag-irak","tag-marines","tag-massacre"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67617","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67617"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67617\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67617"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67617"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67617"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}