{"id":67722,"date":"2006-07-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-07-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/07\/06\/incertitudes-coreennes-et-alentour\/"},"modified":"2006-07-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-07-06T00:00:00","slug":"incertitudes-coreennes-et-alentour","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/07\/06\/incertitudes-coreennes-et-alentour\/","title":{"rendered":"Incertitudes cor\u00e9ennes et alentour"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La crise des missiles de Cor\u00e9e du Nord, qui m\u00e9lange le dramatique et le grotesque comme toutes les crises qui concernent les USA et un de ces \u00c9tats-voyous d\u00e9sign\u00e9s par ces m\u00eames USA, est particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressante dans ses ramifications r\u00e9gionales. Il s&rsquo;agit notamment de la question des r\u00e9actions de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud \u00e0 cette crise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa vue conventionnelle et occidentale, qui tient pour acquises les conceptions habituelles sur les dangers des soi-disant armes de destruction massive, est que la Cor\u00e9e du Sud va se trouver conduite \u00e0 une attitude plus dure avec la Cor\u00e9e du Nord (implicitement, on conclut que la Cor\u00e9e du Nord joue maladroitement avec ses tirs de missiles). C&rsquo;est par exemple ce qu&rsquo;estime Jonathan Watts, du <em>Guardian<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/korea\/article\/0,,1813546,00.html\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>But Mr Kim has upset the few sympathisers he had left. The test firing is a slap in the face for China. Beijing has spent three years trying to forge a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. Only last week its prime minister, Wen Jiabao, called on North Korea not to go ahead with a launch. China must now weigh its rage at being ignored by a little brother with its long-term strategy of maintaining a buffer nation on its north-eastern border.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>South Korean patience is also stretched. Even the office of the pro-engagement president, Roh Moo-hyun, called the launch a provocation that would strengthen the North&rsquo;s enemies.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a une vue diam\u00e9tralement oppos\u00e9e et plus inhabituelle. Elle avance l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que l&rsquo;action de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord va provoquer ou pr\u00e9cipiter de graves divisions dans les pays de la r\u00e9gion quant \u00e0 la r\u00e9action \u00e0 avoir et \u00e0 leurs relations r\u00e9ciproques. Cette conception implique que certains pays (la Chine et la Cor\u00e9e du Sud) ont bien plus peur de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution du Japon (remilitarisation avec l&rsquo;aide des USA) que de la politique de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord, et craignent que le Japon se saisisse de l&rsquo;argument de la crise actuelle pour lancer ce processus de remilitarisation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est la th\u00e8se de  Donald Kirk, sur le site d&rsquo;<a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Korea\/HG07Dg01.html\" class=\"gen\">atimes.com<\/a> en date du 7 juillet :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The launch of the North Korean missiles hardly fazed South Koreans, who saw the whole show as just another one of those gestures that may make headlines for a few days but bear little relevance to daily life on the streets of Seoul. We&rsquo;re worried but not that worried, one South Korean told Asia Times Online. If South Korea were still in the World Cup, this wouldn&rsquo;t even be the top news.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Under the circumstances, South Korean leaders would just as soon avoid taking sides in the great debate in the United Nations on sanctions against North Korea. Why exacerbate tensions, South Korean officials reason, by supporting sanctions while China and Russia are sure to veto them, turning debate in the UN into another meaningless war of words?<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>In fact, it may come as a shock to Americans, but many South Koreans would be likely to defend North Korea&rsquo;s right to test-fire missiles  and even to have nuclear warheads  if needed for \u00a0\u00bbdefense\u00a0\u00bb against the Japanese. Japan&rsquo;s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has regularly antagonized Chinese and Koreans by visits to the Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japan&rsquo;s war dead, including war criminals responsible for conquering much of the rest of Asia and plunging Japan into World War II.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Memories of Japanese colonial cruelty are deeply implanted in the collective psyche of Koreans, North and South, as well as Chinese.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEnvisageant l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se extr\u00eame d&rsquo;une attaque am\u00e9ricano-japonaise contre les bases de lancement de missiles nord-cor\u00e9ennes, Kirk estime \u00e9galement que la r\u00e9action sud-cor\u00e9enne sera une surprise d\u00e9sagr\u00e9able pour les Occidentaux:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Here too, however, North Korea may count on another weapon  that of public opinion in South Korea. While North Korean missiles are of little real concern in Seoul, attack by the US and Japan on North Korean bases would risk massive protests in the South, rendering US bases there either useless or untenable. Kim, in such an event, would have succeeded in his goal of the destruction of the US-South Korean alliance.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 6 juillet 2006 \u00e0 17H19<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La crise des missiles de Cor\u00e9e du Nord, qui m\u00e9lange le dramatique et le grotesque comme toutes les crises qui concernent les USA et un de ces \u00c9tats-voyous d\u00e9sign\u00e9s par ces m\u00eames USA, est particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressante dans ses ramifications r\u00e9gionales. Il s&rsquo;agit notamment de la question des r\u00e9actions de la Cor\u00e9e du Sud \u00e0 cette&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3299,2651,4662,5584,2970,3349,3300,2804],"class_list":["post-67722","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-coree","tag-du","tag-japon","tag-kim","tag-missiles","tag-nord","tag-sud","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67722","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67722"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67722\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67722"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67722"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67722"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}