aujourd’hui<\/a> p\u00e8se de tout son poids.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tHattersley parle de l’attaque de l’arm\u00e9e britannique, aid\u00e9e par des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de la police de Basra, contre le poste de la police irakienne de Basra que cette m\u00eame arm\u00e9e britannique a puissamment contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 mettre en place il y a pr\u00e8s de quatre ans, lors de la lib\u00e9ration du pays. D\u00e9j\u00e0, la description de l’op\u00e9ration semble relever d’une bande dessin\u00e9e des Pieds Nickel\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIraq which for years has been an unmitigated tragedy has turned into Grand Guignol, and, true to the traditions of that genre, horror and farce combine in equal measure. No doubt we should rejoice that al-Jamiat police station in Basra has been destroyed and its prisoners taken to the relative security of a compound in which detainees are hopefully not routinely tortured. But if a sick satire on an obscure television channel included a sketch about British troops attacking a unit of the police that they established and with whom they had been theoretically working for nearly four years, the outcry would not have been limited to complaints about undermining the morale of our troops under fire. We would have been told that the whole idea was too fantastical to sustain the lampoon.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn d\u00e9bat, \u00e0 Washington, de savoir si l’\u00e9tat actuel de l’Irak doit \u00eatre d\u00e9crit proche de la guerre civile ou encore \u00e9loign\u00e9 de cet \u00e9tat. Mais une guerre civile pr\u00e9sente une certain ordre, une certaine coh\u00e9rence. Il y a les R\u00e9publicains espagnols contre les militaires de Franco ; les Armagnacs contre les Bourguignons ; les Sudistes contre les Nordistes, et ainsi de suite. L’Irak ne pr\u00e9sente aucun de ces caract\u00e8res de rangement d’un affrontement interne d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par des objectifs antagonistes. Effectivement, l’attaque de Basra illustre bien l’\u00e9tat de ce magma informe, de ce bouillonnement devenu trop chaotique pour pr\u00e9senter le moindre semblant d’un caract\u00e8re qui puisse \u00eatre regard\u00e9 comme un enseignement quelconque. L’Irak est une exp\u00e9rience extr\u00eame du chaos pur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe place is unmanageable in part because nobody can be sure who is on whose side. The confusion of loyalties highlights the cause of the continuing horror<\/em>\u00bb, observe Roy Hattersley. Puis il explique pourquoi les Britanniques ont attendu si longtemps avant d’attaquer, avec l’aide de la police de Basra, ce poste connu partout dans Basra pour torturer et ex\u00e9cuter \u00e0 qui mieux mieux : \u00abEverything that happens in Iraq confirms that we should not have gone there in the first place. That message was underlined by the unfortunate press officer who explained or tried to justify the delay in ending the torture and organisation of terror groups and assassination squads that was common practice at al-Jamiat police station. First, he said, we had to be sure of the police.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 27 d\u00e9cembre 2006 \u00e0 05H54<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u00abThe worst diplomatic blunder since Suez? By comparison, Suez had a happy ending.\u00bb Quand on sait \u00e0 quel degr\u00e9 de d\u00e9rision catastrophique est plac\u00e9e (le plus souvent de mani\u00e8re injuste) l’exp\u00e9dition de Suez de 1956 par les historiens britanniques, le jugement de Roy Hattersley dans le Guardian d’aujourd’hui p\u00e8se de tout son poids. Hattersley parle… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5394,857,6266],"class_list":["post-68342","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-basra","tag-irak","tag-police"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68342","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68342"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68342\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68342"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68342"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68342"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}