C’est Seymour Hersh qui, le 9 avril, avait mis le feu aux poudres en d\u00e9taillant notamment, dans un de ses articles-vedettes du New Yorker<\/a> (voir aussi notre F&C<\/a> du 9 avril), comment l’\u00e9tat-major am\u00e9ricain, sur instruction de la Maison-Blanche, avait int\u00e9gr\u00e9 une option nucl\u00e9aire dans ses plans de guerre contre l’Iran. Hersh prolonge ses r\u00e9v\u00e9lations dans son article du New Yorker<\/em> du 10 juillet mis en ligne aujourd’hui<\/a>. Il affirme que cette option a \u00e9t\u00e9 finalement \u00e9cart\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Hersh rapporte que la mise en œuvre de la planification nucl\u00e9aire contre l’Iran est l’une des causes<\/a> principales de la fameuse \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volte des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux\u00a0\u00bb, d\u00e9sormais connue au Pentagone comme la \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9volution d’avril\u00a0\u00bb. Cette campagne s’ajouta \u00e0 l’opposition interne<\/a> des militaires, pour faire finalement reculer le pouvoir civil.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Voici le passage où Hersh rapporte comment l’option nucl\u00e9aire a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9cart\u00e9e :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « In late April, the military leadership, headed by General Pace, achieved a major victory when the White House dropped its insistence that the plan for a bombing campaign include the possible use of a nuclear device to destroy Iran’s uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, nearly two hundred miles south of Tehran. The huge complex includes large underground facilities built into seventy-five-foot-deep holes in the ground and designed to hold as many as fifty thousand centrifuges. \u00ab\u00a0Bush and Cheney were dead serious about the nuclear planning,\u00a0\u00bb the former senior intelligence official told me. \u00ab\u00a0And Pace stood up to them. Then the world came back: ‘O.K., the nuclear option is politically unacceptable.’ \u00a0\u00bb At the time, a number of retired officers, including two Army major generals who served in Iraq, Paul Eaton and Charles Swannack, Jr., had begun speaking out against the Administration’s handling of the Iraq war. This period is known to many in the Pentagon as \u00ab\u00a0the April Revolution.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n » \u00ab\u00a0An event like this doesn’t get papered over very quickly,\u00a0\u00bb the former official added. \u00ab\u00a0The bad feelings over the nuclear option are still felt. The civilian hierarchy feels extraordinarily betrayed by the brass, and the brass feel they were tricked into it\u00a0\u00bb — the nuclear planning —\u00a0\u00bbby being asked to provide all options in the planning papers.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 3 juillet 2007 \u00e0 09H19<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Comment GW a abandonn\u00e9 l’option nucl\u00e9aire C’est Seymour Hersh qui, le 9 avril, avait mis le feu aux poudres en d\u00e9taillant notamment, dans un de ses articles-vedettes du New Yorker (voir aussi notre F&C du 9 avril), comment l’\u00e9tat-major am\u00e9ricain, sur instruction de la Maison-Blanche, avait int\u00e9gr\u00e9 une option nucl\u00e9aire dans ses plans de guerre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2604,5160,4180,2773,3004,4519,3856],"class_list":["post-67712","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-des","tag-generaux","tag-hersh","tag-iran","tag-nucleaire","tag-pace","tag-revolte"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67712","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67712"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67712\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67712"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67712"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67712"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}