{"id":67844,"date":"2006-08-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/06\/lechec-de-tsahal-une-mediocrite-etrangement-classique\/"},"modified":"2006-08-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-06T00:00:00","slug":"lechec-de-tsahal-une-mediocrite-etrangement-classique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/06\/lechec-de-tsahal-une-mediocrite-etrangement-classique\/","title":{"rendered":"L’\u00e9chec de Tsahal<\/em> : une m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 \u00e9trangement classique"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le plus \u00e9tonnant dans l’actuelle crise Isra\u00ebl-Hezbollah, c’est le contraste entre la pr\u00e9sentation initiale de cette crise (explosive, r\u00e9volutionnaire, peut-\u00eatre le d\u00e9but de la Guerre mondiale<\/a> n\u00b0III ou n\u00b0IV, etc.) et \u00e9ventuellement ses effets tr\u00e8s<\/strong> indirects (comme par exemple, certains aspects de la situation britannique<\/a>), et, d’autre part, le caract\u00e8re incroyablement classique, habituel, r\u00e9p\u00e9titif, des erreurs qui y sont commises d\u00e8s le d\u00e9part. Ce contraste est d’ailleurs plus que saisissant, il est paralysant pour le th\u00e9\u00e2tre de la crise lui-m\u00eame. Comment esp\u00e9rer des \u00e9v\u00e9nements r\u00e9volutionnaires directs avec des outils aussi mal adapt\u00e9s, aussi pervertis d\u00e8s l’origine?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDe ce point de vue de la m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 qu’est devenue la puissance isra\u00e9lienne, l’unanimit\u00e9 est en train de se faire<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tExtrait de The Observer<\/em> du 6 ao\u00fbt<\/a> : \u00ab Meron Rappoport, a former editor at the Israeli daily Haaretz and military analyst, criticised the air force’s methods for selecting targets: The impression is that information is sometimes lacking. One squadron leader admitted the evidence used to determine attacks on cars is sometimes circumstantial meaning that if people are in an area after Israeli forces warned them to leave, the assumption is that those left behind must be linked to Hizbollah … This is problematic, as aid agencies have said many people did not leave … because they could not, or it was unsafe to travel on the roads thanks to Israel’s aerial bombardment.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUne vue plus large de Rosemary Hollis, du RIIA (Chatam House), rapport\u00e9e par AFP<\/a> le 5 ao\u00fbt : \u00ab The Israelis lack good intelligence. They have completely underestimated the size of the Hezbollah arsenal, the amount of weapons they’ve got stockpiled. <\/em>[] It’s the classic situation of a guerrilla (war). You can’t win except by the most appalling devastation, which is a pyrrhic victory anyway.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israel failed to identify how deep the militants bury themselves in southern Lebanon, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert allowed himself to be convinced by the chief of staff who is from the air force that air power could achieve more that it can, the analyst believes. The level of ground forces that would be required to really smash this kind of enemy is probably something that not even a good proportion of the Israelis could tolerate, she added.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israel is now scaling back its operations accordingly and is hoping to score some kind of success such as the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah or reducing the number of rockets fired at Israel before a ceasefire is inevitable. They would quite like a ceasefire, but they need a success in order to get it, Hollis said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb You need to address the grievances that the supporters of Hezbollah have, more effectively than Hezbollah. Even if Hezbollah stands for the elimination of Israel, that is not a grievance of their supporters. The plight of the Palestinians, the occupation or the use of military force against Israel’s neighbours, the seemingly double standards by which Israel is allowed to flout international law and others are not… You have to address all of those things.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 6 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 15H01<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le plus \u00e9tonnant dans l’actuelle crise Isra\u00ebl-Hezbollah, c’est le contraste entre la pr\u00e9sentation initiale de cette crise (explosive, r\u00e9volutionnaire, peut-\u00eatre le d\u00e9but de la Guerre mondiale n\u00b0III ou n\u00b0IV, etc.) et \u00e9ventuellement ses effets tr\u00e8s indirects (comme par exemple, certains aspects de la situation britannique), et, d’autre part, le caract\u00e8re incroyablement classique, habituel, r\u00e9p\u00e9titif, des… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5737,4058,4640,5736,4641,4714],"class_list":["post-67844","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chatam","tag-echec","tag-house","tag-mediocre","tag-riia","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67844","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67844"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67844\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67844"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67844"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67844"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}