{"id":67934,"date":"2006-08-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/28\/tsahal-une-armee-qui-a-perdu-son-ame\/"},"modified":"2006-08-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-08-28T00:00:00","slug":"tsahal-une-armee-qui-a-perdu-son-ame","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/08\/28\/tsahal-une-armee-qui-a-perdu-son-ame\/","title":{"rendered":"Tsahal<\/em>, une arm\u00e9e qui a perdu son \u00e2me?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dans les ann\u00e9es 1970, on parlait de l’U.S. Army, retour de la terrible exp\u00e9rience vietnamienne et des troubles qu’elle avait connus, comme d’une hollow army<\/em> (litt\u00e9ralement, une arm\u00e9e sans substance, une arm\u00e9e comme une coquille vide, ou bien encore : une arm\u00e9e qui a perdu son \u00e2me \u00e0 partir des probl\u00e8mes techniques et surtout psychologiques qu’elle a rencontr\u00e9s et qu’elle a aggrav\u00e9s).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe terme d’hollow army<\/em>, ou hollow military<\/em>, est repris pour Tsahal<\/em> dans une courte mais tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressante analyse de Trent Telenko, sur son site Winds of Change.NET<\/em>, en date du 22 ao\u00fbt<\/a>. De fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s significative, Telenko met l’accent sur les traits de corruption, dans tous les sens du mot, qui caract\u00e9risent la Tsahal<\/em> postmoderne ; corruption psychologique dans les croyances entretenues sur cette arm\u00e9e ; corruption bureaucratique avec les impasses d’\u00e9quipement, d’entra\u00eenement, etc., au profit de la quincaillerie technologique ; corruption de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, avec les nominations politiques, le favoritisme de la conscription, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe raisonnement de Telenko :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab I come to this conclusion<\/em> [that today’s Israeli Defense Force (IDF) may be a Hollow Military’] via three routes. My day job is as a Defense Department Quality Specialist. Patterns of Defense corruption are part of my professional training. I have also been a serious military wargamer for more than 25 years. Last, being a military history buff, I have James Dunnigan’s How to Make War and Dirty Little Secrets books, Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn’t Work, and most importantly Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam and into the 21st Century, as references for the symptoms of Hollow’ militaries.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb You would expect to see the following things in a Hollow’ draft-based military.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb 1) Shortages of reservist training and reservist stocks and equipment. Check yes’ for the IDF.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb 2) Poor leadership not only at the senior leadership, but all the way down to the battlefield level. Poor leadership that has political cronyism at its heart. The Hezbollah missile strike on the INS Al-Hanit, <\/em>[Aug. 19, 2006 Jerusalem Post op-ed<\/a> by Lenny] Ben-Davis plus multiple posts over on Yonitheblogger.com makes that another check yes’ for the IDF.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb 3) Draft dodging by the political elites and their children. Again, this is another check mark yes’ for the IDF.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Israel could clearly still beat Syria in a stand up conventional military fight as the latter’s armed forces have deteriorated faster for the same reasons than Israel’s, but the majority of IDF reservists who make up between 70 and 80% of the IDF’s ground forces seem to have lost much of their combat effectiveness edge over Arab opponents.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The unnecessary casualties Israel would take from such a regional war, in particular among its neglected reserves all of whom plus their relatives are voters, may not be demographically or politicallly sustainable. Israeli political elites fearing this result may be why the Olmert government bailed on the opportunity provided by the Bush Administration to eliminate Hezbollah and possibly widen the conflict to Syria.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe v\u00e9ritable probl\u00e8me d\u00e9sormais est l’avenir. L’arm\u00e9e am\u00e9ricaine mit plus d’une d\u00e9cennie pour se remettre de son effondrement psychologique vietnamien. (Et encore, pour emprunter une voie qui est elle-m\u00eame une autre forme de corruption de sa substance.) Isra\u00ebl peut-il entreprendre ce processus ? Ces dirigeants ont-ils conscience de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’une reconstruction et d’une renaissance de la chose militaire ? Et ainsi de suite : \u00e0 ces deux questions et d’autres du m\u00eame style, on sera tent\u00e9 de proposer des r\u00e9ponses plus que sceptiques. Les perspectives sont alors tr\u00e8s sombres.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSelon Telenko :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab If this <\/em>[IDF military renaissance] does not happen if Israel’s politicians block it we will know that the Israeli Defense Forces are likely hollow while reform is unlikely until further disasters occur. Israel cannot survive many military disasters. Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu’s silence on these points, plus his past service as Prime Minister of Israel 1996-99, indicate that the blame here might be shared by all of Israel’s political elites.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb American policy-makers should pay close heed to these matters. Corruption by Israeli political elites might be such that the effectiveness of Israel’s armed forces, and the continued existence of Israel, should no longer be considered as givens.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 28 ao\u00fbt 2006 \u00e0 15H51<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dans les ann\u00e9es 1970, on parlait de l’U.S. Army, retour de la terrible exp\u00e9rience vietnamienne et des troubles qu’elle avait connus, comme d’une hollow army (litt\u00e9ralement, une arm\u00e9e sans substance, une arm\u00e9e comme une coquille vide, ou bien encore : une arm\u00e9e qui a perdu son \u00e2me \u00e0 partir des probl\u00e8mes techniques et surtout psychologiques… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3289,5843,5022,5844,4714],"class_list":["post-67934","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-army","tag-hollow","tag-military","tag-telenko","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67934","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67934"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67934\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67934"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67934"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67934"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}