pr\u00e9sent\u00e9<\/a> par AP.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00ab The annual cost of replacing, repairing and upgrading Army equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan is expected to more than triple next year to higher than $17 billion (13.5 billion), according to Army documents obtained by The Associated Press. From 2002 to 2006, the Army spent an average of $4 billion (3.2 billion) a year in annual equipment costs. As the war takes a harder toll on the military, that number is projected to balloon to more than $12 billion (9.6 billion) for the federal budget year that starts Oct. 1, the documents show. The $17 billion (13.5 billion) also includes an additional $5 billion (4 billion) in equipment expenses that the Army requested in previous years but has not yet been provided. The latest costs include the transfer of more than 1,200 2\u00bd-ton trucks, nearly 1,100 Humvees and $8.8 million (7 million) in other equipment from the U.S. Army to the Iraqi security forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Army and Marine Corps leaders are expected to testify before Congress on Tuesday and outline the growing costs of the war with estimates that it will cost between $12 billion (9.6 billion) and $13 billion (10.4 billion) a year for equipment repairs, upgrades and replacements from now on. The Marine Corps has said in recent testimony before Congress that it would need nearly $12 billion (9.6 billion) to replace and repair all the equipment worn out or lost to combat in the past four years. So far, the Marines have received $1.6 billion (1.3 billion) toward those costs to replace and repair the equipment.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 28 juin 2006 \u00e0 17H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
AP a obtenu des documents qui pr\u00e9sentent l’extraordinaire augmentation des co\u00fbts de maintenance de son \u00e9quipement en Irak. En un an, ce budget a tripl\u00e9, pour atteindre le total g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de $17 milliards. La guerre en Irak d\u00e9vore les ressources militaires US et entra\u00eene l’U.S. Army vers une d\u00e9structuration et un sous-\u00e9quipement structurel sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3289,857,5559,2671],"class_list":["post-67699","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-army","tag-irak","tag-maintenance","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67699","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67699"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67699\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67699"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67699"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67699"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}