{"id":67740,"date":"2006-07-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-07-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/07\/12\/et-pourquoi-le-japon-ne-taperait-il-pas-aussi-sur-seoul\/"},"modified":"2006-07-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-07-12T00:00:00","slug":"et-pourquoi-le-japon-ne-taperait-il-pas-aussi-sur-seoul","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/07\/12\/et-pourquoi-le-japon-ne-taperait-il-pas-aussi-sur-seoul\/","title":{"rendered":"Et pourquoi le Japon ne taperait-il pas AUSSI sur S\u00e9oul ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

C’est un tr\u00e8s grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement<\/strong> depuis la fin de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale : le Japon annonce qu’il envisage la possibilit\u00e9 d’une attaque pr\u00e9ventive contre la Cor\u00e9e du Nord. Le gouvernement a \u00e9t\u00e9 convoqu\u00e9 pour appr\u00e9cier s’il peut effectivement poser un tel acte (envisager la possibilit\u00e9 de) dans le cadre de sa Constitution. (Tr\u00e8s grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement<\/strong>? C’est la premi\u00e8re fois depuis 1945 que le Japon \u00e9voque la possibilit\u00e9 d’un acte militaire offensif, et pr\u00e9ventif en plus, de sa propre initiative.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUne d\u00e9p\u00eache AP nous d\u00e9taille la chose de cette fa\u00e7on<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Japan said Monday it was considering whether a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s missile bases would violate its constitution, signaling a hardening stance ahead of a possible Security Council vote.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told reporters his government wants a vote on the measure as soon as possible. I think we must send a message that’s as clear as possible to North Korea, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Japan was badly rattled by North Korea’s missile tests and several government officials openly discussed whether the country ought to take steps to better defend itself, including setting up the legal framework to allow Tokyo to launch a pre-emptive strike against Northern missile sites. If we accept that there is no other option to prevent an attack … there is the view that attacking the launch base of the guided missiles is within the constitutional right of self-defense. We need to deepen discussion, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Japan’s constitution bars the use of military force in settling international disputes and prohibits Japan from maintaining a military for warfare. Tokyo has interpreted that to mean it can have armed troops to protect itself.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A Defense Agency spokeswoman, however, said Japan has no offensive weapons such as ballistic missiles that could reach North Korea. Japanese fighter jets and pilots are not capable of carrying out such an attack, a military analyst said. Japan’s air force is top class in defending the nation’s airspace, but attacking another country is almost impossible, said analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa. Japan has no capacity to wage war.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien entendu, la question envisag\u00e9e ici n’est pas la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d’une frappe. Cela n’importe gu\u00e8re puisque toute cette crise est p\u00e9trie de virtualisme, \u00e0 commencer par les missiles nord-cor\u00e9ens. Ce qui est int\u00e9ressant \u00e0 observer, c’est le d\u00e9veloppement de la parano\u00efa militariste japonaise, directement inspir\u00e9e par les Am\u00e9ricains et qui, comme d’habitude dans cette sorte d’occurrence, d\u00e9passe les Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTr\u00e8s rapidement, les Am\u00e9ricains vont s’apercevoir qu’ils ne contr\u00f4lent plus les Japonais et qu’ils sont enferm\u00e9s dans la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de leur soutien, au nom de la rh\u00e9torique belliciste dont ils sont prisonniers. Comme vont les choses, Tokyo en viendra bien \u00e0 menacer autant S\u00e9oul que Pyong Yang, et les Am\u00e9ricains devront s’y mettre \u00e0 leur tour. Il est difficile de trouver des mots pour d\u00e9crire l’ampleur du vide de la politique am\u00e9ricaine, et son absence compl\u00e8te d’orientation et de sens. Elle est r\u00e9duite \u00e0 une rh\u00e9torique maximaliste de type pavlovien, aussit\u00f4t suivie du constat de l’inapplicabilit\u00e9 d’une telle rh\u00e9torique, d\u00e9sormais suivie de l’apparition d’un substitut (dans ce cas le Japon) qui emprisonne Washington dans son incons\u00e9quence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 juillet 2006 \u00e0 08H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

C’est un tr\u00e8s grand \u00e9v\u00e9nement depuis la fin de la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale : le Japon annonce qu’il envisage la possibilit\u00e9 d’une attaque pr\u00e9ventive contre la Cor\u00e9e du Nord. Le gouvernement a \u00e9t\u00e9 convoqu\u00e9 pour appr\u00e9cier s’il peut effectivement poser un tel acte (envisager la possibilit\u00e9 de) dans le cadre de sa Constitution. (Tr\u00e8s grand… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5603,3299,4662,5602,3439],"class_list":["post-67740","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-belliciste","tag-coree","tag-japon","tag-seoul","tag-strike"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67740","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67740"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67740\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67740"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67740"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67740"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}