On s’interroge beaucoup sur l’\u00e9tonnante (contre-) peformance de Tsahal<\/em>, y compris parmi nos lecteurs (voir le Forum<\/em> au 8 ao\u00fbt<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl y a les explications complexes, avan\u00e7ant notamment diverses th\u00e8ses de manuvres dissimul\u00e9es, plans secrets, etc. Il y a aussi les avis simples, ceux qui s’en tiennent au constat de l’\u00e9vidence. C’est le cas de Amyas Godfrey, dans le Guardian<\/a> aujourd’hui. Expert tr\u00e8s classique du RUSI (Royal United Services Institute de Londres, \u00e9galement connu par son lieu d’\u00e9lection pour les discussions d’experts de Chatham House), Godfrey ne fait finalement qu’aligner les \u00e9vidences. La surprise est qu’il faille effectivement les r\u00e9p\u00e9ter, et qu’il faille les r\u00e9p\u00e9ter \u00e0 propos de Tsahal<\/em>. Ce que nous dit Godfrey est simple bon sens militaire (dans ce cas, pour lutter contre une arm\u00e9e de gu\u00e9rilla ou de partisans) remontant \u00e0 la nuit des temps.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCe qui est important, plus que l’analyse du comportement op\u00e9rationnel de Tsahal<\/em>, c’est la cause de ce comportement. Nous tenons plus que jamais pour l’explication de l’am\u00e9ricanisation<\/a> de Tsahal<\/em>, avec le soutien inattendu de Pierre Lellouche (dans Le Figaro<\/a> du 9 ao\u00fbt, soulign\u00e9 par nous : \u00ab Deuxi\u00e8me erreur due sans doute \u00e0 la<\/em> culture am\u00e9ricaine<\/em><\/strong> qui r\u00e8gne d\u00e9sormais sur Tsahal<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuelques remarques de Godfrey :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab The problem is that regular tactics and weapons are of little use in counter-insurgency. In a conflict where enemy fighters are also civilians, bombs and artillery do little to distinguish which role they are in at any given moment. When the insurgent moves among the people, you must move in those same circles.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Furthering doubt and frustration is the announcement that the Israeli military is sending a new commander to take over in southern Lebanon. Major General Udi Adam is seen as a man who just put out fires instead of taking the initiative. It is perhaps for this reason that it is felt that he is not the commander to see this conflict through to a swift and acceptable conclusion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb With a renewed offensive involving deployment of an additional 30,000 troops pushing up as far as the Litani river, Israel is unlikely to adapt its tactics and will attempt to overpower Hizbullah with military might. This will be playing into Hizbullah’s hands. If it can draw Israeli forces further into a messy ground war there might be disastrous consequencesfor Israel.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Insurgent groups do not own or hold ground, they move through it. Hizbullah is able to fight Israeli forces anywhere in Lebanon. If Israeli forces are still chasing Hizbullah fighters up to and beyond the Litani when the UN comes to an agreement and replaces them with an international force, then Israel will have lost. For Israel, this new offensive is a race against time.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 10 ao\u00fbt \u00e0 10H09<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On s’interroge beaucoup sur l’\u00e9tonnante (contre-) peformance de Tsahal, y compris parmi nos lecteurs (voir le Forum au 8 ao\u00fbt). Il y a les explications complexes, avan\u00e7ant notamment diverses th\u00e8ses de manuvres dissimul\u00e9es, plans secrets, etc. Il y a aussi les avis simples, ceux qui s’en tiennent au constat de l’\u00e9vidence. C’est le cas de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5265,5755,5756,2897,4714],"class_list":["post-67860","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-erreurs","tag-godfrey","tag-lellouche","tag-rusi","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67860","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67860"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67860\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67860"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67860"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67860"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}