a lengthy compromise statement reflecting a typical, middle-of-the-road consensus among an elite Washington "focus group", composed of esteemed individuals not handicapped by much historical or geopolitical familiarity with the region’s problems<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl n’emp\u00eache. L’article est court, percutant, bien fait, et il va au fond des choses dans son aspect critique. Il met en \u00e9vidence aussi bien la catastrophique situation o\u00f9 se trouvent les USA en Irak, que la catastrophique m\u00e9thode actuellement suivie pour tenter d’en sortir. On appr\u00e9ciera cette br\u00e8ve et coupante le\u00e7on de l’exercice du pouvoir par ce que devrait \u00eatre un homme d’Etat, et l’on appr\u00e9ciera la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence faite \u00e0 un homme et \u00e0 une nation que la mode courante recommande de vilipender et de consid\u00e9rer comme quantit\u00e9 n\u00e9gligeable ou quantit\u00e9 d\u00e9pass\u00e9e. (Zbig \u00e9crit ce passage \u00e0 propos du rapport de l’ISG et du m\u00e9morandum de Rumsfeld exposant la situation tr\u00e8s difficile en Irak et recommandant un changement de strat\u00e9gie.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe combination of the two<\/em> [documents] has already elevated Iran’s geopolitical power in the region. Hence the need of the moment is not for tactical tinkering or long consensus reports. Can one imagine Charles de Gaulle in the late 1950s waiting weeks for a long study by French public figures on how to end the Algerian war that was damaging France’s national unity and international reputation? Leadership derived from a sense of history requires sometimes the cutting of Gordian knots, not tying oneself up in knots.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tZbigniew Brzezinski ne peut donc que poursuivre d\u00e9sormais dans son r\u00f4le de Cassandre, bien loin des ivresses rationnelles du temps des esp\u00e9rances imp\u00e9riales, lorsqu’il d\u00e9crivait, dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, dans ses articles et dans ses livres, la fa\u00e7on dont les USA allaient assurer leur h\u00e9g\u00e9monie sur le monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe president, and America’s political leadership, must recognise that the US role in the world is being gravely undermined by the policies launched more than three years ago<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 6 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 09H54<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Certains esprits mal intentionn\u00e9s vont jusqu’\u00e0 avancer que l’article publi\u00e9 par Zbigniew Brzezinski dans le Financial Times du 5 d\u00e9cembre refl\u00e8te \u00e9galement une certaine frustration de cet expert prestigieux (conseiller de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale du pr\u00e9sident Carter, 1977-81), devenu vieux sage entre temps, de n’avoir pas \u00e9t\u00e9 choisi pour faire partie de l’Iraq Study Group (ISG)… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1006,2631,2851,2685,6014,5674,2852],"class_list":["post-68278","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-brzezinski","tag-de","tag-financial","tag-gaulle","tag-isg","tag-leadership","tag-times"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68278","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68278"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68278\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68278"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68278"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68278"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}