Post<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’information vient d’un jeune officier du d\u00e9partement d’Etat, qui a travaill\u00e9 quelques mois sur l’Iran et les personnes connect\u00e9es au programme nucl\u00e9aire. Le d\u00e9partement d’Etat voulait mettre \u00e0 jour ses dossiers sur la question. Le jeune officier se tourna vers la CIA. Refus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe agency claimed that agents on the Iran desk were already overworked, and that such a disclosure could compromise its intelligence sources on Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut it is also believed that the CIA was reluctant to tip its hand on Iran following its failure before the 2003 invasion of Iraq to establish that Saddam Hussein had failed to realise his nuclear ambitions, and that the country did not have a dangerous arsenal.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCela, ce sont les raisons donn\u00e9es par la CIA, d’ailleurs valables en partie. La raison principale est que la CIA a refus\u00e9, par r\u00e9flexe bureaucratique d’antagonisme de fournir des informations \u00e0 une bureaucratie concurrente. L’imp\u00e9ratif de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nucl\u00e9aire ne joue plus aucun r\u00f4le dans un syst\u00e8me extr\u00eamement affaibli et corrompu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe jeune officier s’est donc tourn\u00e9 vers Google, comme vous et moi. Il a programm\u00e9 les termes Iran, nuclear<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb et obtenu 100 noms, bient\u00f4t r\u00e9duits \u00e0 12 puis 11.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tFinalement, la CIA a consenti un effort, mais en imposant d’autres restrictions paralysantes puisque la confirmation qu’elle apporte \u00e0 propos des 11 personnes identifi\u00e9es s’accompagne de la remarque qu’elles n’ont gu\u00e8re d’importance dans la fili\u00e8re nucl\u00e9aire iranienne \u00abAfter bureaucratic wrangling, the CIA eventually confirmed the suspicions about some of the people on the state department list.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHowever, the agency said that that none of those identified by the state department were directly connected to Iran’s efforts to produce a nuclear warhead.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCet \u00e9pisode n’est pas exceptionnel. Il permet par ailleurs de mesurer d’une part ce que sont exactement certaines informations officielles classifi\u00e9es (ce fut le cas, finalement, de la liste des 11 personnes), d’autre part la puissance et le cr\u00e9dit d\u00e9sormais acquis par le Net<\/em> comme source d’information.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 13 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 08H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Voil\u00e0 un \u00e9pisode typique de l’antagonisme et des cloisonnements existant \u00e0 Washington au sein des diverses bureaucraties de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Il est rapport\u00e9 par le Guardian, relayant le Washington Post. L’information vient d’un jeune officier du d\u00e9partement d’Etat, qui a travaill\u00e9 quelques mois sur l’Iran et les personnes connect\u00e9es au programme nucl\u00e9aire. Le d\u00e9partement d’Etat… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2623,3104,3889,3888,2773,3004],"class_list":["post-68301","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bureaucratie","tag-cia","tag-detat","tag-departement","tag-iran","tag-nucleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68301","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68301"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68301\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68301"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68301"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68301"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}