{"id":68118,"date":"2006-10-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/20\/il-y-a-aujourdhui-un-modele-chavez-et-un-modele-venezuelien\/"},"modified":"2006-10-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-20T00:00:00","slug":"il-y-a-aujourdhui-un-modele-chavez-et-un-modele-venezuelien","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/20\/il-y-a-aujourdhui-un-modele-chavez-et-un-modele-venezuelien\/","title":{"rendered":"Il y a aujourd&rsquo;hui un \u201cmod\u00e8le Chavez\u201d et un \u201cmod\u00e8le v\u00e9n\u00e9zu\u00e9lien\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>C&rsquo;est surtout la pol\u00e9mique, les invectives, la rh\u00e9torique qui caract\u00e9risent le personnage de Chavez, autant pour lui-m\u00eame, pour ses partisans que pour ses adversaires. Il y a aussi le fond de son action. La soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d&rsquo;analyse PINR publie une analyse <a href=\"http:\/\/www.pinr.com\/report.php?ac=view_report&#038;report_id=572&#038;language_id=1\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> sur le bilan qu&rsquo;on peut dresser pour le Venezuela. Il est particuli\u00e8rement laudatif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPlusieurs domaines de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution du Venezuela sont mentionn\u00e9s, qui montrent tous la logique de la rupture avec les USA, la r\u00e9orientation vers le reste du monde et le succ\u00e8s complet de cette op\u00e9ration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La rupture avec les USA : \u00ab<em>The collapse in diplomatic ties has been accompanied by weakening commercial links. Venezuela is reducing its petroleum product exports to the United States and selling its U.S.-based refining assets. Many analysts continue to believe that Venezuela&rsquo;s ability to redirect its oil exports away from the United States is limited by economic factors such as the added cost of shipping oil to Asia. Although such shipments reduce Venezuela&rsquo;s oil export revenue by $3 to $4 per barrel, this added cost has not reduced Venezuela&rsquo;s zeal for shipping increasing quantities of crude oil to Asia.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Venezuela&rsquo;s oil shipments to both China and India are increasing. This crude oil is not coming from increased production in Venezuela; it is being redirected from the United States to Asia in an obvious effort by Caracas to weaken its commercial links with the United States. According to data produced by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. imports of crude oil from Venezuela declined by five percent in 2005 compared to 2004. In the first seven months of 2006, U.S. imports of crude oil from Venezuela declined 13 percent from the same period in 2005. This data makes it clear that Venezuela&rsquo;s crude oil exports to the United States are declining.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Many analysts also believe that the concentration of Venezuela&rsquo;s oil refining capacity in the United States further hinders the reorientation of the country&rsquo;s oil exports away from the United States. Yet, Venezuela is involved in a myriad of new refinery projects in Asia, the Middle East and in Latin America. These new and upgraded refineries will all have the capacity to process Venezuela&rsquo;s crude oil. Meanwhile, Venezuela has been gradually unloading its U.S.-based oil refineries and terminating its long-standing gasoline supply contracts.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La tentative d&rsquo;isolement du Venezuela et l&rsquo;\u00e9chec de cette tentative : \u00ab<em>The Bush administration has tried to isolate the Chavez government in order to provoke political change in Venezuela. Rather than becoming isolated from the rest of the world, the Chavez government has worked diligently to deepen its foreign commercial and diplomatic ties with many countries. Venezuela has signed numerous trade and investment deals with Russia, Iran, Syria, India and China. Venezuela has also expanded trade and investment with its neighbors in Latin America. Strengthening commercial ties with many countries have also produced much stronger diplomatic ties.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  La r\u00e9ussite de la reconversion de la production de p\u00e9trole par le Venezuela selon les nouvelles normes voulues par ce pays : \u00ab<em>Many analysts view dimly the nationalization of Venezuela&rsquo;s petroleum industry by the Chavez government, believing that it will induce the collapse of oil production in the country. Assertions that oil production is already declining in Venezuela support this belief. This assertion, however, is incorrect. Despite taking majority ownership in most of the country&rsquo;s joint ventures with foreign companies and significantly increasing tax and royalty rates on these ventures, there has not been an exodus of foreign oil companies from Venezuela. Out of 33 joint operating contracts with foreign oil majors, only two were abandoned by foreign oil companies. The remaining 31 were renegotiated on government terms.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Many analysts, including those at the U.S.-based Energy Information Agency, also believe that oil production in Venezuela is declining and that it will never recover to the pre-strike levels of 2001. While production of conventional crude oil has declined in the past five years, this decline has been entirely offset by increasing production of formerly unconventional extra-heavy crude oil in the Orinoco belt, which has climbed from 200,000 barrels per day in 2001 to almost 700,000 barrels per day in 2005.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Finalement, le constat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est celui d&rsquo;un remarquable succ\u00e8s dans une manuvre strat\u00e9gique gigantesque de r\u00e9orientation des activit\u00e9s du Venezuela, jusqu&rsquo;alors li\u00e9 par des liens de production p\u00e9troli\u00e8re qui semblaient sceller son destin \u00e0 celui des USA. La rupture a eu lieu. Elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 superbement r\u00e9ussie, accompagn\u00e9e par une politique \u00e9conomique d&rsquo;ouverture qui a rencontr\u00e9 un tr\u00e8s grand succ\u00e8s. Le Venezuela, estime Jephraim P. Gundzik, de PINR, est en marche pour devenir le plus riche pays de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique Latine : \u00ab<em>Rapidly increasing foreign direct investment and rising crude oil production during the next several years will be an enormous boon for Venezuela&rsquo;s economy. The social mission of P.D.V.S.A. should help to spread the country&rsquo;s new oil wealth among the population. In addition, increasing oil production will also boost growth across all sectors of Venezuela&rsquo;s economy, pushing unemployment down and wages up. This places Venezuela&rsquo;s economic outlook above all other Latin American countries. For this reason, Venezuela could become Latin America&rsquo;s wealthiest country within the next decade.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a aujourd&rsquo;hui un mod\u00e8le v\u00e9n\u00e9zu\u00e9lien \u00e9conomique et strat\u00e9gique qui est l&rsquo;oeuvre de Chavez et de son \u00e9quipe. L&rsquo;ignorance occidentale \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, particuli\u00e8rement dans les institutions europ\u00e9ennes, est sid\u00e9rante. Pour ces institutions, Chavez reste un accident, quelque chose qui n&rsquo;a pas de signification sinon subversive et d\u00e9pass\u00e9e. Les normes am\u00e9ricanistes color\u00e9es d&rsquo;une vanit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne bien portante colorent et d\u00e9forment tous les jugements venus de notre continent. Le cas Chavez est \u00e9clairant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 20 octobre 2006 \u00e0 09H29<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>C&rsquo;est surtout la pol\u00e9mique, les invectives, la rh\u00e9torique qui caract\u00e9risent le personnage de Chavez, autant pour lui-m\u00eame, pour ses partisans que pour ses adversaires. Il y a aussi le fond de son action. La soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d&rsquo;analyse PINR publie une analyse aujourd&rsquo;hui sur le bilan qu&rsquo;on peut dresser pour le Venezuela. Il est particuli\u00e8rement laudatif. Plusieurs&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3304,3600,668,3305],"class_list":["post-68118","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chavez","tag-petrole","tag-pinr","tag-venezuela"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68118","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68118"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68118\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68118"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68118"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68118"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}