{"id":67896,"date":"2006-08-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/19\/le-moral-de-tsahal-touche-de-plein-fouet\/"},"modified":"2006-08-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-19T00:00:00","slug":"le-moral-de-tsahal-touche-de-plein-fouet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/19\/le-moral-de-tsahal-touche-de-plein-fouet\/","title":{"rendered":"Le moral de <em>Tsahal<\/em> touch\u00e9 de plein fouet"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Dans l&rsquo;apr\u00e8s-coup de la m\u00e9saventure libanaise, d\u00e9tails et informations s&rsquo;accumulent sur les questions les plus essentielles du comportement de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne: l&rsquo;entra\u00eenement des troupes, la fa\u00e7on dont elles sont trait\u00e9es, la fa\u00e7on dont elles sont ravitaill\u00e9es au combat, etc. Ces questions touchent le cur m\u00eame des structures de <em>Tsahal<\/em> et montrent une situation absolument path\u00e9tique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn observera une fois de plus combien le sch\u00e9ma de la mise \u00e0 jour de la d\u00e9cadence de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne suit celui des forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricaines tel qu&rsquo;il est r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 par l&rsquo;Irak. Il y a l\u00e0 la m\u00eame action d&rsquo;un m\u00eame \u00e9tat d&rsquo;esprit bureaucratique, d&rsquo;un m\u00eame accent mis sur la technologie et les \u00e9quipements avanc\u00e9s aux d\u00e9pens de la situation des combattants, de l&rsquo;aspect humain, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAucun doute. L&rsquo;arm\u00e9e qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 battue au Sud Liban par le Hezbollah,  car l&rsquo;on peut parler sans exag\u00e9rer de d\u00e9faite, d\u00e9sormais,  cette arm\u00e9e est totalement une annexe du Pentagone, et elle est trait\u00e9e comme le Pentagone traite ses arm\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCi-dessous, quelques paragraphes d&rsquo;un texte <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washtimes.com\/functions\/print.php?StoryID=20060818-113931-1977r\" class=\"gen\">Washington Times\/AP<\/a> rendant compte de ce climat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>We fought for nothing. We cleared houses that will be reoccupied in no time, said Ilia Marshak, a 22-year-old infantryman who spent a week in Lebanon.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Mr. Marshak said his unit was hindered by a lack of information, by poor training and by untested equipment. In one instance, Israeli troops occupying two houses inadvertently fired at each other because of poor communication between their commanders.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>We almost killed each other, he said. We shot like blind people. &#8230; We shot sheep and goats.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t() <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Some of the harshest criticism has come from reservists, who form the backbone of the army. Israeli men do three years of mandatory service beginning at age 18, but continue to do reserve duty several weeks a year into their 40s.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Israeli newspapers quoted disgruntled reservists as saying they had no provisions in Lebanon, were sent into battle with outdated or faulty equipment and insufficient supplies, and received little or no training.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <I>I personally haven&rsquo;t thrown a grenade in 15 years, and I thought I&rsquo;d get a chance to do so before going north, an unidentified reservist in an elite infantry brigade was quoted as telling the Ma&rsquo;ariv daily.<D> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Israel&rsquo;s largest paper, Yediot Ahronot, quoted one soldier as saying thirsty troops threw chlorine tablets into filthy water in sheep and cow troughs. Another said his unit took canteens from dead guerrillas. When you&rsquo;re thirsty and have to keep fighting, you don&rsquo;t think a lot, and there is no time to feel disgusted, the unidentified soldier was quoted as saying.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The newspaper said helicopters were hindered from delivering food supplies or carrying out rescue operations because commanders feared the aircraft would be shot down. In some instances, soldiers bled to death because they were not rescued in time, Yediot Ahronot said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 14H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Dans l&rsquo;apr\u00e8s-coup de la m\u00e9saventure libanaise, d\u00e9tails et informations s&rsquo;accumulent sur les questions les plus essentielles du comportement de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne: l&rsquo;entra\u00eenement des troupes, la fa\u00e7on dont elles sont trait\u00e9es, la fa\u00e7on dont elles sont ravitaill\u00e9es au combat, etc. Ces questions touchent le cur m\u00eame des structures de Tsahal et montrent une situation absolument path\u00e9tique.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5666,3194,5792,4714],"class_list":["post-67896","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-moral","tag-pentagone","tag-reservistes","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67896","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67896"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67896\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67896"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67896"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67896"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}