{"id":68263,"date":"2006-12-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/02\/quelques-verites-sur-le-nucleaire-britannique\/"},"modified":"2006-12-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-02T00:00:00","slug":"quelques-verites-sur-le-nucleaire-britannique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/02\/quelques-verites-sur-le-nucleaire-britannique\/","title":{"rendered":"Quelques v\u00e9rit\u00e9s sur le nucl\u00e9aire britannique"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le Royaume-Uni, puissance nucl\u00e9aire ? La question est pos\u00e9e aujourd’hui o\u00f9 le gouvernement a l’intention de lancer les premi\u00e8res mesures pour le remplacement des missiles SLBM (missiles strat\u00e9giques nucl\u00e9aires tir\u00e9s de sous-marins) Trident<\/em>. Le d\u00e9bat r\u00e9v\u00e8le des positions inattendues, avec des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s qui, si elles ne sont pas nouvelles, sont frappantes lorsqu’elles sont dites d’une fa\u00e7on si crue.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous parlons du commentaire de Matthew Parris, aujourd’hui<\/a> dans The Times<\/em>. Parris est un conservateur, ancien d\u00e9put\u00e9 tory<\/em>. Il est contre le remplacement des Trident<\/em> \u00e0 cause de la d\u00e9pense que cela implique. Lorsqu’on lui parle de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 du remplacement des Trident<\/em> pour le maintien en \u00e9tat op\u00e9rationnel avanc\u00e9 de la dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire britannique ind\u00e9pendante, il riposte que cette chose n’existe pas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSa description des conditions d’acquisition et d’op\u00e9rationnalit\u00e9 du Trident<\/em> ne nous surprend pas. Elles ont tout de m\u00eame le m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre \u00e9crites noir sur blanc, sans prendre la moindre pr\u00e9caution oratoire. On comparera cet expos\u00e9 avec ce que disait Thatcher, parlant justement d’une dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire britannique ind\u00e9pendante lorsqu’elle argumentait en faveur de l’achat du Trident<\/em>, au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1980.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abFor a nonsense Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent has become. In truth Trident never had much potential practical use, even during the Cold War. It was hardly conceivable that we could deploy this weapon except in co-operation with the United States. The one occasion on which the ability to threaten a nuclear strike might have delivered a specifically British policy goal was the Falklands War: the threat of a strike on Buenos Aires might just have turned Argentina back at an early stage. But nobody thought the Americans would have let us do that. Nor should they have.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOtherwise there was just one good argument for Trident. As a backbench Government MP I on balance accepted it; and voted for it. Solidarity with the United States in the free world’s stand against the advance of Soviet communism may sound a rather abstract goal today, now the Cold War is won, but it mattered then, and Trident was part of it: a potent symbol of parallel resolve, if not a huge practical help. Containing Soviet ambitions was a prize for which the price of our independent nuclear deterrent seemed worth paying.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt is true we cannot know how or where we may be threatened, but we can make useful guesses. Such threats are unlikely to include the very thing we originally acquired Trident to deter: threats from a superpower. The USSR is gone. Not only is the British nuclear deterrent not intended for use against America, but it could not even (practically speaking) be used against America’s wishes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa clart\u00e9 et la franchise de telles explications nous indiquent qu’au Royaume-Uni, aujourd’hui, les positions concernant les special relationships<\/em> sont de plus en plus \u00e9dulcor\u00e9es des arguments virtualistes. Le d\u00e9bat virulent qui est en cours \u00e0 leur propos, parfois avec l’aide des USA<\/a>, a l’avantage de poser le probl\u00e8me tel qu’il est : les special relationships<\/em> sont, du point de vue britannique, un acte d’all\u00e9geance aux USA et rien d’autre et c’est sur ce point qu’il faut se d\u00e9terminer. On le savait mais, aujourd’hui, cela se dit et cela se clame. C’est un point important : d\u00e9sormais, le probl\u00e8me est pos\u00e9 dans ses termes r\u00e9els.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 2 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 15H01<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le Royaume-Uni, puissance nucl\u00e9aire ? La question est pos\u00e9e aujourd’hui o\u00f9 le gouvernement a l’intention de lancer les premi\u00e8res mesures pour le remplacement des missiles SLBM (missiles strat\u00e9giques nucl\u00e9aires tir\u00e9s de sous-marins) Trident. Le d\u00e9bat r\u00e9v\u00e8le des positions inattendues, avec des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s qui, si elles ne sont pas nouvelles, sont frappantes lorsqu’elles sont dites d’une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4875,4345,3004,4907,4775],"class_list":["post-68263","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-britannique","tag-independance","tag-nucleaire","tag-parris","tag-trident"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68263","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68263"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68263\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68263"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68263"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68263"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}