{"id":67913,"date":"2006-08-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/23\/deux-perspectives-pour-interpreter-la-position-de-la-france-a-lonu\/"},"modified":"2006-08-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-23T00:00:00","slug":"deux-perspectives-pour-interpreter-la-position-de-la-france-a-lonu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/23\/deux-perspectives-pour-interpreter-la-position-de-la-france-a-lonu\/","title":{"rendered":"Deux perspectives pour interpr\u00e9ter la position de la France \u00e0 l’ONU"},"content":{"rendered":"

Deux textes de natures et de th\u00e8mes diff\u00e9rents nous sugg\u00e8rent deux fa\u00e7ons d’appr\u00e9cier la position de la France \u00e0 l’ONU, apr\u00e8s son \u00e9volution r\u00e9cente, son r\u00f4le central dans l’\u00e9laboration de la r\u00e9solution 1701 sur le cessez-le-feu ; sa position sur sa participation au contingent de l’ONU, d’abord per\u00e7ue comme une participation tr\u00e8s importante (3.000 hommes), puis sa proposition formelle d’un contingent r\u00e9duit de 200 hommes (en addition des 200 hommes d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans le New York Times<\/em> de ce jour<\/a>, dans un texte dont le sujet central est la question des sanctions contre l’Iran, la position actuelle de la France dans la question libabnaise est \u00e9voqu\u00e9e, mise en parall\u00e8le avec celle des USA. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat du texte est justement que cette position fran\u00e7aise soit \u00e9voqu\u00e9e accessoirement. On peut d’autant mieux admettre qu’il s’agisse d’une \u00e9valuation officieuse largement partag\u00e9e \u00e0 Wahington, dans les milieux politiques gouvernementaux qui inspirent cette sorte de texte, dans un contexte o\u00f9 le conformisme r\u00e8gne en ma\u00eetre. (Il n’y a pas de meilleure indication sur une \u00e9valuatuion politique qu’une indication accessoire, sans intention particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, en un sens comme allant de soi.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab That<\/em> [to keep the Security Council coalition together] will not be easy, in part because the entire United Nations Security Council is supposed to vote on the sanctions package. While only the permanent members can veto, the rising fear, particularly among European diplomats, is that smaller countries on the Council are so angry over how the United States, and now France, have handled the Lebanon crisis that they will give Russia and China political cover to balk against imposing tough sanctions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb While France, for instance, has been almost as insistent on a tough stance against Iran’s nuclear program as the United States, France has also in recent days alienated many members of the Security Council by offering only 200 troops to a peacekeeping effort in Lebanon. The Lebanese situation has caused a lot of bad faith and I think that will play into this, said one European diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic rules.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’autre part, l’\u00e9valuation de WSWS.org<\/a> sur la situation \u00e0 l’ONU, avec une large place \u00e0 la position fran\u00e7aise, est int\u00e9ressante. Nous ne partageons pas la totalit\u00e9 de cette analyse mais les grandes lignes \u00e9voqu\u00e9es sont int\u00e9ressantes. WSWS.org<\/em> pose implicitement la question juste : que cherchent les Am\u00e9ricains et les Isra\u00e9liens avec la 1701? Et l’analyste r\u00e9pond : \u00e0 faire liquider le Hezbollah par d’autres. De ce point de vue, l’\u00e9volution de la position fran\u00e7aise leur pose un gros probl\u00e8me ; et il n’est pas assur\u00e9, si l’on accepte cette analyse, que l’\u00e9valuation donn\u00e9e par le New York Times<\/em> (isolement fran\u00e7ais) soit juste, dans la mesure o\u00f9 les positions fran\u00e7aise et am\u00e9ricaine ne peuvent \u00eatre per\u00e7ues comme proches. (A noter que WSWS.org<\/em> est sur le fond tr\u00e8s rarement favorable \u00e0 la France, d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e comme ancienne puissance coloniale et puissance bourgeoise n\u00e9o-coloniale. Il n’y a donc certainement pas de parti-pris pro-fran\u00e7ais dans l’analyse.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israel and the US wanted the international force to complete the task which the Israeli army failed to achieve during its 33-day attack on the neighboring country: the liquidation of Hezbollah and the conversion of Lebanon into a powerless protectorate of the great powers. Originally, Israel and the US sought to assign the mission to a NATO force with a so-called robust mandate, which would give it the authority to disarm Hezbollah by force.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb France, which worked closely with the Lebanese as well as with other Arab and European governments, was also seeking the disarmament of Hezbollah. In contrast to the US, however, it sought to do this primarily through political means. According to French plans, the disarmament was to take place with the mutual agreement and under the auspices of the Lebanese government, and secured by the presence of the international force.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The unanimous vote in the Security Council for resolution 1701 masked over the underlying differences, but did not resolve them.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israel and the US are continuing to insist on the complete disarming of Hezbollah. The American ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, is seeking to introduce a new resolution to this affect, while Israel is contemptuously ignoring provisions of the cease-fire that stand in its way.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb France, on the other hand, concluded that any attempt to disarm Hezbollah through political means was doomed to failure.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb France’s retreat has created considerable problems for Israel and the US. Following the failure of its offensive in Lebanon, the Israeli government is in deep crisis and needs the support of UN troops on its border. Both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and US President George W. Bush have turned to the Italian prime minister, Romano Prodi, to take over the leadership of the UN force instead of France.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 17H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Deux textes de natures et de th\u00e8mes diff\u00e9rents nous sugg\u00e8rent deux fa\u00e7ons d’appr\u00e9cier la position de la France \u00e0 l’ONU, apr\u00e8s son \u00e9volution r\u00e9cente, son r\u00f4le central dans l’\u00e9laboration de la r\u00e9solution 1701 sur le cessez-le-feu ; sa position sur sa participation au contingent de l’ONU, d’abord per\u00e7ue comme une participation tr\u00e8s importante (3.000 hommes),… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2798,2687,4472,5611,3478,5812,2804],"class_list":["post-67913","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cessez-le-feu","tag-france","tag-hezbollah","tag-liban","tag-onu","tag-resolution","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67913","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67913"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67913\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67913"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67913"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67913"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}