Tsahal<\/em> d\u00e9pendaient d’une planification longuement travaill\u00e9e dans la perspective d’une op\u00e9ration contre le Hezbollah, et qu’elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 engag\u00e9es hors de toute pression d’un danger direct. La seule pression existante \u00e9tait celle des exigences diverses : celle du commandement, celle du pouvoir politique isra\u00e9lien, celle de l’alli\u00e9 US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe probl\u00e8me nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le exactement les conceptions qui pr\u00e9sident aujourd’hui au fonctionnement de Tsahal<\/em> et l’\u00e9tat d’esprit qui r\u00e8gne chez les chefs de cette arm\u00e9e. On retrouve toutes les caract\u00e9ristiques des arm\u00e9es modernes sur le mod\u00e8le am\u00e9ricaniste. L’accent sur les technologies et les interventions automatiques massives, essentiellement a\u00e9riennes, laissent compl\u00e8tement de c\u00f4t\u00e9 les questions psychologiques et d’organisation humaine, obstruant syst\u00e9matiquement les initiatives de terrain. La hi\u00e9rarchie n’est plus pr\u00e9occup\u00e9e que de la seule marche des aspects de la planification qui la concernent ; elle est plus pr\u00e9occup\u00e9e des effets de l’action sur sa propre organisation que sur les op\u00e9rations elles-m\u00eames. C’est la reproduction de l’importance des batailles bureaucratiques prenant le pas sur la guerre r\u00e9elle, si caract\u00e9ristique du Pentagone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVoici quelques extraits de l’article : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab An Israeli brigade commander who was a key player in the Lebanon war has accused senior army officers of being badly out of touch with events on the ground and of exposing soldiers to unnecessary risks.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Amid widening recriminations in Israel that are threatening to bring down the government, Colonel Amnon Eshel, commander of the 7th tank division, in an interview accused his division commander of being insensitive towards the plight of reservists who were called up at a moment’s notice and ill-prepared.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Talking about events leading up to the ground operation Amnon said: I realised there was a problem with the readiness of the reserve regiment to carry out its mission. The regiment commander told me he was not ready. So I went to the division commander … he told me: I don’t care, we’re going in’.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Amnon returned to his division commander twice to request the order be changed and was rejected both times. In the end, he said, he subverted his orders because of his fears of mass casualties. Amnon, who made the claims in an interview with award-winning Israeli film director Nurit Kedar, commanded thousands of soldiers on the eastern section of the south Lebanon front.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Referring to the need to balance the pressure from higher up the military chain to launch the operation swiftly with trying to minimise the risks to the soldiers, Amnon said: It was clear to me that I must carry out my mission, but I did not want others below me to know I was in this dilemma. Many things went wrong in the decision-making process concerning the handling of my operation. My division commander had his own evaluation. The officers at army headquarters were out of touch with what was happening on the ground … we made so many changes in 24 hours. They did not know how to react.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 27 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 08H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La crise affectant Tsahal apr\u00e8s la guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt montre toute sa gravit\u00e9 avec l’interview d’un officier du rang, commandant d’une unit\u00e9 importante ayant particip\u00e9 au conflit contre le Hezbollah. Il s’agit du colonel commandant la 7\u00e8me division de chars, qui d\u00e9crit les conditions de pr\u00e9paration et de mise en action du r\u00e9giment de r\u00e9servistes… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5831,2623,5260,3228,5719,4714],"class_list":["post-67927","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-amnon","tag-bureaucratie","tag-colonel","tag-crise","tag-halutz","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67927","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67927"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67927\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67927"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67927"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67927"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}