{"id":68140,"date":"2006-10-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-28T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/28\/une-erreur-yamamesque\/"},"modified":"2006-10-28T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-28T00:00:00","slug":"une-erreur-yamamesque","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/28\/une-erreur-yamamesque\/","title":{"rendered":"Une erreur \u201cyamamesque\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Une erreur du Department of Trade &#038; Industry (DTI) britannique fait et va faire grand bruit  m\u00eame si avec une certaine discr\u00e9tion  au Royaume-Uni. La bureaucratie de ce minist\u00e8re a archiv\u00e9 aux National Archives, le 8 mai, plusieurs documents class\u00e9s confidentiels qui r\u00e9v\u00e8lent certains dessous du gigantesque march\u00e9 dit <em>Al Yamamah<\/em> sign\u00e9 en 1985 entre le Royaume-Uni et l&rsquo;Arabie Saoudite. (Le march\u00e9 portait notamment sur 72 avions de combat <em>Tornado<\/em>.) Ces documents ont \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenus par Nicholas Gilby, de Campaign Against the Arms Trade, sous l&rsquo;injonction de la loi sur la libert\u00e9 de l&rsquo;information.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t(C&rsquo;est le <em>Guardian<\/em> qui r\u00e9v\u00e8le l&rsquo;affaire <a href=\"http:\/\/politics.guardian.co.uk\/foi\/story\/0,,1933764,00.html\" class=\"gen\">ce matin<\/a>. Le Serious Fraud Office devrait \u00eatre \u00e9galement int\u00e9ress\u00e9 par les documents, puisqu&rsquo;il m\u00e8ne une enqu\u00eate sur <em>Al Yamamah<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe march\u00e9 <em>Al Yamamah<\/em> atteignit <strong>officiellement<\/strong> \u00a343 milliards et porta sur divers aspects, d&rsquo;o\u00f9 des tractations p\u00e9troli\u00e8res n&rsquo;\u00e9taient pas absentes. L&rsquo;ensemble de la chose constitua le tr\u00e9sor de guerre qui permit \u00e0 BAE (alors British Aerospace puis BAE) de vivre confortablement pendant plus d&rsquo;une d\u00e9cennie et d&rsquo;\u00eatre applaudie et cit\u00e9e comme une entreprise tr\u00e8s performante. Les documents confirment que certains dirigeants saoudiens ont aussi pu vivre depuis 1985 encore plus confortablement gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 <em>Al Yamamah<\/em>. (Des Britanniques ext\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 BAE ont \u00e9galement eu leur part. On cite tr\u00e8s volontiers le nom de Mark Thatcher, le fils de Margaret Thatcher qui \u00e9tait Premier ministre en 1985, qui vit actuellement aux USA sous la protection de la CIA.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, la r\u00e9putation d&rsquo;<em>Al Yamamah<\/em> dans les milieux internationaux de la d\u00e9fense \u00e9tait qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de la m\u00e8re de toutes les affaires de corruption de l&rsquo;armement. Les documents rendus publics vont puissamment dans le sens d&rsquo;une confirmation de cette r\u00e9putation. Il s&rsquo;agit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  du <a href=\"http:\/\/image.guardian.co.uk\/sys-files\/Politics\/documents\/2006\/10\/27\/PJ5_39AYMoUSep1985.pdf\" class=\"gen\">contrat initial<\/a>  entre le MoD et l&rsquo;Arabie, de septembre 1985 ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  du <a href=\"http:\/\/image.guardian.co.uk\/sys-files\/Politics\/documents\/2006\/10\/27\/PJ5_39BriefforThatcherSept85.pdf\" class=\"gen\">briefing<\/a> donn\u00e9 \u00e0 Margaret Thatcher en septembre 1985, sur le contrat, avant une rencontre avec les Saoudiens ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  des <a href=\"http:\/\/image.guardian.co.uk\/sys-files\/Politics\/documents\/2006\/10\/27\/JJ5_39HeseltinemeetsSultanSep1985.pdf\" class=\"gen\">minutes<\/a> d&rsquo;une rencontre entre les ministres de la d\u00e9fense respectifs, Heseltine et Prince Sultan, en septembre 1985 ;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  d&rsquo;un <a href=\"http:\/\/image.guardian.co.uk\/sys-files\/Politics\/documents\/2006\/10\/27\/J5_40RiyadhreportconclusionJan86.pdf\" class=\"gen\">t\u00e9l\u00e9gramme<\/a> de Sir Colin Chandler, alors chef du commerce de l&rsquo;armement au MoD, de janvier 1986. (C&rsquo;est, de loin, le document le plus int\u00e9ressant puisqu&rsquo;il d\u00e9taille l&rsquo;inflation artificielle du prix des <em>Tornado<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes documents indiquent de fa\u00e7on formelle que les prix des avions de combat ont \u00e9t\u00e9 artificiellement augment\u00e9s de 32% pour permettre le paiement des commissions diverses. Tout cela est d&rsquo;une pratique courante mais le fait d&rsquo;avoir ces indications sur des documents officiels, dans un march\u00e9 colossal dont d&rsquo;autres aspects sont extr\u00eamement douteux, constitue un point capital.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tParmi les r\u00e9actions de politiciens britanniques, et \u00e0 part les <em>no comment<\/em> suivis d&rsquo;\u00e9tranges excuses de l&rsquo;un ou l&rsquo;autre minist\u00e8re, celles-ci : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Nick Harvey, the Liberal Democrat defence spokesman, said yesterday: The government must now throw light on the veracity of these allegations. There is no doubt that this will only add to the growing calls for the NAO report to be published as it should have been 14 years ago. BAE refused to comment, saying: Al Yamamah is a contract between the governments of the UK and Saudi Arabia. Sir Colin also declined to comment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Ian Gilmour, a Conservative minister at the time, recently confirmed bribes were common on Saudi arms deals. Lord Gilmour told BBC2&rsquo;s Newsnight: You either got the business and bribed, or you didn&rsquo;t bribe and didn&rsquo;t get the business &#8230; If you are paying bribes to high-up people in the government, the fact that it&rsquo;s illegal in Saudi law doesn&rsquo;t mean much.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;aspect le plus anecdotique mais aussi le plus r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur pour les murs du temps concerne les conditions o\u00f9 ces documents ont \u00e9t\u00e9 mis en acc\u00e8s public. Il n&rsquo;y a pas eu de fuites. Il y a eu une erreur bureaucratique, qui a fait archiver ces documents le 8 mai, puis leur d\u00e9couverte et leur exploitation publique, avec mise en ligne sous l&rsquo;\u00e9gide de groupes d&rsquo;adversaires du commerce de l&rsquo;armement. Les documents ont \u00e9t\u00e9 retir\u00e9s des archives mais ils sont accessibles sur divers sites (dont celui du <em>Guardian<\/em>, comme on le voit ci-dessus).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Mr Gilby, the researcher from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade who discovered<\/em> [the documents], <em>said yesterday: I was astonished when I saw the Chandler telegram. This information has been withheld by every single British government department, including the National Audit Office, for more than two decades.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Last night, the DTI said : The files were placed in the National Archive by mistake. Successive governments have regarded the Al Yamamah agreement to be confidential. The files have now been removed. The MoD said : We regret the fact that this material has been made public. We attach great importance to the confidentiality of the government to government Al Yamamah agreement with Saudi Arabia, and in order to protect that confidentiality we are not commenting on these papers.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 28 octobre 2006 \u00e0 05H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Une erreur du Department of Trade &#038; Industry (DTI) britannique fait et va faire grand bruit m\u00eame si avec une certaine discr\u00e9tion au Royaume-Uni. La bureaucratie de ce minist\u00e8re a archiv\u00e9 aux National Archives, le 8 mai, plusieurs documents class\u00e9s confidentiels qui r\u00e9v\u00e8lent certains dessous du gigantesque march\u00e9 dit Al Yamamah sign\u00e9 en 1985 entre&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6058,2820,6059,3174,5291,3129,4364],"class_list":["post-68140","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-coruption","tag-jordan","tag-sultan","tag-thatcher","tag-tornado","tag-typhoon","tag-yamamah"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68140","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68140"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68140\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68140"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68140"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68140"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}