{"id":67914,"date":"2006-08-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/24\/plus-ca-change-plus-cest-la-meme-chose-suite-sans-fin\/"},"modified":"2006-08-24T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-24T00:00:00","slug":"plus-ca-change-plus-cest-la-meme-chose-suite-sans-fin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/24\/plus-ca-change-plus-cest-la-meme-chose-suite-sans-fin\/","title":{"rendered":"Plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose (suite sans fin)<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose (suite sans fin)<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t24 ao\u00fbt 2006 Commen\u00e7ons par une pi\u00e8ce assez classique de conformation virtualiste et bien-pensante, bien dans l’air du temps d\u00e9mocratique dont se nourrit notre conformisme. Il s’agit d’un article du lib\u00e9ral isra\u00e9lien Uri Dromi, directeur des affaires internationales au Israel Democracy Institute, de J\u00e9rusalem, dont nous citons un passage. La dialectique est connue, qui se retrouve comme un poisson dans l’eau dans celle de tous nos lib\u00e9raux de type humanitaro-interventionniste : finalement, malgr\u00e9 toutes nos imperfections, rien ne vaut nos d\u00e9mocraties et leurs repr\u00e9sentations arm\u00e9es que sont le Pentagone et Tsahal<\/em>. Pour autant, poursuit cette dialectique, nous ne sommes certainement pas bellicistes ; nous sommes adeptes des bombardements dans la mesure o\u00f9 ils sont, selon le mot de Havel en marge de la guerre du Kosovo, en avril 1999, humanitaires. Pour faire bref et selon les mots de Dromi lui-m\u00eame : \u00ab In order to be a political dove, one needs to be a military hawk.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans son texte, Dromi fait de l’apparente victoire du Hezbollah la cause de d\u00e9faites chronologiquement toutes proches du m\u00eame Hezbollah, notamment gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une r\u00e9surrection de toutes les vertus d’Isra\u00ebl. Et l’on trouve ce passage, o\u00f9 l’humaniste pr\u00eate attention \u00e0 la chose militaire :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Finally, with his reckless gamble Nasrallah has left Israelis very angry and determined to settle unfinished business. The war exposed a lot of flaws in the Israeli military and civilian systems, but these will be vigorously examined and fixed. Nasrallah and his like, who have no idea how democracies function, may mistake the present turmoil in Israel for weakness. They are in for yet another surprise.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn d’autres termes : c’est parce que la guerre a d\u00e9montr\u00e9 bien des faiblesses et des fautes de Tsahal<\/em> que tous les espoirs nous sont permis : nous allons pouvoir r\u00e9parer et donc triompher, et avec nous la d\u00e9mocratie Car c’est ainsi que notre d\u00e9mocratie triomphe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTournons-nous vers les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux et voyons cela. Un texte document\u00e9 et professionnel d’Aviation Week<\/a> du 21 ao\u00fbt nous pr\u00e9sente les arguments des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux et les perspectives des changements \u00e0 venir, \u00e0 partir notamment d’une rencontre avec a retired air force general<\/em>. Le s\u00e9rieux habituel et les connexions de cette publication nous indiquent qu’il s’agit l\u00e0 d’une source sans aucun doute tr\u00e8s repr\u00e9sentative de la direction des forces arm\u00e9es isra\u00e9liennes, une source qui a le soutien du Pentagone. On peut consid\u00e9rer l’argument officieusement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 comme \u00e9tant tr\u00e8s repr\u00e9sentatif de la position de l’establishment<\/em> militaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In defense of the Israeli air force (IAF), the service’s leadership never claimed that it could suppress the short-range missiles fired by the hundreds from southern Lebanon, says the general, who maintains his contacts with the strike fighter community. Nobody suggested that the air force could win the war alone, he says.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb However, the air force was extremely effective in carrying out the strategic missions it was assigned, the general contends. It took care of all the long-range missile capability that could have inflicted damage south of Haifa, he says. They did not fire a single [210-km.-range Zilzal-2]. Some of the earliest reports from Israel’s defense ministry confirmed that a number of the long-range weapons had been identified and destroyed. The other strategic mission of the IAF was to damage the roads and bridges that had permitted the long-term supply of weapons, supplies and intelligence-gathering equipment from Syria and Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israeli troops are still finding packaged Russian-designed AT-5 antitank weapons produced in Iran, as well as Russian-made, Syrian-supplied Kornet-E laser-guided and Metis-M antiarmor weapons with delivery instructions attached. Other equipment discovered in captured strongholds also include Russian AT-4 Fagot and Italian Milan antitank weapons, as well as a variety of sophisticated observation devices, including night-vision systems and remote-controlled cameras.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb However, the weapons with the most political impact in this conflict were the short-range, unguided artillery rockets, such as the Iranian-built Fajr-3 (now being found in large numbers) that fell on Israel by the hundreds. Despite the bombing campaign, thousands of these weapons were already in Lebanon and in Hezbollah’s hands before the airwar began.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The air force can’t take care of the tactical missiles once they are out of sight in tunnels and building basements, the IAF general says. That’s a different issue. It’s not the task of the air force. There’s no way [fighters and unmanned aircraft] can find and destroy all the short-range rockets. There’s no way to do that but with a ground force that can go into the building and tunnel complexes where the missiles are hidden. That was obvious from the beginning of the war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb While the IAF contends it did its mission, others are putting some of the blame for the offensive’s mixed results on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, the first air force officer to serve in that post. Critics contend that his expectations for the IAF were too high. As a result, along with continued fighting against Hamas in Gaza and the looming roles-and-missions battle between the services, there are strong signals the Israeli defense establishment is headed for a shake-up. Additionally, a heated debate over future defense spending priorities is expected in the coming months.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Israeli military says it struck 7,000 targets during the month-long campaign, with the navy bombarding another 2,500 along the coast. The air force flew more than 15,500 missions, about two-thirds of which were for combat operations and the rest in support roles. About 2,000 helicopter missions were flown, plus 1,000 helicopter-based search-and-rescue missions and 1,200 transport aircraft missions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The IDF says reconnaissance flights totaled more than 1,300, including manned and unmanned aircraft<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n

L’apparence de la r\u00e9forme contre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 bureaucratique<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes arguments sont imparables. Ils se rapportent \u00e0 trois grands th\u00e8mes sur lesquels les militaires (les aviateurs) isra\u00e9liens appuient leur d\u00e9fense:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Nous n’avons jamais pr\u00e9tendu gagner la guerre par la seule force a\u00e9rienne<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Par contre, notre intervention a\u00e9rienne a \u00e9t\u00e9 un tr\u00e8s grand succ\u00e8s par rapport \u00e0 ce que nous voulions faire, en verrouillant la dimension strat\u00e9gique. La tactique, ce n’est pas le travail de l’offensive a\u00e9rienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Vous grognez contre ce qui s’est pass\u00e9 mais il faut que vous vous rendiez compte de ce que nous vous avons \u00e9vit\u00e9 en attaquant aussi efficacement que nous l’avons fait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’arguments st\u00e9r\u00e9otyp\u00e9s, imit\u00e9s de ceux de la bureaucratie du Pentagone, apr\u00e8s chaque conflit o\u00f9 une place centrale a \u00e9t\u00e9 attribu\u00e9e \u00e0 l’offensive a\u00e9rienne et \u00e0 la technologie, c’est-\u00e0-dire, essentiellement tous les conflits o\u00f9 cette bureaucratie est impliqu\u00e9e depuis 1945. Ces arguments sont appuy\u00e9s sur le refus des responsabilit\u00e9s de la guerre tactique et sur la performance virtualiste de la guerre a\u00e9rienne (ce qui se serait pass\u00e9 si nous n’avions pas fait ce que nous avons fait). C’est l’argument fondamental qui marqua la guerre du Viet-n\u00e2m, ou encore la guerre du Kosovo quand elle n’allait pas bien (c’est-\u00e0-dire dans les 9\/10\u00e8me de sa dur\u00e9e, le dernier dixi\u00e8me \u00e9tant occup\u00e9 par l’intervention de la Russie l\u00e2chant Milosevic)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y a quelques restrictions dans l’extrait pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 ci-dessus (\u00ab there are strong signals the Israeli defense establishment is headed for a shake-up. Additionally, a heated debate over future defense spending priorities is expected in the coming months<\/em> \u00bb). Il s’agit essentiellement de remarques de convenance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl existe tous les signes apparents d’un grand d\u00e9bat critique en Isra\u00ebl sur les performances de l’arm\u00e9e, notamment une (des) enqu\u00eate(s) critique sur ce comportement. Le ministre de la justice Hamutz a donn\u00e9 au Premier ministre Olmert les options possibles \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, selon Haaretz<\/em> du 23 ao\u00fbt<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Among the options listed by Mazuz were the following: a state commission of inquiry; a governmental inquiry commission with subpoena powers, like the Zailer Committee; an investigation by the state comptroller; a parliamentary committee of inquiry, like the one the Knesset established earlier this year to investigate the evacuation of the Amona settlement outpost; an inquiry committee appointed by a minister, like the one headed by former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak that Defense Minister Amir Peretz has already established and internal investigations by the various agencies involved, similar to the IDF’s operational investigations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Olmert is expected to make a decision by the end of the week, since on Sunday, the High Court of Justice is slated to hear a petition demanding the establishment of a state commission of inquiry. The state must submit its response to this petition no later than 24 hours before the hearing.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tExaminant le processus de nomination des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux isra\u00e9liens dont d\u00e9pend une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9forme de l’arm\u00e9e qui serait n\u00e9cessaire apr\u00e8s la campagne du Liban, Amir Oren constate (Haaretz<\/em>, 23 ao\u00fbt<\/a>) combien le processus est compl\u00e8tement sous le contr\u00f4le de l’establishment<\/em> militaire : \u00ab Within the army, the chief of staff has full liberty to choose major generals and give them appointments. He can decide in a level-headed way, and also according to caprices, a shared past, love-hate relations and group affiliation. If the defense minister is a former chief of staff, or a retired major general, the process replicates itself, in authorizing or tit-for-tat. Only in rare cases, such as head of Military Intelligence, who also maintains an official connection with the government echelon, do they bother to bring the appointment to the knowledge of a third person, the prime minister. When the prime minister is also the defense minister, only two are partner to the deal.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question technique essentielle de la r\u00e9forme serait de retrouver l’ancienne formule th\u00e9orique du succ\u00e8s de Tsahal<\/em>, avec l’arm\u00e9e de terre r\u00e9cup\u00e9rant sa place dans la direction militaire (\u00ab [T]he main issue on the agenda is rehabilitating the ground forces and the correct balance among the branches of the IDF<\/em> \u00bb). La structure actuelle et les pouvoirs tels qu’ils sont distribu\u00e9s ne laissent gu\u00e8re d’espoir de changement significatif. Le Premier ministre Olmert est bien trop affaibli pour tenter de forcer \u00e0 des modifications importantes, dont il n’a d’ailleurs peut-\u00eatre pas la moindre id\u00e9e de ce qu’elles doivent \u00eatre. L’argument de la pression des \u00e9v\u00e9nements est \u00e9vident, avec l’actuel cessez-le-feu appr\u00e9ci\u00e9 comme une simple phase interm\u00e9diaire entre deux batailles. Le paradoxe du monde bureaucratis\u00e9 dans lequel nous vivons se d\u00e9finit par l’adage invers\u00e9 : on ne change pas une \u00e9quipe qui ne gagne pas (car il n’y a rien \u00e0 mettre \u00e0 la place). L’essentiel de l’action \u00e0 entreprendre sera donc de montrer, comme le fait Dromi, que si certains parlent d’un revers de Tsahal<\/em>, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est que le Hezbollah est en marche vers la d\u00e9faite. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNotre avis est qu’on doit attendre que rien, absolument rien ne sera modifi\u00e9 dans l’orientation des forces arm\u00e9es isra\u00e9liennes, notamment les forces a\u00e9riennes et la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence de ces forces a\u00e9riennes et de la technologie dans la planification bureaucratique, donc dans tout conflit \u00e0 venir. (Cette pr\u00e9\u00e9minence bureaucratique de l’aviation, c’est la nouveaut\u00e9 r\u00e9volutionnaire pour Tsahal<\/em> par rapport \u00e0 ce que fut cette arm\u00e9e. C’est le facteur qui d\u00e9termine autant l’accent mis sur les hautes technologies chez les Isra\u00e9liens que la vigueur des liens entre Tsahal<\/em> et le Pentagone.) La situation \u00e9tait bien d\u00e9crite dans un article de Defense News<\/em> du 17 juillet : \u00ab One IDF brigadier general said anyone in uniform would be quickly marginalized if he or she challenged what he called the General Staff’s precipitous rush toward remote, networked, virtual control over high-threat areas.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA cette lumi\u00e8re, le commentaire de Dromi devrait \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9 comme ang\u00e9lique ou grotesque c’est selon (\u00ab The war exposed a lot of flaws in the Israeli military and civilian systems, but these will be vigorously examined and fixed. Nasrallah and his like, who have no idea how democracies function, may mistake the present turmoil in Israel for weakness<\/em> \u00bb). C’est justement la faiblesse du syst\u00e8me d\u00e9mocratique, soumis au diktat<\/em> de la bureaucratie et de la technologie, qui nous garantit une compl\u00e8te impossibilit\u00e9 de r\u00e9forme. Les structures, les tactiques et les conceptions des forces arm\u00e9es resteront les m\u00eames. Le reste suivra \u00e0 mesure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose (suite sans fin) 24 ao\u00fbt 2006 Commen\u00e7ons par une pi\u00e8ce assez classique de conformation virtualiste et bien-pensante, bien dans l’air du temps d\u00e9mocratique dont se nourrit notre conformisme. Il s’agit d’un article du lib\u00e9ral isra\u00e9lien Uri Dromi, directeur des affaires internationales au Israel Democracy Institute, de J\u00e9rusalem,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4195,2623,5813,2774,3607,3519,4714],"class_list":["post-67914","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-aviation","tag-bureaucratie","tag-dromi","tag-israel","tag-planification","tag-technologie","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67914","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67914"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67914\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67914"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67914"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67914"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}