aujourd’hui<\/a> nous en communique la substantifique moelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tEn gros :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Oui, il vaudrait mieux envisager de quitter l’Irak (Et comment !)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Un retrait graduel serait la meilleure chose \u00e0 faire, qu’il faudrait annoncer assez vite si possible, et qu’il faudrait commencer relatively soon<\/em>, quelque part en 2007 ce serait bien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Pour autant, retrait sur quoi, et o\u00f9 ? Pas de pr\u00e9cisions. Ce pourrait \u00eatre un retrait sur les grandes bases US en Irak, dans l’un ou l’autre pays voisin (notre suggestion : pourquoi pas en Iran ?), aux Etats-Unis m\u00eames<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Document de consensus, plein de sous-entendus, de conseils implicites et d’encouragements non-dits.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe bipartisan Iraq Study Group reached a consensus on Wednesday on a final report that will call for a gradual pullback of the 15 American combat brigades now in Iraq but stop short of setting a firm timetable for their withdrawal, according to people familiar with the panel’s deliberations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbThe report recommends that Mr. Bush make it clear that he intends to start the withdrawal relatively soon, and people familiar with the debate over the final language said the implicit message was that the process should begin sometime next year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe report leaves unstated whether the 15 combat brigades that are the bulk of American fighting forces in Iraq would be brought home, or simply pulled back to bases in Iraq or in neighboring countries. (A brigade typically consists of 3,000 to 5,000 troops.) From those bases, they would still be responsible for protecting a substantial number of American troops who would remain in Iraq, including 70,000 or more American trainers, logistics experts and members of a rapid reaction force.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs the commission wound up two and a half days of deliberation in Washington, the group said in a public statement only that a consensus had been reached and that the report would be delivered next Wednesday to President Bush, Congress and the American public. Members of the commission were warned by Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton not to discuss the contents of the report.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tC’est un document de crise, lorsque Washington est en crise, et sans doute jamais Washington n’a \u00e9t\u00e9 dans une crise si profonde. Document de crise dans un syst\u00e8me o\u00f9 tous les groupes de pression et centres de pouvoir ont leur mot \u00e0 dire et leur voix au chapitre. Document \u00e0 la fois informe et imp\u00e9ratif, qui dit qu’il faut faire quelque chose tr\u00e8s vite et qui s’abstient de dire exactement quoi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe rapport de l’ISG va accentuer la confusion, aggraver les tensions et les affrontements (\u00e0 Washington). R\u00e9alis\u00e9 pour r\u00e9soudre la crise et r\u00e9alis\u00e9 avec la pr\u00e9occupation surtout de ne pas d\u00e9stabiliser la situation \u00e0 Washington alors qu’il concerne l’Irak, il va finalement accentuer cette crise, \u00e0 Washington et en Irak. C’est d’ailleurs la logique m\u00eame : c’est le produit direct d’un syst\u00e8me en crise, produit de crise pour r\u00e9soudre une crise ontologique. Le syst\u00e8me court derri\u00e8re son habilet\u00e9 perdue.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tBon vent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 30 novembre 2006 \u00e0 15H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Le rapport de l’Iraq Study Group dirig\u00e9 par James Baker est boucl\u00e9. Il sera pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 la semaine prochaine au pr\u00e9sident des Etats-Unis. Le New York Times d’aujourd’hui nous en communique la substantifique moelle. En gros : Oui, il vaudrait mieux envisager de quitter l’Irak (Et comment !) Un retrait graduel serait la meilleure chose \u00e0… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4094,857,6014,5295],"class_list":["post-68256","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-baker","tag-irak","tag-isg","tag-rapport"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68256","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68256"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68256\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68256"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68256"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68256"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}