{"id":68322,"date":"2006-12-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/20\/we-are-not-winning-mais-ca-ne-saurait-tarder\/"},"modified":"2006-12-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-20T00:00:00","slug":"we-are-not-winning-mais-ca-ne-saurait-tarder","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/20\/we-are-not-winning-mais-ca-ne-saurait-tarder\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00abWe are not winning<\/em>\u00bb mais \u00e7a ne saurait tarder"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le pr\u00e9sident des USA a, dans une interview au Washington Post<\/em>, apport\u00e9 des \u00e9l\u00e9ments sur la strat\u00e9gie et la situation en Irak que les commentateurs jugent importants. Le Post<\/em> fait grand cas, aujourd’hui<\/a>, de la formule utilis\u00e9e par GW Bush pour caract\u00e9riser la situation en Irak : \u00abWe’re not winning, we’re not losing<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abPresident Bush acknowledged for the first time yesterday that the United States is not winning the war in Iraq and said he plans to expand the overall size of the stressed U.S. armed forces to meet the challenges of a long-term global struggle against terrorists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs he searches for a new strategy for Iraq, Bush has now adopted the formula advanced by his top military adviser to describe the situation. We’re not winning, we’re not losing, Bush said in an interview with The Washington Post. The assessment was a striking reversal for a president who, days before the November elections, declared, Absolutely, we’re winning.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn another turnaround, Bush said he has ordered Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to develop a plan to increase the troop strength of the Army and Marine Corps, heeding warnings from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill that multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan are stretching the armed forces toward the breaking point. We need to reset our military, said Bush, whose administration had opposed increasing force levels as recently as this summer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut in a wide-ranging session in the Oval Office, the president said he interpreted the Democratic election victories six weeks ago not as a mandate to bring the U.S. involvement in Iraq to an end but as a call to find new ways to make the mission there succeed. He confirmed that he is considering a short-term surge in troops in Iraq, an option that top generals have resisted out of concern that it would not help.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA substantial military expansion will take years and would not immediately affect the war in Iraq. But it would begin to address the growing alarm among commanders about the state of the armed forces. Although the president offered no specifics, other U.S. officials said the administration is preparing plans to bolster the nation’s permanent active-duty military with as many as 70,000 additional troops.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQu’a fait GW en pronon\u00e7ant cette nuance s\u00e9mantique que le journal washingtonien a l’air de juger consid\u00e9rable? Plusieurs choses :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t GW r\u00e9interpr\u00e8te le 7 novembre. La col\u00e8re des \u00e9lecteurs venait de ce que l’Am\u00e9rique is not winning<\/em> en Irak. Ce n’est pas faux stricto sensu<\/em> (si l’Am\u00e9rique gagnait en Irak, il n’y aurait pas une telle opposition \u00e0 la guerre, d’ailleurs, la guerre serait finie) ; mais il s’agit bien entendu d’une sollicitation de l’interpr\u00e9tation dont le but n’est que de justifier ce qui suit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Si l’Am\u00e9rique ne gagne pas en Irak, c’est qu’elle n’a pas de forces suffisantes pour gagner. (En passant, c’est justifier in fine<\/em>, mais au profit de GW et de ses actuels projets, le d\u00e9part de Rumsfeld. Le d\u00e9part du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, qui ne voulait pas augmenter le volume des forces, est \u00e9galement r\u00e9interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 : c’est comme si on avait chass\u00e9 Rumsfeld parce qu’il persistait \u00e0 ne pas vouloir gagner en envoyant des troupes suppl\u00e9mentaires.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Les responsabilit\u00e9s sont donc judicieusement r\u00e9parties selon un sch\u00e9ma nouveau, au centre duquel se trouve GW qui comprend parfaitement les probl\u00e8mes \u00e0 mesure qu’ils apparaissent. Le renforcement du corps exp\u00e9ditionnaire US est d\u00e9sormais la condition de la victoire. La fa\u00e7on dont la chose est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e est, dans l’esprit, le contraire du plan Baker. Pour Baker et l’ISG, l’\u00e9ventualit\u00e9 d’un renforcement temporaire doit permettre un retrait US dans des conditions d\u00e9centes ; pour GW, le renforcement doit permettre la victoire, apr\u00e8s laquelle on pourra songer au retrait. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t GW Bush adopte compl\u00e8tement la th\u00e8se des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, ennemis jur\u00e9s \u00e0 la fois de Rumsfeld pour son refus d’augmenter les forces, et du rapport Baker pour son esprit d\u00e9faitiste (munichois). R\u00e9action, par exemple, de Frederick Kagan, n\u00e9o-conservateur notoire, dans le San Francisco Chronicle<\/a>, qui commente le point particulier de l’ordre donn\u00e9 \u00e0 Robert Gates d’augmenter le volume des forces : \u00abI think it’s a great thing that the president has seized this opportunity, the transition from Rumsfeld to Gates, to send Gates off in the right direction, said Frederick Kagan, a military historian and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a think tank in Washington. It’s a great idea. Definitely overdue.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tPubli\u00e9 le 20 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 15H33<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le pr\u00e9sident des USA a, dans une interview au Washington Post, apport\u00e9 des \u00e9l\u00e9ments sur la strat\u00e9gie et la situation en Irak que les commentateurs jugent importants. Le Post fait grand cas, aujourd’hui, de la formule utilis\u00e9e par GW Bush pour caract\u00e9riser la situation en Irak : \u00abWe’re not winning, we’re not losing\u00bb \u00abPresident Bush… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6235,868,6238,1104,6236,569,5050,6237],"class_list":["post-68322","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-are","tag-bush","tag-losing","tag-neocons","tag-not","tag-rumsfeld","tag-we","tag-winning"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68322","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68322"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68322\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68322"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68322"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68322"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}