{"id":68250,"date":"2006-11-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-11-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/29\/le-vrai-role-de-lisg\/"},"modified":"2006-11-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-11-29T00:00:00","slug":"le-vrai-role-de-lisg","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/11\/29\/le-vrai-role-de-lisg\/","title":{"rendered":"Le vrai r\u00f4le de l’ISG"},"content":{"rendered":"

Andrew J. Bacevich est un sp\u00e9cialiste universitaire US des questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d’un r\u00e9el talent. (Il est professeur d’histoire et de relations internationales \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 de Boston.) Nous l’avons d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> rencontr\u00e9 et not\u00e9 ses qualit\u00e9s qui font de lui cette raret\u00e9 : quelque chose qui n’est pas tr\u00e8s loin d’un esprit ind\u00e9pendant. Garder cela alors qu’on se trouve au sein de l’establishment<\/em> US n’est pas un mince exploit. D’o\u00f9 l’int\u00e9r\u00eat que nous devons accorder \u00e0 ses avis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLorsque Bacevich \u00e9crit ce qu’il \u00e9crit dans le Christian Science Monitor<\/em> du 28 novembre<\/a> sur l’ISG de Baker, c’est particuli\u00e8rement significatif. L’ISG est au travail depuis longtemps, on conna\u00eet le r\u00f4le essentiel qu’il doit jouer avec son rapport qui devrait \u00eatre publi\u00e9 d’ici une \u00e0 deux semaines. Publier une condamnation aussi violente de ce groupe, lorsqu’on est, en plus, aussi bien inform\u00e9 que l’est Bacevich, nous en dit long sur la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du r\u00f4le du groupe Baker. Bacevich a fait le tour du probl\u00e8me et cet article pr\u00e9sente des conclusions. Elles sont sans appel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA la lumi\u00e8re de ce que nous rappelons ci-dessus, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est qu’il est tout \u00e0 fait justifi\u00e9 de prendre pour argent comptant l’appr\u00e9ciation de Bacevich. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abEven as Washington waits with bated breath for the Iraq Study Group (ISG) to release its findings, the rest of us should see this gambit for what it is: an attempt to deflect attention from the larger questions raised by America’s failure in Iraq and to shore up the authority of the foreign policy establishment that steered the United States into this quagmire. This ostentatiously bipartisan panel of Wise Men (and one woman) can’t really be searching for truth. It is engaged in damage control.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbTheir purpose is twofold: first, to minimize Iraq’s impact on the prevailing foreign policy consensus with its vast ambitions and penchant for armed intervention abroad; and second, to quell any inclination of ordinary citizens to intrude into matters from which they have long been excluded. The ISG is antidemocratic. Its implicit message to Americans is this: We’ll handle things now go back to holiday shopping.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe ISG will provide cover for the Bush administration to shift course in Iraq. It will pave the way for the Democratic Congress to endorse that shift in a great show of bipartisanship. But it will hold no one responsible.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAbove all, it will leave intact the assumptions, arrangements, and institutions that gave rise to Iraq in the first place. In doing so, it will ensure that the formulation of foreign policy remains the preserve of political mahatmas like Baker and Hamilton, with the American people left to pick up the tab.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn this way, the ISG will make possible even likely \u00ac a repetition of some disaster akin to Iraq at a future date.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans ces conditions, et puisque effectivement l’ISG n’est qu’une entreprise de rafistolage convoqu\u00e9e en urgence, qu’il n’est \u00e9videmment pas \u00e0 l’abri<\/a> des divisions internes et de l’\u00e9touffement bureaucratique qui caract\u00e9risent le syst\u00e8me, nous aurions tendance \u00e0 encore plus insister m\u00eame sur les chances r\u00e9duites de l’ISG de mener \u00e0 bien sa pi\u00e8tre mission. Etant une \u00e9manation du syst\u00e8me et de ses ambitions les plus m\u00e9diocres, l’ISG en a aussi les d\u00e9fauts. Parmi ceux-ci, il y a l’impuissance et la paralysie qui apparaissent tr\u00e8s vite lorsqu’une mission d\u00e9licate est entreprise. Non seulement l’ISG est une entreprise de rafistolage mais il se pourrait bien qu’il ne rafistole rien du tout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 29 novembre 2006 \u00e0 08H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Andrew J. Bacevich est un sp\u00e9cialiste universitaire US des questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d’un r\u00e9el talent. (Il est professeur d’histoire et de relations internationales \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 de Boston.) Nous l’avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 rencontr\u00e9 et not\u00e9 ses qualit\u00e9s qui font de lui cette raret\u00e9 : quelque chose qui n’est pas tr\u00e8s loin d’un esprit ind\u00e9pendant. Garder cela alors… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5422,4094,5223,5222,6014,3014],"class_list":["post-68250","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bacevitch","tag-baker","tag-control","tag-damage","tag-isg","tag-systeme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68250","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68250"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68250\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68250"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68250"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68250"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}