{"id":68086,"date":"2006-10-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/11\/le-quatrieme-cavalier-de-lapocalypse\/"},"modified":"2006-10-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-11T00:00:00","slug":"le-quatrieme-cavalier-de-lapocalypse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/11\/le-quatrieme-cavalier-de-lapocalypse\/","title":{"rendered":"Le quatri\u00e8me cavalier de l&rsquo;Apocalypse"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Il y a deux fa\u00e7ons de consid\u00e9rer la crise nucl\u00e9aire nord-cor\u00e9enne : d&rsquo;un point de vue strat\u00e9gique, par rapport \u00e0 la r\u00e9gion o\u00f9 elle se produit, ou d&rsquo;un point de vue nucl\u00e9aire, par rapport \u00e0 l&rsquo;effet impliqu\u00e9 par la possession de cette arme. Chan Akya, sur <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Korea\/HJ11Dg02.html\" class=\"gen\">atimes.com<\/a>, choisit la deuxi\u00e8me voie. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans cette logique, Akya observe et pr\u00e9voit la constitution d&rsquo;un arc nucl\u00e9aire, dont il craint les effets d\u00e9stabilisateurs : \u00ab<em>Three non-Abrahamic powers now possess nuclear weapons (China, India and North Korea). It is very likely that the number will quickly become five (including South Korea and Japan) in the very near future. Thus there will be a geographical continuum of nuclear states from Japan to Pakistan, which when Russia, Iran and Israel are added, becomes the atomic crescent. If you were considering the idea of building a nuclear shelter, now would be a good time to start, although<\/em> [] <em>the exercise would prove pointless.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tElargi au champ plus large de tous les possesseurs de l&rsquo;arme nucl\u00e9aire, le raisonnement de Akya devient effectivement apocalyptique lorsqu&rsquo;il d\u00e9compte les pays qui seraient susceptibles d&rsquo;utiliser cette arme en premi\u00e8re frappe : \u00ab<em>In my view, the three states with the greatest potential for launching first strikes are Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. Add a United States that misunderstands its role in the world and the effect of its policies, and the four horsemen of the apocalypse, as the Bible so lovingly puts it, are in place.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux quatre cavaliers attribue la Famine \u00e0 la Cor\u00e9e du Nord, la Guerre \u00e0 l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique, la Peste et la Mort \u00e9tant \u00e0 partager sans choix d\u00e9fini entre les deux autres. Le raisonnement, avec cette quincaillerie biblique, est original, montrant combien la prolif\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire a pour premi\u00e8re cons\u00e9quence certaine de d\u00e9cha\u00eener l&rsquo;imagination des strat\u00e8ges. Malgr\u00e9 cette originalit\u00e9, une constante se retrouve dans le r\u00f4le et la tendance d&rsquo;\u00e9volution attribu\u00e9s aux USA. L&rsquo;explosion de la bombe nord-cor\u00e9enne est d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et tr\u00e8s r\u00e9pandue per\u00e7ue directement comme une d\u00e9faite am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAinsi la conclusion d&rsquo;Akya, apr\u00e8s avoir fait des USA l&rsquo;un des quatre Cavaliers :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>I have left the last of the four horsemen, and admittedly the one whose malcontent policies started it all, to the last. The United States may not realize this today, but the existence of the crescent mentioned above in essence destroys its claims to be the sole superpower. The US can no longer wage unilateral warfare against any country within the above-defined crescent, because the needs and reactions of natural allies need to be taken into count. Both Iran and North Korea are capable of gambling  and desperate enough to do so \u00ac that a first strike against the US will not lead to nuclear retribution as its neighborhood will be damaged as well. The US cannot risk nuclear fallout on Japan and South Korea, nor on Saudi Arabia and Israel.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>A country that cannot stomach civilian losses and is limited from engaging in massive retribution will in essence have to rethink its strategic paradigm. In a matter of a few years, the US will go back to defending itself domestically from hostile forces, rather than projecting its power globally.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>It is the end of the American century.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 11 octobre 2006 \u00e0 05H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Il y a deux fa\u00e7ons de consid\u00e9rer la crise nucl\u00e9aire nord-cor\u00e9enne : d&rsquo;un point de vue strat\u00e9gique, par rapport \u00e0 la r\u00e9gion o\u00f9 elle se produit, ou d&rsquo;un point de vue nucl\u00e9aire, par rapport \u00e0 l&rsquo;effet impliqu\u00e9 par la possession de cette arme. Chan Akya, sur atimes.com, choisit la deuxi\u00e8me voie. Dans cette logique, Akya&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2769,4012,3299,5995,2651,3349,3004,3716,2804],"class_list":["post-68086","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-americain","tag-apocalypse","tag-coree","tag-croissant","tag-du","tag-nord","tag-nucleaire","tag-siecle","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68086","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68086"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68086\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68086"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68086"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68086"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}