{"id":68199,"date":"2006-11-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-11-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/14\/les-prescriptions-du-docteur-england-au-chevet-du-jsf\/"},"modified":"2006-11-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-11-14T00:00:00","slug":"les-prescriptions-du-docteur-england-au-chevet-du-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/14\/les-prescriptions-du-docteur-england-au-chevet-du-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"Les prescriptions du docteur England au chevet du JSF<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les prescriptions du docteur England au chevet du JSF<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t14 novembre 2006 Le 26 octobre, le n\u00b02 du Pentagone, Gordon England, convoquait les chefs des deux armes principalement int\u00e9ress\u00e9es (en principe) par le JSF. Il s’agissait des secr\u00e9taires \u00e0 la Navy et \u00e0 l’Air Force et des chefs militaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(En m\u00eame temps, comme on l’a vu dimanche 12 novembre<\/a>, England organisait lors de cette rencontre les demandes du Pentagone pour les demandes de budget suppl\u00e9mentaire au Congr\u00e8s. La rencontre fut sanctionn\u00e9e par un m\u00e9morandum.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous publions ci-apr\u00e8s les bribes d’information et les commentaires sur cette intervention, par deux des plus prestigieuses publications de l’orbite du Pentagone et du complexe militaro-industriel : Defense News<\/em> et Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> (AWST). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici d’abord les textes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le premier d’entre eux est l’\u00e9ditorial de Defense News<\/em> du 30 octobre<\/a>, sous le titre : \u00abStay on Course Joint Strike Fighter<\/em>\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbMajor military programs are like watches their success depends on countless moving parts doing their thing in harmony. Throw in a grain of sand, and you end up with major damage.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe works are even more sensitive in programs involving nine nations. That’s why every success of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), now called the F-35 Lightning II, has to be counted as a blessing. One arrived recently, courtesy of the effort’s most influential member, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAt an Oct. 26 budget meeting, England affirmed his support for the JSF by directing the U.S. Navy to fund the first two years of the next phase of the ambitious program. In its draft 2008 budget plan, the Navy had proposed skipping funding for two years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Navy said the cut was shaped by a congressional proposal this summer to delay the program by two years. Lawmakers said the move would allow development to wrap up before production started, but other observers called it political cover for service plans to redirect money to shipbuilding.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFor England, the question was: How can the DoD ask international partners to commit by December to the program’s next phase when one of its biggest participants the Navy isn’t funding its share of the effort?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhile the Navy has yet to find the money, England’s decision sent a series of welcome signals.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFirst, that England is committed to the program and its international scope.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSecond, the former Navy secretary showed critics he can be tough on his former service on budget and policy questions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbEngland must build on this momentum and use his considerable diplomatic skills to rebuild faith in the program. The move will also demonstrate America’s willingness to be a collaborative security partner, an image tarnished over the past years by Washington’s alternating indifference and arrogance toward its overseas friends.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOn JSF, he must assuage international allies, some of whom feel Washington’s JSF commitment is less than ironclad, a reasonable fear given the Air Force and the Navy have alternatives. Some in the Air Force would love to have more F-22s, while many naval aviators would prefer more F\/A-18E\/Fs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn short, officials in JSF partner nations as well as some within the DoD worry that the Pentagon, which faces a budget crunch, will look at the JSF program as a piggy bank. The fear is that once the ink is dry on a memorandum of understanding, the Pentagon will cut its commitment, sticking everyone with higher bills, or worse, forcing the program’s collapse.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIf JSF fails, Britain would be left without a STOVL jet for its future aircraft carriers, which are being designed only to accommodate jump jets. Without JSF, U.K. officials don’t know what planes will operate from these two warships.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn other countries, the failure of JSF could hamstring transformation into flexible network-centric forces that can operate more smoothly with the U.S. military in future crises.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbEqually important, England must accommodate allies’ technology and logistics concerns to reverse a feeling held by some that JSF is being developed by America for export sales, rather than as a collaborative endeavor.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbEngland must keep JSF on track to improve U.S. capabilities, to give allied air forces a stealthy, first-day-of-war aircraft, and to bolster frayed global relationships.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le texte de Aviation Week<\/a> est plus court. Il s’agit d’une simple note dans la rubrique Washington Outlook<\/em>, dans le num\u00e9ro du 6 novembre, parue sous le titre : \u00abEngland Tells Navy, USAF To Avoid F-35 Delays.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abAfter discovering Navy and Air Force plans to cut and delay their portions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England called in senior leaders, including the service secretaries, to re-energize the military’s dedication to the program and reassure international partners. Although the Navy never made public its proposal to delay production, the move had become known around the Pentagon well in advance of a meeting, planned in about four weeks, of the Defense Acquisition Working Group to discuss JSF. England’s rush to cement military support was propelled by efforts to get a memorandum of understanding signed this month with a number of partner countries. England told the services to go back and find a reasonable, effective way forward without delay, an aide says. There was no specific order to fully fund the program just to aggressively pursue a new option so that we don’t delay it. I don’t think anyone even knows what fully funded is any more. I don’t know when these new options will be reported out. But England did want the [international] partners to know the [U.S.] military is fully committed to the program.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

Soutenir le JSF<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes deux textes sont lumineux. Ils nous disent successivement, \u00e0 titre d’information et pour confirmation des diff\u00e9rentes analyses que nous avons d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’Air Force et la Navy ne s’int\u00e9ressent gu\u00e8re au programme JSF en tant que tel, sinon pour en faire leur vache \u00e0 lait favorite. C’est en effet la fonction essentielle du programme JSF aujourd’hui du point de vue des services confront\u00e9s \u00e0 des d\u00e9penses supra-extraordinaires malgr\u00e9 des budgets extraordinaires : une sorte de blanchiment bureaucratique des allocations budg\u00e9taires. Le programme JSF permet notamment de transf\u00e9rer de l’argent aux deux forces qui en ont grand besoin, pour des programmes et des urgences diff\u00e9rents. Il est assez probable que le JSF prenne le chemin de devenir une sorte de SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) du d\u00e9but du XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle. (Lanc\u00e9e en 1983 par Reagan pour \u00e9tablir une d\u00e9fense anti-missiles herm\u00e9tique, la SDI s’est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e et a prosp\u00e9r\u00e9 sous son nom jusqu’en 1988-89, puis sous d’autres noms jusqu’aux ann\u00e9es 1999-2000, en engloutissant plus de $100 milliards sans jamais rien produire qui puisse \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme s’approchant du statut op\u00e9rationnel. Il para\u00eet qu’on s’en approcherait aujourd’hui, avec un syst\u00e8me lanc\u00e9 \u00e0 nouveau depuis 2001-2002, mais bien s\u00fbr avec des ambitions op\u00e9rationnelles r\u00e9duites, contre les menaces nord-cor\u00e9ennes, iraniennes, etc.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Personne ne sait exactement ce que l’Air Force et la Navy font de leurs allocations budg\u00e9taires d’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale (notamment pour ce qui concerne le programme JSF, mais aussi pour le reste de leur gestion budg\u00e9taire sans doute) y compris Gordon England lui-m\u00eame (\u00abAfter<\/em> discovering<\/em><\/strong> Navy and Air Force plans to cut and delay their portions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program<\/em>\u00bb). Cela confirme le climat structurel r\u00e9gnant actuellement au Pentagone, o\u00f9 le pouvoir est compl\u00e8tement dilu\u00e9 entre les diff\u00e9rents centres concurrents, bureaucraties, etc. Bien \u00e9videmment, dans cette logique le JSF souffre beaucoup puisqu’il n’est pas aim\u00e9, ni de la Navy, ni de l’Air Force.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t N\u00e9anmoins, England tape du poing (gant\u00e9) sur la table. Grand acte d’autorit\u00e9, pour une cause simple: d’ici fin d\u00e9cembre, il s’agit que les pays alli\u00e9s signent leur Memorendum of Understanding (MoU). Le but n’est pas dissimul\u00e9. Il ne s’agit pas de relancer le programme mais de sembler relancer le programme : \u00abEngland’s rush to cement military support was<\/em> propelled by efforts to get a memorandum of understanding signed this month<\/em><\/strong> with a number of partner countries.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t D’ailleurs, la mesure r\u00e9clam\u00e9e est elle-m\u00eame d\u00e9crite comme th\u00e9orique, de principe, pour rassurer les alli\u00e9s. La question de l’allocation des fonds n’est pas fix\u00e9e et il n’y a aucun ordre du pouvoir civil \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard : \u00abEngland told the services to go back and find a reasonable, effective way forward without delay, an aide says. There was no specific order to fully fund the program just to aggressively pursue a new option so that we don’t delay it. I don’t think anyone even knows what fully funded is any more. I don’t know when these new options will be reported out. But England did want the<\/em> [international] partners to know the<\/em> [U.S.] military is fully committed to the program.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe plus int\u00e9ressant, finalement, dans ces deux textes, c’est qu’ils laissent justement entendre qu’une relance du programme est n\u00e9cessaire (ou encore : \u00ab to re-energize<\/em>). Curieuse id\u00e9e. Chacun sait que l’argent ne manque pas pour le JSF, ni la publicit\u00e9, ni les proclamations du monde de la communication. Pourtant, les deux textes nous font comprendre, par simple logique antinomique, qu’il y a aujourd’hui (qu’il y avait, si l’intervention England est efficace) blocage, abandon d’\u00e9nergie, d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est dans ce contexte de r\u00e9flexion qu’il faut se d\u00e9placer pour comprendre<\/strong> la substance du programme JSF et envisager son \u00e9volution. L’explication est notamment psychologique et bureaucratique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe programme JSF n’est litt\u00e9ralement \u00e0 personne au Pentagone. Il est orphelin en un sens. Or la destin\u00e9e d’un programme ne d\u00e9pend pas, au Pentagone, de l’argent ; au contraire, l’argent est la chose la plus abondamment disponible, puisque le Pentagone est constamment arros\u00e9 d’une pluie de dizaines de $milliards. La destin\u00e9e d’un programme d\u00e9pend du soutien bureaucratique que lui apportent le ou les parents. Si personne ne s’int\u00e9resse vraiment \u00e0 lui, l’orphelin est perdu. On se paye sur la b\u00eate (on lui prend des cr\u00e9dits) ; on allonge les d\u00e9lais ; on raffine le produit ; on annonce r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement que ce programme est le plus important du si\u00e8cle et que, pour cette raison, il faut encore du temps et de l’argent Qui soutient le JSF ? England n’est qu’un parent (disons un parrain) d’adoption, le temps de faire signer leurs MoU aux na\u00effs Europ\u00e9ens. Dans deux mois, il passera \u00e0 autre chose, et puis il faut songer \u00e0 la bataille contre le Congr\u00e8s, et puis en 2008 l’administration actuelle est \u00e0 son terme<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les prescriptions du docteur England au chevet du JSF 14 novembre 2006 Le 26 octobre, le n\u00b02 du Pentagone, Gordon England, convoquait les chefs des deux armes principalement int\u00e9ress\u00e9es (en principe) par le JSF. Il s’agissait des secr\u00e9taires \u00e0 la Navy et \u00e0 l’Air Force et des chefs militaires. (En m\u00eame temps, comme on l’a… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4526,250,3319,6128,6127],"class_list":["post-68199","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-england","tag-jsf","tag-navy","tag-parents","tag-parrains"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68199","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68199"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68199\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68199"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68199"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68199"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}