International Herald Tribune<\/em> le cheminement de ce processus, qui va des ambitions de d\u00e9mocratisation de tout le Moyen-Orient et du reste du monde \u00e0 partir de la conqu\u00eate et de la d\u00e9mocratisation de l’Irak au d\u00e9bat actuel sur le nombre de brigades de l’U.S. Army qu’il faudrait envoyer aujourd’hui pour tenter de s\u00e9curiser Bagdad.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne va de pair avec l’effondrement r\u00e9gulier de la strat\u00e9gie conceptuelle et de la puissance militaire am\u00e9ricaniste qui va avec, et l’aggravation r\u00e9guli\u00e8re de la situation en Irak. Il marque la perversion en substance du pouvoir \u00e0 Washington et de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments annexes (Congr\u00e8s, communaut\u00e9 des experts, gestion du Pentagone) qui l’accompagnent. Il y a un processus d’aveuglement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral r\u00e9gulier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tIl s’agit d’une crise structurelle qui, au-del\u00e0 de la strat\u00e9gie elle-m\u00eame, affecte la vision du monde qui ne cesse elle-m\u00eame de r\u00e9tr\u00e9cir (toutes les pr\u00e9occupations de Washington sont aujourd’hui concentr\u00e9es sur l’Irak et la situation \u00e0 Bagdad, comme si le monde se r\u00e9duisait \u00e0 Bagdad). Enfin, et comme naturellement, ce sont la psychologie et l’esprit eux-m\u00eames qui sont affect\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tBacevitch d\u00e9crit le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la strat\u00e9gie qui r\u00e9tr\u00e9cit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abAs if tacitly acknowledging that they have spent all their ammunition strategically, Bush and his lieutenants now preoccupy themselves with operational matters that ought to fall within the purview of field commanders. Will sending another half-dozen combat brigades into Baghdad secure the Iraqi capital? How about if we make it 10? That issues like these should now command presidential attention testifies to the administration’s disarray. It’s as if Franklin Roosevelt had tried to manage the Battle of the Bulge from his desk in the Oval Office.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbFighting the Battle of Baghdad does not qualify as presidential business. Devising an effective response to the threat posed by Islamic radicalism does. On that score, however, the most pressing question is this: Does open-ended global war provide the proper framework for formulating that response? Or has global war, based on various illusions about American competence and American power, led to a dead end?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAmerica’s failure in Iraq lends considerable urgency to this question. That no responsible member of this administration possesses the presence of mind, the imagination or the courage to address the issue head-on forms yet another part of the tragedy unfolding before our eyes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 06H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne tragique qui se d\u00e9roule sous nos yeux est le r\u00e9tr\u00e9cissement constant de la perception et de la psychologie de la direction am\u00e9ricaniste. Andrew J. Bacevitch retrace dans un article qu’il publie aujourd’hui dans l’International Herald Tribune le cheminement de ce processus, qui va des ambitions de d\u00e9mocratisation de tout le Moyen-Orient et du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6249,5422,3198,6248,3440,3248],"class_list":["post-68328","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aveuglement","tag-bacevitch","tag-gw","tag-retrecir","tag-strategie","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68328","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68328"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68328\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68328"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68328"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68328"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}