{"id":68002,"date":"2006-09-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-09-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/09\/18\/on-persiste-et-on-signe\/"},"modified":"2006-09-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-09-18T00:00:00","slug":"on-persiste-et-on-signe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/09\/18\/on-persiste-et-on-signe\/","title":{"rendered":"On persiste et on signe"},"content":{"rendered":"

Apr\u00e8s la deuxi\u00e8me guerre du Liban, la force a\u00e9rienne isra\u00e9lienne ne craint qu’une chose : que quelque r\u00e9formateur farfelu arrive \u00e0 faire accepter l’id\u00e9e qu’il faut renforcer les unit\u00e9s de combat terrestres aux d\u00e9pens des unit\u00e9s a\u00e9riennes. Comme l’on sait, la guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt a \u00e9t\u00e9 la d\u00e9monstration flagrante de l’incapacit\u00e9 de la force a\u00e9rienne de traiter ce type de guerre dit de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G). Mais la force a\u00e9rienne affirme que les prochaines guerres n’auront rien \u00e0 voir avec ce qui vient de se passer et qu’il faut donc, plus que jamais, mettre l’accent sur la force a\u00e9rienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette argumentation entre dans la logique d\u00e9sormais bien connue<\/a> : puisque la guerre que nous avions pr\u00e9vue, avec les mat\u00e9riels que nous avions, n’a pas eu lieu, c’est donc cette guerre-l\u00e0, toujours avec ces m\u00eames mat\u00e9riels, qu’il faut plus que jamais pr\u00e9parer.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa logique des aviateurs est expos\u00e9e dans un texte d’Haaretz<\/em> de ce jour<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abMeanwhile, senior Israel Air Force officers warned on Sunday that an apparent move by the General Staff, the Defense Ministry and the government to invest more in the ground forces at the expense of the IAF, as one lesson of the war that followed the kidnapping, is liable to severely harm the IAF’s preparedness for future wars, which may well be different from the recent one in Lebanon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe sources warned that the impending cuts were liable to force the IAF to cut back on manpower and training, and perhaps even to shut down complete fighter squadrons. Halutz, a former commander of the IAF, has said in the past that he would rather shut down a tank division than a fighter squadron, but the officers fear that the public backlash generated by the war may force him to abandon this stance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAccording to these officers, the principle threats now facing Israel are Syria, which could view the outcome of the recent war as encouragement for attacking Israel in order to regain the Golan Heights; Iran, should it succeed in obtaining nuclear weapons; and Egypt, should President Hosni Mubarak be succeeded by a regime hostile to Israel. Moreover, they said, Israel could face war on two or all of these fronts at once, requiring it to be able to shift forces quickly from one front to another – something at which the air force obviously excels.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe officers also claimed that ground troops might never be employed at all in wars against any of these countries. However, they added, if ground forces were employed, air force cover would be needed to give them freedom to maneuver.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 18 septembre 2006 \u00e0 10H07<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Apr\u00e8s la deuxi\u00e8me guerre du Liban, la force a\u00e9rienne isra\u00e9lienne ne craint qu’une chose : que quelque r\u00e9formateur farfelu arrive \u00e0 faire accepter l’id\u00e9e qu’il faut renforcer les unit\u00e9s de combat terrestres aux d\u00e9pens des unit\u00e9s a\u00e9riennes. Comme l’on sait, la guerre de juillet-ao\u00fbt a \u00e9t\u00e9 la d\u00e9monstration flagrante de l’incapacit\u00e9 de la force a\u00e9rienne… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4195,5901,5701,4714],"class_list":["post-68002","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aviation","tag-enseignement","tag-g4g","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68002","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68002"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68002\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68002"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68002"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68002"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}