{"id":68108,"date":"2006-10-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/17\/comment-le-hezbollah-a-gagne-bien-plus-que-la-guerre\/"},"modified":"2006-10-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-17T00:00:00","slug":"comment-le-hezbollah-a-gagne-bien-plus-que-la-guerre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/17\/comment-le-hezbollah-a-gagne-bien-plus-que-la-guerre\/","title":{"rendered":"Comment le Hezbollah a gagn\u00e9 bien plus que la guerre"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Nous vous recommandons trois articles successivement parus sur <em>atimes.com<\/em>, qui forment en fait les trois parties d&rsquo;une \u00e9tude g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur le conflit entre Isra\u00ebl et le Hezbollah en juillet-ao\u00fbt, sur le th\u00e8me de \u00ab<em>How Hezbollah defeated Israel<\/em>\u00bb. Successivement :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La guerre du renseignement, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/HJ12Ak01.html\" class=\"gen\">12 octobre<\/a> ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La guerre terrestre, le <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/HJ13Ak01.html\" class=\"gen\">13 octobre<\/a> ; <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La guerre politique, le <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/HJ14Ak01.html\" class=\"gen\">14 octobre<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;ensemble d&rsquo;analyses et d&rsquo;expos\u00e9s de faits et situations le plus riche et le plus complet publi\u00e9 jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 ce jour sur le conflit. Les deux auteurs sont honorablement connus et connus comme des sp\u00e9cialistes confirm\u00e9s et ind\u00e9pendants, avec de nombreuses connexions et r\u00e9seaux d&rsquo;information. Ils pr\u00e9sentent de tr\u00e8s bonnes garanties de s\u00e9rieux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLeur verdict est imparable : victoire compl\u00e8te du Hezbollah. Ci-dessous, un extrait de l&rsquo;introduction et de la conclusion g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l&rsquo;ensemble des trois textes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Our overall conclusion contradicts the current point of view being retailed by some White House and Israeli officials: that Israel&rsquo;s offensive in Lebanon significantly damaged Hezbollah&rsquo;s ability to wage war, that Israel successfully degraded Hezbollah&rsquo;s military ability to prevail in a future conflict, and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), once deployed in large numbers in southern Lebanon, were able to prevail over their foes and dictate a settlement favorable to the Israeli political establishment.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Just the opposite is true. From the onset of the conflict to its last operations, Hezbollah commanders successfully penetrated Israel&rsquo;s strategic and tactical decision-making cycle across a spectrum of intelligence, military and political operations, with the result that Hezbollah scored a decisive and complete victory in its war with Israel.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The victory of Hezbollah in its recent conflict with Israel is far more significant than many analysts in the United States and Europe realize. The Hezbollah victory reverses the tide of 1967  a shattering defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan that shifted the region&rsquo;s political plates, putting in place regimes that were bent on recasting their own foreign policy to reflect Israeli and US power. That power now has been bullied and reversed, and a new leadership is emerging in the region.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The singular lesson of the conflict may well be lost on the upper echelons of Washington&rsquo;s and London&rsquo;s pro-Israel, pro-values, we-are-fighting-for-civilization political elites, but it is not lost in the streets of Cairo, Amman, Ramallah, Baghdad, Damascus or Tehran. It should not be lost among the Israeli political leadership in Jerusalem. The Arab armies of 1967 fought for six days and were defeated. The Hezbollah militia in Lebanon fought for 34 days and won. We saw this with our own eyes when we looked into the cafes of Cairo and Amman, where simple shopkeepers, farmers and workers gazed at television reports, sipped their tea, and silently mouthed the numbers to themselves: \u00a0\u00bbseven\u00a0\u00bb, \u00a0\u00bbeight\u00a0\u00bb, \u00a0\u00bbnine\u00a0\u00bb &#8230;<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 17 octobre 2006 \u00e0 18H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nous vous recommandons trois articles successivement parus sur atimes.com, qui forment en fait les trois parties d&rsquo;une \u00e9tude g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur le conflit entre Isra\u00ebl et le Hezbollah en juillet-ao\u00fbt, sur le th\u00e8me de \u00abHow Hezbollah defeated Israel\u00bb. Successivement : La guerre du renseignement, le 12 octobre ; La guerre terrestre, le 13 octobre ; La&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3811,2645,4472,2774,4087,4714],"class_list":["post-68108","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cook","tag-guerre","tag-hezbollah","tag-israel","tag-perry","tag-tsahal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68108","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68108"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68108\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68108"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68108"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68108"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}