{"id":68163,"date":"2006-11-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-11-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/03\/jsf-ii-la-realite\/"},"modified":"2006-11-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-11-03T00:00:00","slug":"jsf-ii-la-realite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/03\/jsf-ii-la-realite\/","title":{"rendered":"JSF (II) : la r\u00e9alit\u00e9<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

JSF (II) : la r\u00e9alit\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t3 novembre 2006 A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l’aspect fantasyland<\/em> Made in LM<\/a> (Lockheed Martin) du programme JSF, voici la solide (et sordide ?) r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Une bataille de chiffonniers noirs de suie, dans un tunnel bureaucratique fort mal \u00e9clair\u00e9. On parle ici des n\u00e9gociations USA-UK sur le JSF, avec comme question fondamentale la souverainet\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle dont les Britanniques ne d\u00e9mordent pas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn article d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> nous permet d’avoir une appr\u00e9ciation sur la situation des n\u00e9gociations USA-UK. Le style mesur\u00e9 et contenu caract\u00e9ristique de l’hebdomadaire ne dissimule certainement pas les difficult\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables qui restent sur la route d’une signature du MoU (Memorendum of Understanding).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAutre \u00e9l\u00e9ment int\u00e9ressant que nous confirme l’article, qui concerne le MoU. Le MoU que les Am\u00e9ricains veulent voir paraph\u00e9 par leurs partenaires non-US est d\u00e9nomm\u00e9 Production Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) et porte sur un engagement interm\u00e9diaire (une sorte de renouvellement de bail) qui n’implique en aucune fa\u00e7on une commande ferme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe tr\u00e8s optimiste Tom Burbage, VP et patron du programme JSF chez LM, optimiste par contrat et profession, n’envisage pourtant que six \u00e0 sept pays signant le PSFD pr\u00e9vu pour d\u00e9cembre. Une ou deux nations ne devrai(en)t signer qu’au premier semestre 2007. Tout cela vaut \u00e9videmment pour le cas o\u00f9 toutes les nations engag\u00e9es dans le programme acceptent de poursuivre la coop\u00e9ration. Sur ce dernier point, on se permettra d’avancer qu’il existe une certaine incertitude.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tExemple de cette incertitude, le cas britannique bien s\u00fbr. La situation est complexe, invraisemblable, bureaucratique, labyrinthique choisissez le qualificatif qu’il vous plaira aux derni\u00e8res nouvelles de la situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici un long extrait de l’article d’AWST<\/a> du 30 octobre qui nous informe \u00e0 ce propos (le sigle LO utilis\u00e9 dans l’article donne les initiales de Low Observable, expression d\u00e9signant les technologies furtives int\u00e9gr\u00e9es dans l’avion) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abA critical aspect of the talks between London and Washington is the British need for operational sovereignty and what this implies with regard to low-observable technology.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe main operating base for the British JSF aircraft \u00ac known as the Joint Combat Aircraft will be at RAF Lossiemouth in northern Scotland. The Defense Ministry intent is to carry out maintenance, repair and upgrade of the aircraft at this base, along with post-work low-observable verification. But this has implications with regard to U.S. National Disclosure Policy (NDP).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBurbage believes a satisfactory approach to LO is achievable. The easiest route would be through the use of British government personnel, although that runs counter to the ministry’s revised approach to combat aircraft support. The strategy for depth maintenance is to perform it at the types’ main operating base, using significant industry input.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBurbage admits that the use of U.K. industry staff to support and maintain LO aspects of the aircraft is more problematic. However, he points to Team JSF, the alliance including Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, as a potential conduit to addressing this issue.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBAE Systems will be the lead element in the U.K., he says, adding that there may be a need for a few U.S. personnel for some elements of LO maintenance and verification. He recognizes it would be politically unacceptable for a U.S. flag to fly metaphorically over RAF Lossiemouth. Likewise, from the NDP perspective, though, he adds it would be equally unacceptable to have BAE Systems flag flown from the base.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOther industry sources suggest the blended team approach offers the best method to address U.S. security issues and British requirements for \u00a0\u00bboperational sovereignty\u00a0\u00bb of the aircraft.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe U.K.’s Defense Technology Strategy published in October stresses the intent is to have a coherent [low-observable] ownership policy which covers contractual acceptance of LO platforms and support systems; through life signature measurement and maintenance facilities and processes.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhile the report does not directly identify the JSF in this context, it is implicit. Guaranteeing the required technology access and understanding to provide this capability is at the heart of the ongoing negotiations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBurbage says first flight is penciled in for early December. Ambitions to fly in October were thwarted by the amount of time it was taking to swap out ground-cleared items for flight-cleared equipment. This is complete, however, and the aircraft is now back on the flight ramp, he adds.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe U.K. plans to purchase up to 138 aircraft over a 16-year period from 2011-27. This number covers both the replacement of the Harrier GR9 with four squadrons of the F-35, and a limited number of aircraft to meet the manned element of the replacement of the Tornado GR4.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBurbage says the U.K. will have two F-35s in the third batch of low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft. These will be based in the U.S. to form an operational evaluation unit. Delivery of aircraft for U.K. units will begin from LRIP IV in 2012.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRemaining to be seen is the strength of the U.K.’s negotiating hand. Drayson has repeatedly suggested there is a Plan B but this may simply be not to join the PSFD phase, and instead purchase the aircraft off the shelf at a later date. This would also undermine much of the rationale in the Defense Industrial Strategy, of which Drayson is the main architect. Perhaps Britain’s strongest card is a potential effect on the other partner nations, were London to delay signing PSFD.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

La souverainet\u00e9, cela ne se divise pas<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’article donne suffisamment de d\u00e9tails pour mesurer le labyrinthe bureaucratique qu’on est en train d’explorer pour tenter de parvenir \u00e0 une solution. Manifestement personne ne veut une rupture mais personne ne veut c\u00e9der dans une mati\u00e8re o\u00f9 la moindre concession significative signifierait une capitulation. Le probl\u00e8me est que la question pos\u00e9e est de celle qui ne se divise pas ; la souverainet\u00e9 est une mati\u00e8re de substance, de la sorte qu’on ne peut diviser. On est souverain ou on ne l’est pas, on ne peut l’\u00eatre \u00e0 moiti\u00e9. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes solutions envisag\u00e9es sont \u00e0 la mesure du caract\u00e8re insoluble du probl\u00e8me. Envisager des \u00e9quipes mixtes UK-US pour assurer la maintenance des JSF britanniques, avec les Am\u00e9ricains disposant de l’ultime clef pour les technologies sensibles mais les Britanniques commandant ces \u00e9quipes, permet de comprendre l’ind\u00e9m\u00ealable complexit\u00e9 de la chose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa description du Plan B britannique (que faire en cas d’impasse) par AW&ST est particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice de l’\u00e9tat d’esprit am\u00e9ricaniste. Il semble impossible \u00e0 cet esprit qu’il puisse y avoir la possibilit\u00e9 de l’achat d’un autre avion que le JSF. Les Britanniques, tacticiens compliqu\u00e9s comme d’habitude, se pr\u00eatent \u00e0 ce jeu en n’ignorant rien des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s (c’est-\u00e0-dire, qu’il y a effectivement d’autres avions<\/a> disponibles).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’impression qui se d\u00e9gage de l’article est plut\u00f4t celle d’une irr\u00e9m\u00e9diable impasse, dans tous les cas pour le moment. Il est sans doute probable que les Britanniques voudront suivre cette tactique : refuser pour l’instant la signature du PSFD, esp\u00e9rer entra\u00eener d’autres partenaires dans cette voie pour poss\u00e9der un fort moyen de pression sur Washington et esp\u00e9rer finalement l’emporter (acc\u00e8s aux technologies contest\u00e9es).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

JSF (II) : la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 3 novembre 2006 A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l’aspect fantasyland Made in LM (Lockheed Martin) du programme JSF, voici la solide (et sordide ?) r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Une bataille de chiffonniers noirs de suie, dans un tunnel bureaucratique fort mal \u00e9clair\u00e9. On parle ici des n\u00e9gociations USA-UK sur le JSF, avec comme question fondamentale… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[5179,250,3345,2746,3344,2758,2804],"class_list":["post-68163","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-drayson","tag-jsf","tag-relationships","tag-souverainete","tag-special","tag-uk","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68163","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68163"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68163\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68163"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68163"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68163"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}