{"id":67876,"date":"2006-08-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/14\/don-rumsfeld-et-william-s-lind-meme-pensee\/"},"modified":"2006-08-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-14T00:00:00","slug":"don-rumsfeld-et-william-s-lind-meme-pensee","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/14\/don-rumsfeld-et-william-s-lind-meme-pensee\/","title":{"rendered":"Don Rumsfeld et William S. Lind, m\u00eame pens\u00e9e ?"},"content":{"rendered":"

On peut difficilement faire du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld et de l’expert dissident, promoteur du concept de la guerre de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G) William S. Lind, des personnalit\u00e9s proches par les conceptions. D’o\u00f9 la surprise de les voir se rencontrer, selon certaines interpr\u00e9tations, sur un point fondamental d’analyse strat\u00e9gique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLind d\u00e9veloppe depuis quelque temps l’id\u00e9e que les forces US en Irak sont dans une position difficile, qui peut devenir tragique dans certaines circonstances (une attaque de l’Iran par les USA, une riposte de l’Iran). Dans son plus r\u00e9cent<\/a> (11 ao\u00fbt) article, Lind compare la position du corps exp\u00e9ditionnaire US \u00e0 une sorte de Stalingrad des sables potentiel, d’autant plus si la faiblesse d’Isra\u00ebl se confirme , affaiblissant \u00e0 mesure la protection du flanc de l’arm\u00e9e US. Son id\u00e9e est bien la menace d’un possible an\u00e9antissement de ce corps, comme l’arm\u00e9e de Von Paulus \u00e0 Stalingrad :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abTo the region, America’s apparently unconditional and unbounded support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq are part of the same picture. For a military historian, the question arises: will history see Iraq as America’s Stalingrad? If we kick the analogy up a couple of levels, to the strategic and grand strategic, there are parallels. Both the German and the American armies were able largely to take, but not hold, the objective. Both had too few troops. Both Berlin and Washington underestimated their enemy’s ability to counterattack. Both committed resources they needed elsewhere and could not replace to a strategically unimportant objective. Finally, both entrusted their flanks to weak allies and to luck.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLet us hope that, unlike von Paulus, our commanders know when to get out, regardless of orders from a leader who will not recognize reality.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn imaginerait qu’un officiel de l’administration GW comme le super-dur qu’est Rumsfeld rejette \u00e9videmment une telle hypoth\u00e8se strat\u00e9gique impliquant la possibilit\u00e9 d’une telle faiblesse strat\u00e9gique des USA. La surprise est bien que, d’apr\u00e8s des remarques rapport\u00e9es par Seymour Hersh le 14 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, ce pourrait \u00eatre exactement le contraire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHersh note : \u00ab Some current and former intelligence officials who were interviewed for this article believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said that there was a feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war. He added, Air power and the use of a few Special Forces had worked in Afghanistan, and he tried to do it again in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it didn’t work. He thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the Israeli attack plan would not work, and the last thing he wanted was another war on his shift that would put the American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A Western diplomat said that he understood that Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies of the war plan. He is angry and worried about his troops in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White House during the last year of the war in Vietnam, from which American troops withdrew in 1975, and he did not want to see something like this having an impact in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s concern, the diplomat added, was that an expansion of the war into Iran could put the American troops in Iraq at greater risk of attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 14 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 10H01<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On peut difficilement faire du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld et de l’expert dissident, promoteur du concept de la guerre de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G) William S. Lind, des personnalit\u00e9s proches par les conceptions. D’o\u00f9 la surprise de les voir se rencontrer, selon certaines interpr\u00e9tations, sur un point fondamental d’analyse strat\u00e9gique. Lind d\u00e9veloppe depuis quelque temps… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4255,857,1012,569,3828],"class_list":["post-67876","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-defaite","tag-irak","tag-lind","tag-rumsfeld","tag-stalingrad"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67876","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67876"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67876\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67876"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67876"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67876"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}