repouss\u00e9<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVoici le paragraphe en question :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe officers said that for Israel to retain air superiority over Arab and Muslim states, some of which are now being armed with the most advanced American weaponry, the IAF needs about 100 new planes a year. In the coming decade, the IAF would like to acquire three or four squadrons of F-35 planes, the successor to the F-16, and a smaller number of F-22s, successor to the F-15 at a cost that is liable to reach $200 million per plane.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCette mention du F-22, venue de sources assez s\u00fbres, indique clairement qu’en cette affaire \u00e9galement (le sort du F-22), Isra\u00e9liens de l’IAF et Am\u00e9ricains de l’USAF ont partie li\u00e9e. Les Am\u00e9ricains veulent que l’IAF annonce son intention d’acheter le F-22 (quoi qu’il en soit de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de ce projet, d’ailleurs) pour renforcer le statut du programme au Congr\u00e8s. La complicit\u00e9 entre aviateurs isra\u00e9liens et aviateurs am\u00e9ricains est compl\u00e8te, les premiers n’ayant rien \u00e0 refuser aux seconds dans la mesure o\u00f9 le soutien g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF \u00e0 l’IAF au niveau strat\u00e9gique constitue un puissant argument pour maintenir et renforcer le statut de l’IAF \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de l’establishment<\/em> isra\u00e9lien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tEntre amis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 18 septembre 2006 \u00e0 12H07<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Dans ce texte d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 dans le sujet pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de ce m\u00eame ‘Bloc-Notes’, un paragraphe int\u00e9ressant fait mention des besoins de la force a\u00e9rienne isra\u00e9lienne (IAF) pour conserver sa sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 a\u00e9rienne sur les pays arabes. Il s’agit toujours des m\u00eames sources proches de l’IAF, qui font mention de ses intentions d’achat (ou de proposition d’achat)… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[249,2969,5903,250,4714,41],"class_list":["post-68004","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-f-22","tag-f-35","tag-iaf","tag-jsf","tag-tsahal","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68004","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68004"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68004\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68004"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68004"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68004"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}