{"id":67830,"date":"2006-08-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/03\/lex-optimisme-de-tsahal-et-les-manoeuvres-de-washington\/"},"modified":"2006-08-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-03T00:00:00","slug":"lex-optimisme-de-tsahal-et-les-manoeuvres-de-washington","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/03\/lex-optimisme-de-tsahal-et-les-manoeuvres-de-washington\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;ex-optimisme de <em>Tsahal<\/em> et les manoeuvres de Washington"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La lettre d&rsquo;information <em>Strategic Alert<\/em>, dans son \u00e9dition du 3 ao\u00fbt (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.eirna.com\/html\/alert-ins.htm\" class=\"gen\">acc\u00e8s payant<\/a>) rapporte que les promesses des chefs militaires isra\u00e9liens faites au cabinet, pour emporter la d\u00e9cision d&rsquo;attaque, le 12 juillet dernier, \u00e9taient extr\u00eamement optimistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>After the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hisbollah on July 12, the top officers of the Israel Defense Force General Staff, including Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz, told Israel&rsquo;s political leaders that Hisbollah would collapse in four or five days of pounding by the Israeli Air Force.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The same senior Israeli intelligence source who revealed the above to EIR, further said: If [Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Israeli Defense Minister Amir] Peretz had known that after more than two weeks Hisbollah would still be firing rockets into Israel, they would have never approved the plan. Already the Army is in trouble, they cannot win this war and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tall their plans have collapsed.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa m\u00eame source cit\u00e9e par <em>Strategic Alert<\/em> s&rsquo;\u00e9tonne de la mobilisation de trois divisions de r\u00e9servistes. Elle estime que pour une invasion de la zone du Liban jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 la rivi\u00e8re Litani, cet appoint de forces est trop important.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab  <em>Therefore, the source concluded, these divisions are aimed at keeping Syria in check. My fear is that this will have exactly the opposite effect and be seen as a provocation. While the Syrian military would be no match for Israeli ground forces, they could use the same tactics as the Hisbollah, not with Katyusha rockets but with their large inventory of Scub B\/C missiles that are capable of reaching all parts of Israel. The danger is that this whole mobilization could snowball into a war with Syria.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEnfin, la source cit\u00e9e par EIR estime que les Isra\u00e9liens se trompent en croyant que les Am\u00e9ricains leur font une faveur en leur permettant de continuer la bataille contre le Hezbollah. Pour elle, les Am\u00e9ricains poursuivent un but cach\u00e9, qui est de pousser les Isra\u00e9liens dans une guerre avec la Syrie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 3 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 14H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La lettre d&rsquo;information Strategic Alert, dans son \u00e9dition du 3 ao\u00fbt (acc\u00e8s payant) rapporte que les promesses des chefs militaires isra\u00e9liens faites au cabinet, pour emporter la d\u00e9cision d&rsquo;attaque, le 12 juillet dernier, \u00e9taient extr\u00eamement optimistes. \u00ab After the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hisbollah on July 12, the top officers of the Israel&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5718,4928,3142,3867,4714],"class_list":["post-67830","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-alert","tag-eir","tag-strategic","tag-syrie","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67830","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67830"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67830\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67830"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67830"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67830"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}