{"id":68299,"date":"2006-12-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/13\/lus-army-et-le-marine-corps-vont-etre-gates\/"},"modified":"2006-12-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-13T00:00:00","slug":"lus-army-et-le-marine-corps-vont-etre-gates","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/13\/lus-army-et-le-marine-corps-vont-etre-gates\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;U.S. Army et le Marine Corps vont \u00eatre g\u00e2t\u00e9s"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Nous reprenons un d\u00e9tail du texte, du Washington <em>Post<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/12\/11\/AR2006121100508_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">12 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, que nous avons cit\u00e9 pour la nouvelle <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3467\" class=\"gen\">pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente<\/a>. Voici l&rsquo;extrait, avec, soulign\u00e9 en gras par nous, le passage qui nous importe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The group disagreed on the key issue of whether to send more troops to Iraq, with retired Gen. John M. Keane arguing that several thousand additional soldiers could be used to improve security in Baghdad, and others expressing doubt about that proposal, according to sources at the meeting. But the five agreed in telling Bush that the Army and Marine Corps both need to be bigger, and also<\/em> <strong><em>need bigger budgets.<\/em><\/strong>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette derni\u00e8re recommandation (<em>bigger budgets<\/em>) est d&rsquo;une importance consid\u00e9rable,  quoique sans beaucoup de surprise. Lorsque quelque chose va mal dans un domaine, la r\u00e9action am\u00e9ricaniste est de mettre plus d&rsquo;argent dans le domaine qui traite ce quelque chose, impliquant que la m\u00e9thode suivie n&rsquo;est pas erron\u00e9e (ce qui est am\u00e9ricaniste ne peut \u00eatre erron\u00e9) mais qu&rsquo;elle n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 appliqu\u00e9e avec assez de poids (d&rsquo;argent). La psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste est celle de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2679\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;inculpabilit\u00e9<\/a> et, par cons\u00e9quent celle de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3393\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;in\u00e9luctabilit\u00e9<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans le cas qui nous occupe et dans l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se tr\u00e8s probable o\u00f9 GW suit les recommandations du groupe, il est \u00e9galement probable qu&rsquo;un effort budg\u00e9taire suppl\u00e9mentaire va \u00eatre fait pour l&rsquo;U.S. Army et le Marine Corps, et cela sera au d\u00e9triment des autres armes. Les projets tr\u00e8s co\u00fbteux des syst\u00e8mes sophistiqu\u00e9s de la Guerre froide (dont le JSF), qui forment l&rsquo;essentiel des budgets d&rsquo;investissement de ces deux autres services (l&rsquo;USAF et la Navy) vont avoir encore plus de difficult\u00e9s \u00e0 recevoir leurs dotations budg\u00e9taires. La crise interne du Pentagone \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard va \u00eatre renforc\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa s\u00e9paration et l&rsquo;antagonisme des services vont \u00eatre accrus. L&rsquo;USAF va \u00eatre encore plus partisane d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran, pour prouver l&rsquo;utilit\u00e9, la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de ces syst\u00e8mes de la Guerre froide, tandis que l&rsquo;U.S. Army va y \u00eatre encore plus oppos\u00e9e, de crainte de subir des cons\u00e9quences op\u00e9rationnelles (iraniennes) dangereuses pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de son corps engag\u00e9 en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 13 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 06H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nous reprenons un d\u00e9tail du texte, du Washington Post du 12 d\u00e9cembre, que nous avons cit\u00e9 pour la nouvelle pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente. Voici l&rsquo;extrait, avec, soulign\u00e9 en gras par nous, le passage qui nous importe. \u00abThe group disagreed on the key issue of whether to send more troops to Iraq, with retired Gen. John M. Keane arguing&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3289,6206,250,3895,3194],"class_list":["post-68299","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-army","tag-budgets","tag-jsf","tag-marines","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68299","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68299"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68299\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68299"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68299"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68299"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}