The New Air Force Program<\/a> est b\u00e2ti autour d’interviews informelles du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 l’Air Force Michael Wynne et du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral T. Michael Moseley, chef d’\u00e9tat-major.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’extrait ci-dessous concerne effectivement le JSF <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab However, the Air Force won a major concession in that, if the F-35 program is delayed, F-22s will remain in production until the F-35 is ready to be built. It was deemed necessary that the nation maintain a warm production line of modern fifth generation fighters, and a bridge buy of F-22s is possible if the F-35 program hits any lengthy snags in development.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Many of the F-15s have not even passed half their life expectancy, Wynne told reporters in late 2005. So we really have quite a phenomenal weapon system in that regard, that can be … quite a partner to an F-22.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Moseley told reporters in April that the Air Force is considering maintaining a force of 196 F-15Cs for the foreseeable future but that it hasn’t been decided yet whether these aircraft would receive a major upgrade, such as advanced radars, to improve their reach. The Air Force in late spring was working on a number of fighter roadmaps to determine the best course of action to take on these legacy fighters, Moseley said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their Fiscal 2007 budget deliberations, approved the Pentagon’s plan to give the Air Force more Raptors, but the Senate Armed Services Committee didn’t go along with USAF’s plan to enter a multiyear contract on the airplane. The House, however, OK’d the multi-year plan on the condition that DOD provides the requested justification. The two houses have not yet ironed out their differences.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb The Air Force’s requirement for the F-35 strike fighter has notionally hovered around 1,700 aircraft for several years, but the QDR seemed to set the stage for a smaller number. Moseley said acquisition could fall to between 1,100 and 1,400 aircraft, but he added that the program still is too new for the Air Force to make a final decision. If the program is delayed, and more F-22s are purchased, fewer F-35s might be needed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Such a scenario moved one step closer to reality when the Senate Armed Services Committee deleted $1.2 billion from the F-35 program, saying the aircraft is behind schedule.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb The F-22 and F-35 buys also will depend on how gracefully the rest of the fleet ages. Cracks have been discovered in the wings of most of the A-10 fleet, which already was due to receive precision attack upgrades as well as an engine upgrade. If USAF decides to invest in those upgrades, it will take money away from other parts of the global attack portfolio.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb So, between F-22 and F-35 is an interesting set of interconnected decisions on the rest of our tactical inventory, Moseley said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’extrait ci-dessus nous confirme trois choses, directement ou entre les lignes :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de vases communicants est officiellement \u00e9tabli entre le F-22 et le F-35, au d\u00e9triment du second. Le JSF sert \u00e0 l’USAF d’outil pour tenter de prolonger ou de renforcer le F-22, le interesting<\/em> dans la phrase de Moseley en dit quelques tonnes (\u00ab So, between F-22 and F-35 is an interesting set of interconnected decisions on the rest of our tactical inventory<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t• La commande USAF de F-35 est maintenant clairement fix\u00e9e entre 1.100 et 1.400, mais avec possibilit\u00e9 de changement clairement envisag\u00e9e, vers la r\u00e9duction bien entendu : \u00ab If the <\/em>[F-35\/JSF] program is delayed, and more F-22s are purchased, fewer F-35s might be needed.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t• L’USAF a l’air d’envisager sans trop de tristesse la r\u00e9duction budg\u00e9taire et l’allongement du programme F-35\/JSF en train d’\u00eatre mis en place par le Congr\u00e8s. Cette attitude est contraire \u00e0 celle du cabinet du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense (ou bien celui-ci a-t-il \u00e9volu\u00e9?). C’est l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du m\u00e9canisme tendant \u00e0 prolonger le F-22 au d\u00e9triment du F-35. D\u00e8s lors que le Congr\u00e8s soutient un prolongement implicite du F-22 (ce qui est implicite avec l’approbation d’une commande pluriannuelle du F-22), l’USAF supportera un retard du JSF avec r\u00e9duction de la commande, et m\u00eame elle le favorisera.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 8 juillet 2006 \u00e0 12H01<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Air Force Magazine reste une des meilleures sources ouvertes pour conna\u00eetre le point de vue officiel-officieux (officieux-officiel?) de l’USAF sur les grands probl\u00e8mes qui la concernent. Notre attention se porte, avec le num\u00e9ro de juillet, sur l’in\u00e9vitable JSF. L’article The New Air Force Program est b\u00e2ti autour d’interviews informelles du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 l’Air Force Michael… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[249,250,5399,41,4777],"class_list":["post-67726","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-f-22","tag-jsf","tag-moseley","tag-usaf","tag-wynne"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67726","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67726"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67726\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67726"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67726"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67726"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}