{"id":68282,"date":"2006-12-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-07T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/07\/les-experts-militaires-sont-pessimistes\/"},"modified":"2006-12-07T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-07T00:00:00","slug":"les-experts-militaires-sont-pessimistes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/07\/les-experts-militaires-sont-pessimistes\/","title":{"rendered":"Les experts militaires sont pessimistes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>En m\u00eame temps que le rapport de l&rsquo;ISG est rendu public, les experts s&rsquo;affairent autour de la principale hypoth\u00e8se pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par le document : un retrait des forces US d&rsquo;Irak. Leurs analyses sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pessimistes. L&rsquo;essentiel de ce pessimisme est aliment\u00e9 par les probl\u00e8mes que poserait la prise en main de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du pays par les forces irakiennes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<a href=\" http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/story.php?F=2405991&#038;C=america\" class=\"gen\">Defense News<\/a> publie une analyse de Reuters sur la question. En voici quelques \u00e9l\u00e9ments, \u00e0 partir de l&rsquo;interview de deux de ces experts. Il faut observer qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;experts proches des milieux militaires. Leurs analyses recoupent le scepticisme profond des forces arm\u00e9es pour la situation en Irak en cas de retrait US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tStephen Biddle, du Strategic Studies Institute du U.S. Army War College: \u00ab<em>The short term will see a drop in (U.S.) casualties. But the military consequence of pulling back will be to cede the initiative to the enemy and to reduce the patrol presence that keeps enemy activity down. Regular U.S. patrols are keeping the level of the violence down. If we stop doing that patrolling the violence is going to get worse.<\/em>\u00bb Concernant le r\u00f4le \u00e9ventuel des forces arm\u00e9es irakiennes, Biddle dit ceci: \u00ab<em>Even if you&rsquo;ve got an effective military you still have the problem that that amounts to arming one of the two sides in the civil war. And as the death toll rises the military will takes sides among the militias &#8230; and splinter.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLoren Thompson du Lexington Institute: \u00ab<em>We can train Iraqis to be better soldiers but it is not proven we can train them to be better Iraqis. They will still be loyal to communities and tribes rather than central government. There is too much unjustified optimism that Iraqi forces are tractable and trainable. To date there is little evidence.<\/em>\u00bb Thompson s&rsquo;interroge \u00e9galement sur la strat\u00e9gie de l&rsquo;administration Bush : \u00ab<em>If our goal is to prevent the spread of civil war, then we are not going to be pulling troops out, because the moment we do, the war will grow so ferocious we will stop deploying. If our goal is to get out, then we are going to have to accept an even higher level of civil strife. If Americans leave Iraq, it will not be peaeful by anybody&rsquo;s definition.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 7 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 12H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En m\u00eame temps que le rapport de l&rsquo;ISG est rendu public, les experts s&rsquo;affairent autour de la principale hypoth\u00e8se pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par le document : un retrait des forces US d&rsquo;Irak. Leurs analyses sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pessimistes. L&rsquo;essentiel de ce pessimisme est aliment\u00e9 par les probl\u00e8mes que poserait la prise en main de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4094,6014,3474],"class_list":["post-68282","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-baker","tag-isg","tag-thompson"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68282","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68282"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68282\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68282"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68282"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68282"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}