{"id":68142,"date":"2006-10-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-10-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/29\/the-insubordination-of-the-week-au-general-the-lord-guthrie-pour-ses-remarques-sur-les-catastrophes-en-cours\/"},"modified":"2006-10-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-10-29T00:00:00","slug":"the-insubordination-of-the-week-au-general-the-lord-guthrie-pour-ses-remarques-sur-les-catastrophes-en-cours","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/10\/29\/the-insubordination-of-the-week-au-general-the-lord-guthrie-pour-ses-remarques-sur-les-catastrophes-en-cours\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cThe Insubordination of the Week<\/em>\u201d au g\u00e9n\u00e9ral the Lord Guthrie, pour ses remarques sur les catastrophes en cours"},"content":{"rendered":"

C’est d\u00e9sormais une telle habitude qu’on pourrait faire une institution, une sorte de prix The Insubordination of the Week<\/em>, \u00e0 attribuer, chaque semaine, \u00e0 un nouveau g\u00e9n\u00e9ral britannique d\u00e9cidant de dire publiquement tout le mal qu’il pense de la catastrophique politique britannique (en Irak, en Afghanistan et ainsi de suite).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette fois il s’agit du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Guthrie, officiellement General the Lord Guthrie, pair du royaume apr\u00e8s une prestigieuse carri\u00e8re jusqu’\u00e0 la direction g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des arm\u00e9es sous le Tony Blair glorieux de 2001-2002. Guthrie traite ceux (Blair en premier) qui prirent les d\u00e9cisions d’envoi des forces britanniques en Afghanistan, avec leurs capacit\u00e9s si r\u00e9duites et risquant une catastrophe militaire, de cuckoo<\/em> (coucou, mais aussi toqu\u00e9). En langage britannique imag\u00e9, le mot implique une bien faible consid\u00e9ration pour l’intelligence de celui qui est ainsi qualifi\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGuthrie nous informe donc, apr\u00e8s Donnatt<\/a> et Inge<\/a>, des catastrophiques conditions britanniques, dans une interview \u00e0 The Observer<\/a>. La remarque la plus int\u00e9ressante que doit susciter cette intervention, \u00e0 notre sens, c’est celle qui concerne la v\u00e9ritable institutionnalisation de la critique du pouvoir politique par les corps qui devraient lui \u00eatre soumis notamment par un devoir de silence, dans ce cas les militaires, ceux qui devraient \u00eatre les plus silencieux<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tExtraits de The Insubordination of the Week<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abTony Blair’s most trusted military commander yesterday branded as cuckoo’ the way Britain’s overstretched army was sent into Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe remarkable rebuke by General the Lord Guthrie came in an Observer interview, his first since quitting as Chief of the Defence Staff five years ago, in which he made an impassioned plea for more troops, new equipment and more funds for a very, very over-committed army.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe decision by Guthrie, an experienced Whitehall insider and Blair confidant, to go public is likely to alarm Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence more than the recent public criticism by the current army chief Sir Richard Dannatt. Anyone who thought this was going to be a picnic in Afghanistan anyone who had read any history, anyone who knew the Afghans, or had seen the terrain, anyone who had thought about the Taliban resurgence, anyone who understood what was going on across the border in Baluchistan and Waziristan [should have known] to launch the British army in with the numbers there are, while we’re still going on in Iraq is cuckoo, Guthrie said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn a unprecedented show of scepticism towards Blair, he said the Prime Minister’s promise to give the army anything it wants was unrealistic. I’m sure he meant what he said. He is not dishonest. But there is no way you can magic up trained Royal Air Force crews, or trained soldiers, quickly. You can’t magic up helicopters, because there aren’t any helicopters, said Guthrie, promoted from chief of army staff to become overall head of the military for Blair’s first term of office.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbGuthrie said Britain was reaping the whirlwind for assuming too great a peace dividend’ after the Cold War and risks being ill-equipped for a whole new set of dangers. He also cast doubt on suggestions of an early pullout from Iraq, saying that Britain could not afford to leave a bloodbath behind.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 29 octobre 2006 \u00e0 09H45<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

C’est d\u00e9sormais une telle habitude qu’on pourrait faire une institution, une sorte de prix The Insubordination of the Week, \u00e0 attribuer, chaque semaine, \u00e0 un nouveau g\u00e9n\u00e9ral britannique d\u00e9cidant de dire publiquement tout le mal qu’il pense de la catastrophique politique britannique (en Irak, en Afghanistan et ainsi de suite). Cette fois il s’agit du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,705,6061,3283,6060],"class_list":["post-68142","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-blair","tag-coucou","tag-general","tag-guthrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68142","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68142"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68142\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68142"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68142"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68142"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}