{"id":68331,"date":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/22\/que-dirait-gates-dune-attaque-contre-liran\/"},"modified":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-12-22T00:00:00","slug":"que-dirait-gates-dune-attaque-contre-liran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/12\/22\/que-dirait-gates-dune-attaque-contre-liran\/","title":{"rendered":"Que dirait Gates d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran ?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Devant les divers d\u00e9veloppements plut\u00f4t belliqueux de GW Bush <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3492\" class=\"gen\">contre<\/a> l&rsquo;offensive plut\u00f4t pacificatrice du rapport Baker (ISG), la position du nouveau secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates para\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9licate. Gates a particip\u00e9 aux d\u00e9bats de l&rsquo;ISG, il est proche de la tendance Baker-Bush-p\u00e8re, il est par cons\u00e9quent bien plus que r\u00e9serv\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard des d\u00e9veloppements en Irak et, plus encore, de la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est ce dernier point qui nous int\u00e9resse. Pr\u00eatons attention \u00e0 l&rsquo;avis de l&rsquo;excellent Tom Engelhardt, \u00e9diteur du site <a href=\"http:\/\/www.tomdispatch.com\/\" class=\"gen\">TomDispatch.com<\/a>, interview\u00e9 par <a href=\"http:\/\/www.motherjones.com\/interview\/2006\/12\/tom_engelhardt.html\" class=\"gen\">Mother Jones<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>Mother Jones:<\/em><\/strong> <em>And yet there&rsquo;s still talkand, one assumes, a live debate within the Bush administrationabout whacking Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>Tom Engelhardt:<\/em><\/strong> <em>Well, I was struck by something Robert Gates, the new Secretary of Defense, said at his confirmation hearings the other week. The Bush administration has claimed that, thanks to the Congressional resolutions of 2001 and 2002, they have the right to whack Iran without going back to Congress. But Gates said he doubted they had that right. He also said going to war with Iran would be the absolute last resort. You know, in words there are differences. There&rsquo;s a difference, believe it or not, in political Washington between going to war as a last resortwhich is what Bush saysand as an absolute last resort. And in fact unlike the neocons he&rsquo;s not a mad dreamer; he is a reasonably sane human being, clearly, whatever his flaws are, and he knows that to attack Iran would be madness. He laid it out: To begin with you&rsquo;d have oil at $150 a barrel in about 30 seconds, and the Iranians can make sure of thisthey can take their oil off the market, they can mine the Persian Gulf. Basically, they can significantly impede the flow from the oil heartlands of the planet. They can whack us in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn voit que Engelhardt est plut\u00f4t optimiste \u00e0 propos de Gates, en s&rsquo;appuyant sur ce qu&rsquo;il juge savoir de sa personnalit\u00e9. C&rsquo;est peut-\u00eatre faire preuve d&rsquo;optimisme. Qui aurait dit que Colin Powell, lui aussi mod\u00e9r\u00e9 et proche de Bush-p\u00e8re, se laisserait prendre \u00e0 l&rsquo;affaire irakienne jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 plaider les preuves totalement fabriqu\u00e9es et souvent grotesques de la culpabilit\u00e9-ADM de Saddam, devant le monde entier, \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU, le 5 f\u00e9vrier 2003?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe syst\u00e8me est l\u00e0. Si une impulsion lui est donn\u00e9e (c&rsquo;est l\u00e0 que les personnalit\u00e9s comptent, dans leur capacit\u00e9 d&rsquo;intoxication du syst\u00e8me) avec l&rsquo;appui du pr\u00e9sident, un secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense ne peut pr\u00e9tendre l&rsquo;arr\u00eater. Il peut tout au plus d\u00e9missionner, ce qui rejoint d&rsquo;ailleurs la formule de Chev\u00e8nement (Si un ministre n&rsquo;est pas d&rsquo;accord, il ferme sa gueule ou il d\u00e9missionne). M\u00eame une d\u00e9mission est chose extr\u00eamement rare et Powell  encore lui  a montr\u00e9 la capacit\u00e9 de r\u00e9sistance qu&rsquo;on peut offrir \u00e0 cette tentation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 13H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Devant les divers d\u00e9veloppements plut\u00f4t belliqueux de GW Bush contre l&rsquo;offensive plut\u00f4t pacificatrice du rapport Baker (ISG), la position du nouveau secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates para\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9licate. Gates a particip\u00e9 aux d\u00e9bats de l&rsquo;ISG, il est proche de la tendance Baker-Bush-p\u00e8re, il est par cons\u00e9quent bien plus que r\u00e9serv\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard des&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1381,3984,2773,1391],"class_list":["post-68331","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-engelhardt","tag-gates","tag-iran","tag-powell"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68331","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68331"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68331\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68331"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68331"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68331"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}