Un nouveau livre de Ron Suskind fait grand bruit aux USA. Il s’agit de The One Percent Doctrine<\/a>. Ron Suskind est connu pour avoir \u00e9crit un livre sur la courte carri\u00e8re gouvernementale du secr\u00e9taire au tr\u00e9sor Paul O’Neill, The Price of Loyalty<\/a>, livre qui nous en disait beaucoup sur la psychologie de GW et des actuels dirigeants am\u00e9ricanistes. Suskind nous est cher parce que c’est lui qui a le plus avanc\u00e9 sur la voie de l’identification concr\u00e8te et \u00e9v\u00e9nementielle du virtualisme am\u00e9ricaniste de GW Bush & Cie ou, selon ses termes, la faith-based community<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAvec The One percent Doctrine<\/em>, Suskind poursuit ses recherches en d\u00e9veloppant une analyse de l’action et de la psychologie des m\u00eames dirigeants, surtout le plus sombre et le plus myst\u00e9rieux d’entre eux, le vice-pr\u00e9sident Cheney. C’est Cheney qui expliqua, quelques jours apr\u00e8s 9\/11, que s’il n’y avait qu’un pour cent de possibilit\u00e9 d’une attaque terroriste, il fallait agir comme si cette attaque \u00e9tait une certitude.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tRobert Parry, autre auteur dissident qui explore les myst\u00e8res de la direction de l’am\u00e9ricanisme (allez voir ses livres sur son site consortiumnews.com<\/a>), explique bien la signification de la doctrine de Cheney dans un texte qu’il met en ligne le 27 juin<\/a>. Il s’agit bien de cette doctrine compl\u00e8tement extraordinaire qui, consid\u00e9rant la plus infime<\/strong> possibilit\u00e9 d’une menace, de cette menace-l\u00e0 (le terrorisme), comme une certitude absolue<\/strong>, ouvre le champ \u00e0 la cr\u00e9ation du monde compl\u00e8tement fabriqu\u00e9 o\u00f9 nous vivons depuis 9\/11.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuelques mots de Parry :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Author Ron Suskind’s account of Dick Cheney’s one percent doctrine the idea that if a terrorist threat is deemed even one percent likely the United States must act as if it’s a certainty supplies a missing link in understanding the evolving madness of the Bush administration’s national security strategy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb A one-percent risk threshold is so low that it negates any serious analysis that seeks to calibrate dangers within the complex array of possibilities that exist in the real world. In effect, it means that any potential threat that crosses the administration’s line of sight will exceed one percent and thus must be treated as a clear and present danger.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The fallacy of the doctrine is that pursuing one-percent threats like certainties is not just a case of choosing to be safe rather than sorry. Instead, it can suck the pursuer into a swollen river of other dangers, leading to a cascading torrent of adverse consequences far more dangerous than the original worry.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb For instance, George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq may have eliminated the remote possibility that Saddam Hussein would someday develop a nuclear bomb and share it with al-Qaeda. (Some intelligence analysts put that scenario at less than one percent, although Bush called it a gathering danger.) But the U.S. military invasion of Iraq had the unintended consequence of bolstering the conviction in North Korea and Iran that having the bomb may be the only way to fend off the United States.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 28 juin 2006 \u00e0 09H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un nouveau livre de Ron Suskind fait grand bruit aux USA. Il s’agit de The One Percent Doctrine. Ron Suskind est connu pour avoir \u00e9crit un livre sur la courte carri\u00e8re gouvernementale du secr\u00e9taire au tr\u00e9sor Paul O’Neill, The Price of Loyalty, livre qui nous en disait beaucoup sur la psychologie de GW et des… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1294,4375,3067,1221,5552,4464,4373,610],"class_list":["post-67696","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cheney","tag-community","tag-doctrine","tag-faith-based","tag-onepercent","tag-parry","tag-suskind","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67696","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67696"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67696\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67696"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67696"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67696"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}