{"id":67621,"date":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/04\/un-massacre-trop-loin\/"},"modified":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-06-04T00:00:00","slug":"un-massacre-trop-loin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/04\/un-massacre-trop-loin\/","title":{"rendered":"Un massacre trop loin ?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un massacre trop loin ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t4 juin 2006 On ne peut traiter le massacre de Haditha \u00e0 la l\u00e9g\u00e8re (\u00e0 la l\u00e9g\u00e8re : nullement par irrespect pour les victimes assassin\u00e9es mais pour son importance politique, parce qu’on estimerait que c’est un massacre de plus dans une horrible campagne irakienne qui en a vu tant d’autres). Haditha est tr\u00e8s particulier, tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifique. Ce massacre est en train d’envahir massivement la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste. Ce massacre l\u00e8ve un voile sur la com\u00e9die am\u00e9ricaniste qui s’appelle : d\u00e9mocratie, vertu, courage et honneur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe peuple am\u00e9ricain ne tient d’une fa\u00e7on stable que dans la mesure o\u00f9 la fable vertueuse que le syst\u00e8me lui d\u00e9bite depuis deux si\u00e8cles est encore audible<\/strong>. Tant de choses se sont \u00e9croul\u00e9es ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, avec un Pr\u00e9sident passant de 80% \u00e0 30% de soutien, un Congr\u00e8s dans lequel aujourd’hui 3% d’Am\u00e9ricains font confiance, un syst\u00e8me \u00e9conomique qui met un PDG \u00e0 la retraite avec une prime de $400 millions<\/a>, un syst\u00e8me incapable de commencer s\u00e9rieusement une op\u00e9ration de secours d’une ville d\u00e9vast\u00e9e par un ouragan avant deux semaines de temps et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl restait l’arm\u00e9e, l’honneur et le courage des boys<\/em>. M\u00eame Abou Ghraib n’avait pas vraiment entam\u00e9 cette croyance. Haditha est en train de s’y employer, pour 24 innocents civils massacr\u00e9s par des Marines. La machine m\u00e9diatique, les r\u00e9flexes auto-destructeurs du syst\u00e8me sont en marche. Les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents (My-La\u00ef et le Viet-n\u00e2m) ne sont pas encourageants. Ce qui compte d\u00e9sormais n’est pas l’horreur de la chose elle-m\u00eame, mais l’horreur qu’on en per\u00e7oit ; si la machine auto-destructrice marche bien, cette horreur va immens\u00e9ment grandir dans la perception qu’on en a, avec des effets psychologiques \u00e0 mesure. Cette perception heurte de plein fouet, dans une tension horrible, le trait de linculpabilit\u00e9<\/a> qui caract\u00e9rise la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste. C’est un cas classique et d\u00e9vastateur de collision antagoniste de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici ce qu’\u00e9crit, assez justement m\u00eame s’il ne va pas au fond des choses, Gerard Baker du Times<\/em>, ce 3 juin<\/a> (le Times<\/em> conservateur, britannique et pro-am\u00e9ricain est tr\u00e8s en pointe dans la d\u00e9nonciation du massacre, et l’on retrouve, implicitement, l\u00e0 aussi, cette rancur britannique pour les cousins am\u00e9ricains qui les ont tant m\u00e9pris\u00e9s, humili\u00e9s, ignor\u00e9s, malgr\u00e9 la servilit\u00e9 blairiste depuis quatre ans):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab This Memorial Day week has probably been the worst seven days for the US military since the Vietnam War ended more than 30 years ago. If proven true, the stories of the massacre at al-Haditha will have profound consequences, not just for the public’s increasingly hostile attitude to the Iraq war, but also for its belief in and support for the very idea of US engagement in lengthy struggles to create stability in far-off places.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It was, as much as anything, the sense of lost honour that led to America’s worst military reverse in its history the Vietnam War. In March 1968 Lieutenant William Calley led his men on a murderous rampage through the Vietnamese village of My Lai. When, after a lengthy cover-up, he was finally convicted by a court martial three years later, it marked a turning point in the public’s tolerance for the war. A month after his conviction, a poll recorded for the first time a majority of Americans calling for an immediate end to the war. It was with that searing memory in mind that American commanders dispatched their troops into Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 with the instruction: No My Lais you hear?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Bien entendu, l’effet et l’\u00e9cho de la chose sont tels que les langues se d\u00e9lient. Le Times<\/em>, toujours lui, signale que deux autres massacres<\/a> sont d\u00e9nonc\u00e9s. Le Premier ministre irakien, conscient que son cr\u00e9dit se joue et qu’il pourrait acqu\u00e9rir dans cette affaire une l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 inesp\u00e9r\u00e9e, se manifeste en accusateur n\u00b01<\/a> du comportement des soldats de son protecteur principal. (\u00ab They run them over and leave them, or they kill anyone suspicious. This cannot be accepted, Mr Maliki said in comments remarkable from a leader whose government’s fragile grip on the country would be impossible without the presence of 130,000 US troops on its soil. He demanded full access to US files on the cases so that Iraqis could pursue their own investigations.<\/em> \u00bb) C’en est au point o\u00f9, dans une mise au point surr\u00e9aliste, la Maison-Blanche affirme que Maliki a dit \u00e0 l’ambassadeur US \u00e0 Bagdad qu’il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 cit\u00e9 erron\u00e9ment\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab White House press secretary Tony Snow said that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had told U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad that he had been misquoted. But Snow was unable to explain what al-Maliki told Khalilzad or how he had been misquoted.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That is a little too complicated for me to try to read out, Snow said at a briefing where he was pressed to explain how al-Maliki’s remarks were supposed to have been distorted. It becomes a little convoluted and so I don’t want to make a real clear characterization because it’s a little hazy to me, Snow said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSi Haditha prend les proportions d’un My-La\u00ef pour sa perception, les cons\u00e9quences seront d\u00e9vastatrices. Si l’on tient compte de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, ces cons\u00e9quences seront bien plus graves qu’au temps du Viet-n\u00e2m.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelles cons\u00e9quences politiques ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Pour aller au plus \u00e9vident, c’est la crise ouverte entre Washington et le gouvernement irakien, qui a pris un tour aggrav\u00e9 la nuit derni\u00e8re avec des demandes d’excuses officielles<\/a> du gouvernement irakien \u00e0 Washington, assorties de demandes de compensations pour les personnes affect\u00e9es. Le Pentagone entend \u00e9carter le maximum d’accusations, m\u00eame lorsque les indications sont accablantes. Une fois de plus, les amis britanniques prennent leurs distances (Selon Scotsman on Sunday<\/em>: \u00ab The escalation in tensions comes as sources at the Foreign Office confirmed that the British Government is also urging the Americans to co-operate fully with comprehensive investigations into the deaths at both Ishaqi and Haditha.<\/em> \u00bb) On a ainsi l’impression, pour la premi\u00e8re fois, que ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne extraordinaire d’une crise entre le parrain du gouvernement irakien et ce gouvernement irakien d\u00e9pendant en principe directement des forces d’occupation peut devenir un facteur important de la situation en Irak. Rien de pareil n’a jamais exist\u00e9 au Viet-n\u00e2m.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Il ne faut pas oublier que c’est une Am\u00e9rique fatigu\u00e9e (Strategic Fatigue<\/a>), d\u00e9j\u00e0 bless\u00e9e par de multiples scandales et de nombreux revers, qui serait ainsi frapp\u00e9e. L’effet peut \u00e9videmment \u00eatre d’une tentation de repli, tel que l’envisage le m\u00eame Gerard Baker, non sans glisser \u00e0 nouveau une petite pique anti-am\u00e9ricaine, cette fois contre Condy Rice et les conseillers de GW qui semblent avoir perdu depuis le 11 septembre toute la soi-disant sagesse dont ils avaient fait montre avant d’arriver au pouvoir :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The slaughter seems to have had its origins in the desperate and frightening conditions of a counter-insurgency operation in Iraq for which most American servicemen have not been well prepared. Although there has been much outrage expressed in the US this week, there has also been much sympathy for the conditions in which American soldiers find themselves. There is a gathering sense that the outrages of al-Haditha and elsewhere are not isolated examples of bad behaviour but also the almost inevitable consequence of deploying the US military to a task for which it is ill equipped and poorly trained policing and pacifying an alien people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This scepticism about using the military as a tool to remake nations and civilise a hostile world was put best by an article in the periodical Foreign Affairs in 2000. The author attacked the misuse of the US military in nation-building projects in the Clinton years. The president must remember that the military is lethal, and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It was a succinct indictment about the dangers of using the military as anything other than a fighting force. Its author was Condoleezza Rice, then principal foreign policy adviser to the man who was soon to be President Bush. It is hard to escape the sense that Americans are increasingly coming to embrace its wisdom, even as its authors have disowned it.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais toute notre attention doit aller bien entendu \u00e0 l’aspect psychologique. Pour l’arm\u00e9e US, d’abord, dont de nombreux rapports nous d\u00e9crivent l’\u00e9tat psychologique<\/a> et la coh\u00e9sion<\/a> comme \u00e9tant caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s par le plus grand d\u00e9sarroi et une d\u00e9structuration acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour la population am\u00e9ricaine \u00e9galement. La puissance militaire, l’honneur et la probit\u00e9, le sens du devoir de l’arm\u00e9e sont les derni\u00e8res perceptions vertueuses de l’am\u00e9ricanisme que le bras virtualiste du syst\u00e8me a r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 maintenir. On comprend combien leur mise en cause si radicale serait si particuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9stabilisante. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un massacre trop loin ? 4 juin 2006 On ne peut traiter le massacre de Haditha \u00e0 la l\u00e9g\u00e8re (\u00e0 la l\u00e9g\u00e8re : nullement par irrespect pour les victimes assassin\u00e9es mais pour son importance politique, parce qu’on estimerait que c’est un massacre de plus dans une horrible campagne irakienne qui en a vu tant d’autres).… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[5436,3895,5437,5469],"class_list":["post-67621","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-haditha","tag-marines","tag-massacre","tag-my-lai"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67621","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67621"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67621\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67621"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67621"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67621"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}