{"id":68329,"date":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/22\/stalingrad-sur-le-tigre\/"},"modified":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","slug":"stalingrad-sur-le-tigre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/22\/stalingrad-sur-le-tigre\/","title":{"rendered":"Stalingrad sur le Tigre"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le d\u00e9bat sur l&rsquo;envoi de forces suppl\u00e9mentaires pour tenter de restaurer le contr\u00f4le de Bagdad est un aspect essentiel de cette strat\u00e9gie qui r\u00e9tr\u00e9cit que nous signalons dans <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3501\" class=\"gen\">la note pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente<\/a>. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un plan portant sur l&rsquo;envoi d&rsquo;un contingent important de forces suppl\u00e9mentaires (autour de 50.000 hommes) dans le secteur m\u00eame de Bagdad, pour reprendre Bagdad, comme si Bagdad \u00e9tait devenu le centre (<em>center of gravity of this conflict<\/em>) d&rsquo;une renaissance miraculeuse de la puissance et de l&rsquo;influence US,  comme l&rsquo;Irak lui-m\u00eame \u00e9tait pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 il y a trois ans, mais d&rsquo;une mani\u00e8re compl\u00e8tement offensive, \u00e0 la diff\u00e9rence d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui. L&rsquo;Irak \u00e9tait en 2003 le relais final de l&rsquo;affirmation am\u00e9ricaniste sur le monde alors que Bagdad en est aujourd&rsquo;hui la derni\u00e8re chance<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBien entendu, le plan vient des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, qui restent les ma\u00eetres \u00e0 penser de GW. Il implique qu&rsquo;une fois r\u00e9gl\u00e9 le probl\u00e8me de Bagdad, les USA seront \u00e0 nouveau pr\u00eats \u00e0 frapper partout, \u00e0 nouveau au z\u00e9nith de leur puissance, et particuli\u00e8rement \u00e0 frapper l&rsquo;Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tParmi les strat\u00e8ges et experts qui commentent cette orientation, certains craignent le pire, notamment le spectre d&rsquo;un Stalingrad sur le Tigre, la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une d\u00e9faite militaire majeure de l&rsquo;U.S. Army.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tJim Lobe signale les circonstances de ce plan n\u00e9o-conservateur (\u00ab<em>The plan, which was presented to Bush last week in a meeting with five national-defense specialists, including two associates of the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI)<\/em>\u00bb), analyse <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/HL22Ak01.html\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a>, sur le site <em>Atimes.com<\/em>, la perspective g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, du point de vue militaire.   <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>While Bush has not explicitly endorsed the concept, he noted at his year-end White House press conference on Wednesday that he was open to the idea. Vice President Dick Cheney&rsquo;s office, which is closely tied to AEI, is known to support it strongly.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>According to all the talk in Washington, the plan&rsquo; whipped up by AEI&rsquo;s Fred Kagan is likely to be mostly implemented by President Bush when he stops stalling about his policy in Iraq, said Pat Lang, the former chief Middle East analyst at the Pentagon&rsquo;s Defense Intelligence Agency, who has warned that, if implemented, it would likely lead to Stalingrad on the Tigris&rsquo;.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>A surge&rsquo; of the size possible under current constraints on US forces will not turn the tide in the guerrilla war, warned Lang, who noted, along with many other experts in the past month, that the reinforcement of thousands of US troops in Baghdad since last summer had actually increased the violence there.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Those who believe still more troops will bring victory&rsquo; are living in a dangerous dream world and need to wake up, he added, conceding, however, that it may appeal to Bush for that very reason. He wants to redeem his freedom agenda&rsquo;, restore momentum to his plans, and in his mind this might clear up&rsquo; Iraq so that he could move on to Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 06H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le d\u00e9bat sur l&rsquo;envoi de forces suppl\u00e9mentaires pour tenter de restaurer le contr\u00f4le de Bagdad est un aspect essentiel de cette strat\u00e9gie qui r\u00e9tr\u00e9cit que nous signalons dans la note pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un plan portant sur l&rsquo;envoi d&rsquo;un contingent important de forces suppl\u00e9mentaires (autour de 50.000 hommes) dans le secteur m\u00eame de Bagdad, pour&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[632,1104,3828,6250],"class_list":["post-68329","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bagdad","tag-neocons","tag-stalingrad","tag-tigre"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68329","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68329"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68329\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68329"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68329"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68329"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}