{"id":67685,"date":"2006-06-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-06-25T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/25\/au-fait-peuvent-ils-descendre-taepodong-2\/"},"modified":"2006-06-25T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-06-25T00:00:00","slug":"au-fait-peuvent-ils-descendre-taepodong-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/06\/25\/au-fait-peuvent-ils-descendre-taepodong-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Au fait, peuvent-ils descendre Taepodong<\/em>-2?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Depuis qu’il est question d’un essai d’un missile nord-cor\u00e9en intercontinental Taepodong<\/em>-2, beaucoup de sp\u00e9culations autour de la question : peuvent-ils le faire ? (C’est-\u00e0-dire : les USA peuvent-ils abattre Taepodong<\/em>-2 ?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question n’est pas indiff\u00e9rente. Le concept de d\u00e9fense strat\u00e9gique anti-missiles (SDI, puis BDM entre divers noms bureaucratiques utilis\u00e9s) est apparu officiellement avec le discours du 23 mars 1983, compos\u00e9 directement \u00e0 partir de l’univers intellectuel enfi\u00e9vr\u00e9 du pr\u00e9sident Ronald Reagan. Il s’agissait alors de Star War<\/em>, ou SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). Plus de deux d\u00e9cennies et quelque chose comme $150-$250 milliards plus tard, se pose toujours la m\u00eame question : cela marche-t-il ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEt si les Nord-Cor\u00e9ens faisaient leur essai? Et si Washington essayait d’abattre Taepodong<\/em>-2? Qui aurait le plus \u00e0 perdre? Les Am\u00e9ricains y voient la possibilit\u00e9 d’affirmer leur puissance technologique et militaire (si la riposte r\u00e9ussissait) ; d’autres y voient la possibilit\u00e9 inverse (si la riposte ratait). Bref, un jeu de guerre dans une atmosph\u00e8re assez surr\u00e9aliste, o\u00f9 l’enfi\u00e8vrement de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste tient une place essentielle<\/a>. Quelques supputations de Martin Sieff, de UPI<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In the past five and a half years, the Bush administration has spent at least $35 billion to deploy that system. What has it got for all that money?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A lot has certainly been done. Some, 11 ground-based midcourse interceptors, or GBIs are now deployed against exactly the kind of potential threat that North Korea’s Taepodong 2 represents. Some nine of them are deployed at Fort Greeley, Alaska and another two at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A thoughtful study by Harold C. Hutchison published Friday on StrategyPage.com weighed the pros and cons of whether U.S. forces should seek to shoot down the Taepodong 2 when it is test-launched, possibly as early as this weekend.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb On the plus’ side, Hutchison notes, trying to shoot down Taepodong 2 would be a real world’ test the GBIs at Fort Greeley and Vandenberg that would be as close as they could get to a real world’ situation without an actual attack. A successful takedown of a missile would make the American ballistic missile defense system a very real consideration for China and North Korea, rendering their arsenal of ballistic missiles obsolete, Hutchison wrote. It would go a long way towards blunting threats to American allies in the region.<\/em> (…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Also, Hutchison notes, It might take more than one shot to hit the missile and the United States has a very small number of GBIs.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Further, he pointed out, Potential opponents would learn a great deal about the American missile-defense system and such information could make the system’s task harder in a real war.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn passant, Martin Sieff note l’essentiel de cette affaire, que le ministre russe de la d\u00e9fense Ivanov qualifie assez justement de show<\/em>, si l’essai et la riposte ont vraiment lieu. La riposte constituerait un pas de g\u00e9ant de plus dans le sens de la d\u00e9stabilisation et de la d\u00e9structuration du syst\u00e8me l\u00e9gal international, au cr\u00e9dit (?) de Washington, bien s\u00fbr<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab However, there is also the not insignificant fact that shooting down another nation’s test-fired ICBM could be interpreted as an act of war. And it would be unprecedented international behavior. No nation has ever sought to prevent another nation testing its own ICBMs by either shooting them down or taking preemptive military action against their launch pads.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 25 juin 2006 \u00e0 10H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Depuis qu’il est question d’un essai d’un missile nord-cor\u00e9en intercontinental Taepodong-2, beaucoup de sp\u00e9culations autour de la question : peuvent-ils le faire ? (C’est-\u00e0-dire : les USA peuvent-ils abattre Taepodong-2 ?) La question n’est pas indiff\u00e9rente. Le concept de d\u00e9fense strat\u00e9gique anti-missiles (SDI, puis BDM entre divers noms bureaucratiques utilis\u00e9s) est apparu officiellement avec le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5541,3299,2651,2970,3349,4087,5536,5542],"class_list":["post-67685","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-abm","tag-coree","tag-du","tag-missiles","tag-nord","tag-perry","tag-taepodong-2","tag-test"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67685","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67685"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67685\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67685"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67685"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67685"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}