aujourd’hui<\/a>) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abGeostrategically, the North Korea nuclear crisis benefits Iran in several ways. First, it may translate into a costly US force buildup in the Korean Peninsula, thus reducing the United States’ military menace with regard to Iran. Second, Iran, which has purchased North Korean missiles in the past, may opt to strengthen its military relations with North Korea, in which case its bargaining position in the ongoing negotiations will be somewhat enhanced.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThird, China, which relative to Russia has been quiet on the issue of Iran sanctions, may now find itself hard-pressed to support the United States’ bid for sanctions against Iran. This is because of Beijing’s extensive ties with Pyongyang – China is North Korea’s main trade partner and supplier of food, petroleum, technology, investment capital and economic aid.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs a result, despite its verbal condemnation of North Korea, China is unlikely to go along with any tangible UN sanctions on North Korea and, in turn, this will make it doubly difficult for Beijing to rationalize future support for sanctions on Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAfrasiabi note que les r\u00e9actions iraniennes devant l’explosion nucl\u00e9aire nord-cor\u00e9enne sont ambigu\u00ebs et nuanc\u00e9es. Il n’est pas assur\u00e9 que les Iraniens jugent que cet acte de prolif\u00e9ration soit une bonne chose, ce qui conduit l’auteur \u00e0 observer qu’une tendance hostile \u00e0 la prolif\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire pourrait se d\u00e9velopper \u00e0 terme en Iran. Pour Afrasiabi, l’Iran pourrait se d\u00e9couvrir pr\u00e9occup\u00e9 par le fait que la fin de la non-prolif\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire (qui serait un fait acquis si l’Iran lui-m\u00eame suivait la voie de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord) pourrait inciter plusieurs de ses voisins \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper l’arme nucl\u00e9aire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tIl note en conclusion, apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 ce th\u00e8me :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe whole, however, must not be at odds with the parts, and Iran’s NPT obligations cannot and should not be considered in isolation from the precarious state of the NPT today, ie, as a regime in crisis. Yet instead of joining North Korea for what would amount to a loud requiem for the non-proliferation regime, a responsible Iranian reaction would be to adopt the long-term view of things and do what is necessary on its part, as a respectable member of the international community, to strengthen this regime.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 11 octobre 2006 \u00e0 06H17<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Sp\u00e9cialiste des questions iraniennes travaillant dans les milieux universitaires US, Kaveh L. Afrasiabi estime que l’effet de la crise nucl\u00e9aire cor\u00e9enne sur la position de l’Iran \u00e9largit nettement les options de ce pays dans la crise qui l’affecte actuellement face \u00e0 la communaut\u00e9 internationale. Pour Afrasiabi, le cas nord-cor\u00e9en renforce pour l’imm\u00e9diat la position de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3299,2651,2773,3349,3004,1343],"class_list":["post-68087","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-coree","tag-du","tag-iran","tag-nord","tag-nucleaire","tag-proliferation"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68087","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68087"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68087\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68087"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68087"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68087"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}