{"id":68291,"date":"2006-12-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/10\/louest-vers-la-defaite\/"},"modified":"2006-12-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-10T00:00:00","slug":"louest-vers-la-defaite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/10\/louest-vers-la-defaite\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;Ouest vers la d\u00e9faite"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">L&rsquo;Ouest vers la d\u00e9faite<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t10 d\u00e9cembre 2006  Nous aurions pu aussi bien \u00e9crire : <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=871\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;anglosph\u00e8re<\/a> vers la d\u00e9faite, tant l&rsquo;Ouest, lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;Irak et de l&rsquo;Afghanistan, et de la soi-disant guerre contre la terreur, cette monstruosit\u00e9 qui va avec, est une affaire anglo-am\u00e9ricaine. Mais il s&rsquo;agit d\u00e9sormais moins d&rsquo;une alliance, voire d&rsquo;un liaison exalt\u00e9e et coupable (<em>special relationships<\/em>) que d&rsquo;un faux-couple pervers et auto-destructeur, au nom d&rsquo;une ambition anglo-saxonne qui s&rsquo;av\u00e8re suicidaire sur le terme tr\u00e8s court. Au-del\u00e0, l&rsquo;exemple choisi nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le le sort tragique de cette civilisation occidentale annex\u00e9e par l&rsquo;ambition vaniteuse, par l&rsquo;<em>hubris<\/em> anglo-saxon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous prenons ici comme support \u00e0 cette r\u00e9flexion deux articles du m\u00eame <em>Independent<\/em> de Londres, excellent en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pour nous d\u00e9crire les avatars de cette alliance si perverse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  \u00ab<em>CIA is undermining British war effort, say military chiefs  Confidential report speaks of serious tensions&rsquo; in the coalition over strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan<\/em>\u00bb, paru le <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/middle_east\/article2062489.ece\" class=\"gen\">10 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques extraits :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>British intelligence officers and military commanders have accused the US of undermining British policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, after the sacking of a key British ally in the Afghan province of Helmand.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>British sources have blamed pressure from the CIA for President Hamid Karzai&rsquo;s decision to dismiss Mohammed Daud as governor of Helmand, the southern province where Britain deployed some 4,000 troops this year. Governor Daud was appointed in mid-year to replace a man the British accused of involvement in opium trafficking, but on Thursday Mr Karzai summoned him to Kabul and sacked him, along with his deputy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Americans knew Daud was a main British ally, one official told The Independent on Sunday, yet they deliberately undermined him and told Karzai to sack him. The official said the Defence Secretary, Des Browne, was tearing his hair out.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Meanwhile, a confidential assessment of the situation in Iraq, seen by the IoS, has reported \u00a0\u00bbserious tensions\u00a0\u00bb in the American-British coalition. American commanders in the country are believed to oppose the British strategy for handing over Maysan and Basra provinces to Iraqi control as part of an exit strategy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The disclosures come only days after differences between the US and Britain were on display during Tony Blair&rsquo;s visit to Washington, and the Iraq Study Group issued a report containing withering criticism of President George Bush&rsquo;s policies. With British commanders warning that they may not be able to succeed in Afghanistan unless forces in Iraq are drawn down, cracks in the transatlantic alliance are likely to widen.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t  \u00ab<em>Killed in action: Marine Jonathan Wigley, born Melton Mowbray, 1985. Died Garmsir, 2006  His death on Tuesday seemed to be just another tragic casualty in Afghanistan. But his killing, possibly by US fire, raises a series of questions that should haunt the men who sent him to war.<\/em>\u00bb. L&rsquo;article de Kim Sengupta et de Raymond Whitaker est publi\u00e9 le m\u00eame <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/uk\/this_britain\/article2062516.ece\" class=\"gen\">10 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> dans <em>The Independent<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAu travers d&rsquo;un document officiel et de la mort d&rsquo;un Royal Marine britannique, tu\u00e9 par le feu d&rsquo;un A-10 am\u00e9ricain, sont expos\u00e9s tous les travers fatals des soi-disant guerres, en train de devenir d\u00e9faites mortelles, que ces deux pays ont initi\u00e9es et conduisent aujourd&rsquo;hui de mal en pis. Au bout du chemin, d&rsquo;\u00e9pouvantables d\u00e9stabilisations menacent leurs ambitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The British troops were pinned down in a stretch of farmland, among mud-walled compounds and a network of irrigation canals, with their line of retreat cut off by relentless fire from machine-guns and mortars. As the insurgents tried to encircle them, the beleaguered men of 45 Commando called in air support. Taliban positions were pounded by US F-18s and A-10s, and British Apache helicopter gunships.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>It was at this moment, amid the flames, smoke and ear-splitting noise, that Jonathan Wigley was mortally wounded &#8211; almost certainly by friendly fire. I saw it. It was the A-10. I was five feet away, said a marine afterwards, his face etched with dirt and tiredness. I saw it swooping toward us. I will never forget that noise. It was horrible.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>His men had expected resistance, said Major Andy Plewes, the company commander. What we didn&rsquo;t know was how strong it was. We were prepared for it, which is why we were able to hold them off and move safely back &#8230; but we don&rsquo;t have enough forces in the area to hold ground completely. That has to be done by Afghan security forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Major Plewes was identifying one of the worst problems facing Nato forces in Afghanistan. Their British commander, Lt-Gen David Richards, had hoped to adopt less aggressive tactics than the US forces they replaced, but like the Americans, they are constantly having to make up in firepower what they lack in numbers on the ground.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>If Lt-Gen Richards had been given the strategic reserve of around 1,000 soldiers he has constantly sought, troops needing support would not have to rely so frequently on air strikes. These inevitably have unintended effects: while Marine Wigley was in a very dangerous situation, the risks of having to call in a fearsome ground-attack aircraft such as the A-10 to blast insurgents in the next trench are obvious.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>the British would need a much bigger force without having to use the kind of firepower that would leave the locals finding only ruins on their return. Nor is that supposed to be the mission: commanders stress they went into Helmand to provide support for reconstruction and development, not to seek war with the Taliban. Troops are carrying out what development work they can in Helmand, but they lack the numbers to have a major impact.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<h3>Une civilisation bloqu\u00e9e<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une revue g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de tous les d\u00e9fauts, les travers, les incompr\u00e9hensions, les d\u00e9fiances, de toutes les fautes, les erreurs, les vanit\u00e9s, qui parcourent ces deux guerres, ces deux soi-disant guerres d&rsquo;Afghanistan et d&rsquo;Irak. Tout ce qu&rsquo;on y rencontre laisse pantois, par rapport aux pr\u00e9visions et aux certitudes qui accompagnaient toutes ces entreprises lorsqu&rsquo;elles furent lanc\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA aucun moment, il n&rsquo;y a l&rsquo;impression d&rsquo;une guerre, d&rsquo;o\u00f9 nos pr\u00e9cautions de langage \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Derri\u00e8re la naus\u00e9e de leur langage conformiste (d\u00e9mocratie, droits de l&rsquo;homme, modernit\u00e9) on ne trouve rien qui assure le s\u00e9rieux d&rsquo;une guerre et la justifie malgr\u00e9 tout, avec un but, une strat\u00e9gie, des ressources mesur\u00e9es au besoin, un esprit d&rsquo;entreprise et une solidarit\u00e9 entre les combattants alli\u00e9s. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un d\u00e9sordre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral recouvert h\u00e2tivement des simulacres de la communication,  et, pr\u00e9cisons-le, bien que cela nous apparaisse d&rsquo;\u00e9vidence, d\u00e9sordre du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l&rsquo;Ouest, de l&rsquo;anglosph\u00e8re en campagne, et nullement du c\u00f4t\u00e9 des talibans ou des insurg\u00e9s divers et vari\u00e9s d&rsquo;Irak. L&rsquo;impression est bien celle de la dissolution d&rsquo;un empire aux abois, notre (leur) empire de la civilisation occidentale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a une immense tromperie virtualiste dans cette fable de la guerre contre la terreur renforc\u00e9e de l&rsquo;autre fable de l&#8217;empire am\u00e9ricaniste en train de s&rsquo;\u00e9tablir sur le monde. L&rsquo;Occident domine le monde depuis deux si\u00e8cles, de colonisation en d\u00e9colonisation et en n\u00e9o-colonialisme divers. Nous assistons aux derniers spasmes de la chose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl faut ajouter sans se lasser, pour continuellement prendre date, que tout cela est typiquement anglo-saxon, y compris le virtualisme dont on veut habiller l&rsquo;ensemble pour nous faire prendre des vessies pour des lanternes. On y retrouve, exacerb\u00e9s, tous les d\u00e9fauts de cette ambition un temps qualifi\u00e9e d&rsquo;anglosph\u00e8re, avec, couronnant le lot, leur extraordinaire vanit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl devient de plus en plus probable que des \u00e9v\u00e9nements graves, s&rsquo;apparentant \u00e0 de r\u00e9elles d\u00e9faites militaires, nous attendent sur l&rsquo;un ou l&rsquo;autre th\u00e9\u00e2tre. Il semble de plus en plus improbable que des trucs comme l&rsquo;excellentissime rapport de l&rsquo;Iraq Study Group y puissent quelque chose parce qu&rsquo;ils s&rsquo;adressent \u00e0 une structure qui se dissout, \u00e0 un ordre (dans l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> anglo-saxon) qui n&rsquo;existe plus, \u00e0 une mesure du jugement qui n&rsquo;est plus qu&rsquo;un lointain souvenir. Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements graves en Afghanistan et en Irak ne sont pas les r\u00e9sultats des op\u00e9rations militaires, ou pas seulement, ils sont l&rsquo;effet d&rsquo;abord de la discorde chez l&rsquo;ami , du d\u00e9sordre extraordinaire, de la corruption psychologique, de la vanit\u00e9 imp\u00e9rative et de l&rsquo;inculture affich\u00e9e qui caract\u00e9risent les \u00e9lites de notre civilisation. Nous ne m\u00e9ritons plus ni notre puissance, ni notre pouvoir. Nous ne m\u00e9ritons plus la place que nous tenons dans l&rsquo;Histoire. Nous sommes (ils sont) des usurpateurs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl ne reste \u00e0 la civilisation occidentale qu&rsquo;une seule chose : un \u00e9norme poids technologique et mat\u00e9rialiste emp\u00eachant toute r\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, par une autre civilisation ou par elle-m\u00eame, emp\u00eachant toute mise en cause d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me perverti \u00e0 l&rsquo;extr\u00eame. C&rsquo;est la concr\u00e9tisation tr\u00e8s rapide de la trag\u00e9die entrevue par <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=315\" class=\"gen\">Arnold Toynbee<\/a> (\u00ab<em>Pourquoi la civilisation ne peut-elle continuer \u00e0 avancer, tout en tr\u00e9buchant, d&rsquo;\u00e9chec en \u00e9chec, sur le chemin p\u00e9nible et d\u00e9gradant, mais qui n&rsquo;est tout de m\u00eame pas compl\u00e8tement celui du suicide, et qu&rsquo;elle n&rsquo;a cess\u00e9 de suivre pendant les quelques premiers milliers d&rsquo;ann\u00e9es de son existence? La r\u00e9ponse se trouve dans les r\u00e9centes inventions techniques de la bourgeoisie moderne occidentale.<\/em>\u00bb). Notre puissance mat\u00e9rialiste et la perte de tout sens spirituel bloquent tout effort de re-spiritualisation en nous faisant de plus en plus prisonniers du syst\u00e8me machiniste que nous avons fabriqu\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa d\u00e9monstration est en train d&rsquo;en \u00eatre faite, dans les montagnes afghanes et les \u00e9tendues sablonneuses d&rsquo;Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;Ouest vers la d\u00e9faite 10 d\u00e9cembre 2006 Nous aurions pu aussi bien \u00e9crire : l&rsquo;anglosph\u00e8re vers la d\u00e9faite, tant l&rsquo;Ouest, lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;Irak et de l&rsquo;Afghanistan, et de la soi-disant guerre contre la terreur, cette monstruosit\u00e9 qui va avec, est une affaire anglo-am\u00e9ricaine. Mais il s&rsquo;agit d\u00e9sormais moins d&rsquo;une alliance, voire d&rsquo;un liaison exalt\u00e9e&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3236,4097,4115,3423,6200,4071,3072],"class_list":["post-68291","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-afghanistan","tag-allies","tag-anglosphere","tag-civilisation","tag-discorde","tag-ouest","tag-toynbee"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68291","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68291"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68291\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68291"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68291"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68291"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}