{"id":68288,"date":"2006-12-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/09\/le-destin-annonce-du-rapport-de-lisg-laccelerateur-paradoxal-du-desordre-washingtonien\/"},"modified":"2006-12-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-09T00:00:00","slug":"le-destin-annonce-du-rapport-de-lisg-laccelerateur-paradoxal-du-desordre-washingtonien","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/09\/le-destin-annonce-du-rapport-de-lisg-laccelerateur-paradoxal-du-desordre-washingtonien\/","title":{"rendered":"Le destin annonc\u00e9 du rapport de l&rsquo;ISG : l&rsquo;acc\u00e9l\u00e9rateur paradoxal du d\u00e9sordre washingtonien"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le rapport de l&rsquo;Iraq Study Group (ISG) de James Baker est sans doute promis \u00e0 un destin \u00e9trange. Compos\u00e9 comme un document parfait du <em>consensus<\/em> bipartisan habituel \u00e0 l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> US quand les choses vont mal, il pourrait se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler comme la pomme de discorde id\u00e9ale, la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence m\u00eame du d\u00e9sordre washingtonien. Ce serait alors le signe de la profondeur de la crise. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, le d\u00e9sordre est si grand \u00e0 Washington que les m\u00e9decines \u00e9prouv\u00e9es qu&rsquo;on y applique pour r\u00e9sorber ce d\u00e9sordre, au contraire l&rsquo;alimentent, l&rsquo;accroissent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe texte de Jim Lobe, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/lobe\/?articleid=10130\" class=\"gen\">le 8 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> sur <em>Antiwar.com<\/em>, nous para\u00eet excellent \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Il d\u00e9crit implicitement cette extraordinaire situation. Le rapport ISG, au lieu de faire l&rsquo;unit\u00e9, focalise les contradictions, les affrontements, les querelles de susceptibilit\u00e9 et de conception. Chaque \u00e9l\u00e9ment du d\u00e9sordre peut y trouver son miel pour renforcer sa position de contributeur au d\u00e9sordre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Puisque le rapport de l&rsquo;ISG n&rsquo;est pas mal fait, puisque c&rsquo;est un excellent rapport de compromis et qu&rsquo;il aboutit au r\u00e9sultat inverse, c&rsquo;est bien que la messe est dite. La crise washingtonienne l&rsquo;a d\u00e9finitivement emport\u00e9 sur toute tentative de la r\u00e9sorber.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLobe cite l&rsquo;un des membres de l&rsquo;ISG, l&rsquo;ancien chef de cabinet de Clinton Leon Panetta: \u00ab<em>This country cannot be at war and be as divided as we are today.<\/em>\u00bb Eh bien, il se trouve que oui, l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique peut \u00eatre \u00e0 la fois en guerre et radicalement divis\u00e9e comme elle l&rsquo;est. C&rsquo;est bien l\u00e0 qu&rsquo;est la trag\u00e9die.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;introduction du texte de Jim Lobe vaut pour une pr\u00e9vision tr\u00e8s mod\u00e9r\u00e9e des malheurs qui attendent le rapport, et Washington \u00e9galement : \u00ab<em>One day after its official release, the package of 79 recommendations on U.S. Iraq and Middle East policy released Wednesday by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG) faced a very uncertain future.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Denounced by hawks and doves alike in both major parties, the ISG&rsquo;s 142-page report received what at best could be called an ambiguous response at the White House and on Capitol Hill.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 9 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 07H59<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le rapport de l&rsquo;Iraq Study Group (ISG) de James Baker est sans doute promis \u00e0 un destin \u00e9trange. Compos\u00e9 comme un document parfait du consensus bipartisan habituel \u00e0 l&rsquo;establishment US quand les choses vont mal, il pourrait se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler comme la pomme de discorde id\u00e9ale, la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence m\u00eame du d\u00e9sordre washingtonien. Ce serait alors le&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3356,6014,1094,6197],"class_list":["post-68288","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-desordre","tag-isg","tag-lobe","tag-panetta"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68288","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68288"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68288\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68288"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68288"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68288"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}