{"id":68090,"date":"2006-10-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/12\/les-neocons-sont-infatigables\/"},"modified":"2006-10-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-12T00:00:00","slug":"les-neocons-sont-infatigables","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/12\/les-neocons-sont-infatigables\/","title":{"rendered":"Les <em>neocons<\/em> sont infatigables"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Vraiment sans la moindre surprise, on observe le d\u00e9cha\u00eenement <em>as usual<\/em> des n\u00e9o-conservateurs apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;explosion nucl\u00e9aire nord-cor\u00e9enne.  On dirait une machine bien huil\u00e9e, bien programm\u00e9e, dans laquelle il suffit de glisser une pi\u00e8ce  en l&rsquo;occurrence l&rsquo;annonce de l&rsquo;essai nucl\u00e9aire  pour obtenir un torrent de recommandations belliqueuses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est bien entendu impensable de recommencer \u00e0 n\u00e9gocier, \u00e0 six ou \u00e0 deux. C&rsquo;est l&rsquo;option la plus mod\u00e9r\u00e9e qui est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e : abandonner toute n\u00e9gociation et faire pression. Ensuite, toutes les options agressives sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es selon les auteurs et leurs humeurs, avec l&rsquo;id\u00e9e d&rsquo;un blocus, celle d&rsquo;une s\u00e9lectivit\u00e9 agressive dans l&rsquo;aide apport\u00e9e \u00e0 la population, etc. Surtout, on d\u00e9taille avec ravissement des actions de d\u00e9stabilisation en Cor\u00e9e du Nord, avec comme but quasiment magique, le S\u00e9same des n\u00e9o-conservateurs : <em>regime change<\/em>! Et cela avec des moyens militaires bien entendu ; et au-del\u00e0, bien entendu, la recommandation d&rsquo;une action militaire directe de grande ampleur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tJim Lobe nous <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Front_Page\/HJ12Aa01.html\" class=\"gen\">d\u00e9taille<\/a> cette tr\u00e8s originale offensive n\u00e9o-conservatrice. Il nous signale, en passant, que GW Bush doit s&rsquo;inspirer de Churchill et pas de Chamberlain en 1938-40. Tr\u00e8s original. L\u00e0 aussi, la machine a fonctionn\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The North Korean test has stripped any plausibility to arguments that engaging dictators works, according to Michael Rubin, a Middle East specialist at AEI, who added that the Bush administration now faced a watershed in its relations with other states that have defied Washington in recent years.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bbThis crisis is not just about North Korea, but about Iran, Syria, Venezuela and Cuba as well, said Rubin. Bush now has two choices: to respond forcefully and show that defiance has consequence, or affirm that defiance pays and that international will is illusionary.<D> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Bush must now choose whether his legacy will be one of inaction or leadership, Chamberlain or Churchill, Rubin said in a reference to the pre-World War II debate between the appeasement of British prime minister Neville Chamberlain and the war policy of his successor, Winston Churchill.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The neo-conservatives, whose influence on the Bush administration has generally been on the wane since late 2003 when it became clear that the Iraq war they had done so much to champion was going badly, nonetheless retain some clout, particularly through the offices of Vice President Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 12 octobre 2006 \u00e0 08H33<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Vraiment sans la moindre surprise, on observe le d\u00e9cha\u00eenement as usual des n\u00e9o-conservateurs apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;explosion nucl\u00e9aire nord-cor\u00e9enne. On dirait une machine bien huil\u00e9e, bien programm\u00e9e, dans laquelle il suffit de glisser une pi\u00e8ce en l&rsquo;occurrence l&rsquo;annonce de l&rsquo;essai nucl\u00e9aire pour obtenir un torrent de recommandations belliqueuses. Il est bien entendu impensable de recommencer \u00e0 n\u00e9gocier,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3299,2651,1094,1104,3349],"class_list":["post-68090","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-coree","tag-du","tag-lobe","tag-neocons","tag-nord"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68090","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68090"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68090\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68090"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68090"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68090"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}