A new report by the staff of the House of Representatives intelligence committee suggested that the administration was ill-equipped to drive a hard bargain. It found significant gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the various areas of concern about Iran and said policymakers will need high-quality intelligence to assess Iranian intentions to prepare for any new round of negotiations.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl y a pourtant dans cette \u00e9valuation US de l’Iran, malgr\u00e9 la similitude de (mauvaise) qualit\u00e9, une tr\u00e8s grande diff\u00e9rence avec la situation irakienne (\u00e9valuation US de l’Irak avant l’invasion de l’Irak). Le climat \u00e0 Washington est compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rent. Le d\u00e9sordre et la confusion ont remplac\u00e9 la confiance en soi arrogante de l’ann\u00e9e 2002. L’atmosph\u00e8re est tellement d\u00e9l\u00e9t\u00e8re \u00e0 Washington qu’il ne semble plus gu\u00e8re question de manipulations et de dissimulation de la part de l’administration GW pour ce qui concerne l’Iran, comme cela avait \u00e9t\u00e9 le cas avec l’Irak. Au contraire, le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral qui s’installe est que les USA ne savent rien de la situation iranienne, \u00e0 un point o\u00f9 il semble impossible d’esp\u00e9rer une am\u00e9lioration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 24 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 10H17<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La catastrophe irakienne avait \u00e9t\u00e9 commenc\u00e9e \u00e0 partir d’un renseignement am\u00e9ricain compl\u00e8tement manipul\u00e9, d\u00e9sinform\u00e9 et catastrophiquement faux. Il semble que l’Iran, avec qui on envisage \u00e9galement un affrontement, ne soit pas mieux loti. Un article du Guardian d’aujourd’hui signale la diffusion hier d’un rapport de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9senants : \u00ab A new report by… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,2773,2807,3248],"class_list":["post-67916","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-renseignement","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67916","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67916"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67916\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67916"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67916"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67916"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}