{"id":68119,"date":"2006-10-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-21T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/21\/le-bateau-ivre-anglo-saxon\/"},"modified":"2006-10-21T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-21T00:00:00","slug":"le-bateau-ivre-anglo-saxon","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/21\/le-bateau-ivre-anglo-saxon\/","title":{"rendered":"Le bateau ivre anglo-saxon"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Qui commande aux Etats-Unis, GW Bush? Qui commande au Royaume-Uni, Tony Blair? R\u00e9ponses douteuses dans les deux cas. L&rsquo;Irak est en train de r\u00e9duire en lambeaux la stabilit\u00e9 et la ma\u00eetrise tant vant\u00e9es des deux r\u00e9gimes anglo-saxons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<em>The fact of the matter<\/em>, comme ils disent, est qu&rsquo;une fi\u00e8vre de panique s&rsquo;est empar\u00e9e des deux <em>establishments<\/em>. En cause, une seule question : comment se sortir d&rsquo;Irak, et vite? Aux USA, la recherche d&rsquo;une strat\u00e9gie de sortie prend des <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/middle_east\/article1916341.ece\" class=\"gen\">allures fr\u00e9n\u00e9tiques<\/a>. Le plus int\u00e9ressant, au travers de ces nouvelles, est de d\u00e9couvrir que, de plus en plus, les deux pays fonctionnent avec des structures parall\u00e8les qui coop\u00e8rent entre elles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Aux USA, l&rsquo;ISG (Iraq Study Group pr\u00e9sid\u00e9 par James Baker) accentue sa pression et pousse l&rsquo;examen des solutions draconiennes qu&rsquo;il propose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  Ce que montre <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/Iraq\/Story\/0,,1928037,00.html\" class=\"gen\">un article<\/a> du <em>Guardian<\/em>, c&rsquo;est que le Foreign Office de Londres travaille sur les m\u00eames options, en coop\u00e9ration \u00e9troite avec l&rsquo;ISG.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Pressure for a change of strategy is partly the result of leaks from a review from a study group set up by the former US secretary of state, James Baker, at Mr Bush&rsquo;s request. The leaks from Mr Baker&rsquo;s Iraq Study Group (ISG), which is due to report after next month&rsquo;s Congressional elections, suggest it will recommend a fundamental change of course.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Foreign Office is conducting a review in tandem with Mr Baker. UK officials said the Foreign Office was beavering away on about half a dozen options, roughly the same as those considered by the ISG. One official said discussions were proceeding at a high tempo.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Among the changes the ISG is expected to recommend is the opening of talks on Iraq&rsquo;s future with Syria and Iran, countries the White House has sought to isolate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The failure of the Baghdad initiative is convincing evidence that a military solution is not going to work, said Larry Diamond, a former adviser to the US-led occupation authority in Baghdad who also advised the ISG. We should be talking to neighbouring Arab states and we think we should be talking to Iran  to broker the compromises which might save the situation, Mr Diamond told the Guardian.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Other options being considered are a redeployment of forces to super-bases in Iraq or bases outside the country, pressuring the Baghdad government to find a fairer way of sharing Iraq&rsquo;s oil wealth to give Sunnis a better deal, and even the partitioning of the country into autonomous Kurdish, Sunni and Shia regions  an idea the White House has dismissed as a non-starter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>British diplomats, including Dominic Asquith, the ambassador to Iraq, and Sir David Manning, ambassador to Washington, have contributed to the ISG.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Foreign Office is backing the ISG proposal to engage with Iran and Syria. We are encouraging them to go with that, a Foreign Office source said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tRien ne semble montrer que ces deux groupes (l&rsquo;ISG et le Foreign Office) aient le soutien explicite de Bush et de Blair, qui continuent \u00e0 plaider vaguement le maintien de leurs forces aussi longtemps que la situation le n\u00e9cessitera. Tout montre au contraire qu&rsquo;ils agissent comme deux structures parall\u00e8les, mettant au point leur propre politique qu&rsquo;ils tenteront ensuite d&rsquo;imposer \u00e0 leurs dirigeants.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 21 octobre 2006 \u00e0 08H37<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Qui commande aux Etats-Unis, GW Bush? Qui commande au Royaume-Uni, Tony Blair? R\u00e9ponses douteuses dans les deux cas. L&rsquo;Irak est en train de r\u00e9duire en lambeaux la stabilit\u00e9 et la ma\u00eetrise tant vant\u00e9es des deux r\u00e9gimes anglo-saxons. The fact of the matter, comme ils disent, est qu&rsquo;une fi\u00e8vre de panique s&rsquo;est empar\u00e9e des deux establishments.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3426,4094,705,868,2863,857,6014,3774],"class_list":["post-68119","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anglo-saxon","tag-baker","tag-blair","tag-bush","tag-foreign","tag-irak","tag-isg","tag-office"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68119","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68119"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68119\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68119"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68119"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68119"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}