{"id":67994,"date":"2006-09-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-09-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/09\/14\/le-pentagone-et-la-regle-dor-de-la-concurrence\/"},"modified":"2006-09-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-09-14T00:00:00","slug":"le-pentagone-et-la-regle-dor-de-la-concurrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/09\/14\/le-pentagone-et-la-regle-dor-de-la-concurrence\/","title":{"rendered":"Le Pentagone et la r\u00e8gle d&rsquo;or de la concurrence"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>David Walker, le directeur du Government Accountability Office (GAO, \u00e9quivalent de la Cour des Comptes) a donn\u00e9 les r\u00e9sultats d&rsquo;une enqu\u00eate de ses services sur les conditions dans lesquelles les r\u00e8gles de concurrence sont respect\u00e9es au sein du d\u00e9partement de la d\u00e9fense (DoD, ou Pentagone). A part des cas extr\u00eames repr\u00e9sentant largement moins de 0,1% des contrats pour lesquels un cas de monopole existe, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dans des programmes ultra-secrets et hautement sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s, tous les contrats du Pentagone avec l&rsquo;industrie priv\u00e9e doivent faire l&rsquo;objet d&rsquo;un appel d&rsquo;offres et soumis \u00e0 la concurrence. Les r\u00e9sultats des recherches du GAO, portant sur les $270 milliards de contrats qui seront pass\u00e9s en 2006, sont les suivants :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  41% d&rsquo;entre eux sont soumis aux r\u00e8gles de la concurrence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  50% d&rsquo;entre eux sont pass\u00e9s directement \u00e0 un seul contractant, sans \u00eatre soumis \u00e0 un appel d&rsquo;offres.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  9% sont dans une cat\u00e9gorie dite ind\u00e9termin\u00e9e, dont il n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 possible de d\u00e9terminer si elle rel\u00e8ve ou non de la mise en concurrence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWalker d\u00e9posait le 7 septembre devant la sous-commission des Appropriations de la Chambre. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/story.php?F=2088715&#038;C=america\" class=\"gen\">Defense News<\/a> rapporte, le 11 septembre, quelques observations sur ce t\u00e9moignage :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>According to Walker, the Army hired security guards through sole-source contracts at 46 of 57 Army installations  avoiding competitive bidding even though it recognized it was paying 25 percent more when failing to require bidding, he said.<\/em> ()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Walker said contractors and the military services tend to overpromise and underdeliver when it comes to building weapons. The final product too often can&rsquo;t do all that was promised, is delivered months or years late and is extremely over budget. Contractors are at fault when they lowball costs and promise capabilities they can&rsquo;t deliver, Walker said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The services are at fault because they often fail to separate what they want from what they need and can afford. Walker avoided naming specific programs, but in the past has said the Air Force is unable to make a sound business case for buying the F-22 fighter, a plane designed to fight the Soviet Union of the 1970s and 1980s. <\/em>[ Walker] said only that the F-22 is a case study that illustrates many of the contracting woes that beset the Defense Department.<D><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>One that infuriated several subcommittee members is the Pentagon&rsquo;s practice of paying award fees and other financial incentives to contractors despite dismal performance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>For example, the Army paid Boeing and Sikorsky nearly $203 million in award fees on the Comanche helicopter program. Then, after spending 21 years and $7 billion without producing a workable helicopter, the Army canceled the program in 2004. The Air Force paid Lockheed Martin almost $850 million in award fees for the F-22, a stealth fighter that has taken two decades to build, has been plagued with problems and cost $65 billion  at least $3.5 billion in cost overruns.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>To some extent, production delays and cost overruns can be blamed on the military, which often changes requirements, disrupting contractor work and adding cost, Walker said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 14 septembre 2006 \u00e0 08H22<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>David Walker, le directeur du Government Accountability Office (GAO, \u00e9quivalent de la Cour des Comptes) a donn\u00e9 les r\u00e9sultats d&rsquo;une enqu\u00eate de ses services sur les conditions dans lesquelles les r\u00e8gles de concurrence sont respect\u00e9es au sein du d\u00e9partement de la d\u00e9fense (DoD, ou Pentagone). A part des cas extr\u00eames repr\u00e9sentant largement moins de 0,1%&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4139,4248,4544,3194],"class_list":["post-67994","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-concurrence","tag-gao","tag-gaspillage","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67994","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67994"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67994\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67994"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67994"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67994"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}